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This dissertation investigates the evolution of commercial bank regulation by focusing on what 
lawmakers enact, how regulators implement it, and how it evolves.  Much of the scholarly literature 
conceives of regulation either as a tool that is captured by the regulated industry or as a means by which 
government officials castigate business.  According to these conceptions, relatively stable and consistent 
patterns of influence develop whereby one set of actors directs the actions of other actors within this 
policy realm.  Not only do these approaches incompletely model the policymaking process, but they also 
oversimplify the relationships between the actors.  In contrast, I argue that these conceptions of regulation 
are inaccurate and that banking regulation is a case of pluralism.  By examining the periods with multiple 
federal regulators that were also marked by significant instabilities in the banking system, I argue that the 
evolution of regulation is more accurately understood as a process of “partisan mutual adjustment.”   
According to this conception, multiple actors within this policy realm exist in a state of interdependence 
in which they interact consequentially and exert influence upon the others whenever they choose to do so.  
This relationship among the actors explains the unusual policymaking pattern over this period in which 
numerous crises struck the banking sector, yet the actors persisted in their “deregulatory” efforts despite 
these events.  Through this examination of banking regulation, my dissertation suggests policymakers be 
much more cognizant of the interdependencies among the actors and the countermoves that one actor’s 
moves can trigger in this dynamic environment.  This approach prepares policymakers to institute reforms 
more likely to succeed at averting another financial crisis.      
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1. BANKING LAW, ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND THE EVOLUTION OF REGULATION 
Moments after conference committee negotiations concluded over the Dodd-Frank Act 
on June 25, 2010, the Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) 
declared, “It’s a great moment….No one will know until this is actually in place how it works. 
But we believe we’ve done something that has been needed for a long time” (Cho, Yang, & 
Dennis 2010).  Sen. Dodd might have been referring to legislators having failed to read the 2,000 
plus page financial regulatory bill, but his statement’s more likely meaning was that lawmakers 
simply did not know how the regulators would implement the statute.  Thus, the Connecticut 
senator was acknowledging that the process of bank regulation entails much more than mere 
legislation.  That said, however, is there anything about bank regulation that permits us 
anticipate how it will unfold?  How does regulation in the American banking system evolve?  Put 
another way, what statutes do lawmakers enact, how do members of the bureaucracy implement 
this legislation, and how does the regulation evolve? 
 My dissertation contends that much of American banking regulation can be understood 
and its evolution anticipated by knowledge of the policymaking process, the participants, and the 
relationship between them.  Depending on when and where one observes bank regulatory 
policymaking, an individual will see participants cooperating, competing, having heated conflict, 
or taking an active role while their counterparts remain withdrawn from the process.  
Nevertheless, the interdependencies among the actors drive the results of this policymaking 
process.  Over the course of the last century, banking policy has become increasingly complex, 
so it has mainly attracted attention from the banking industry, other financial firms and industries 
competing against banking, and policymakers in elected office and the bureaucracy.  Bank 
regulatory policy emerges from the interaction of these groups and actors.  In my policy study, 
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the regulators tend to be the most significant actors as they not only participate in the crafting of 
regulatory legislation, but implement the statutes through the writing and interpretation of 
various rules.  
I argue that bank regulation can best be viewed as an instance of pluralism.  Because 
bank regulatory policy occurs within a decision making system characterized by the absence of 
central control, separate branches, and a group of federal regulators sharing responsibility and 
power over the banking sector, the type of pluralism known as partisan mutual adjustment more 
specifically characterizes this case.  Partisan mutual adjustment, according to the political 
scientist Charles E. Lindblom, describes a decision making system in which multiple, 
interdependent actors or units coordinate their actions by adjusting to one another (Lindblom 
1965).  Furthermore, interdependence requires that “every decision maker is directly 
consequential for at least one other, and all are related indirectly through at least one chain 
whose links are composed of direct relations” (Lindblom 1965: 22).   
In theory, such a system of decision making could contain elements of central control, the 
absence of a commonly agreed upon criterion for decisions shared by all actors involved makes 
it partisan.  Lindblom uses the term “partisan” to describe the decision making system because 
all actors within it do not share the same agreed upon criterion for deciding.  Though there may 
be a common criterion among the different decision making units, there are undeniably some 
units that have a different criterion and possess the wherewithal to act upon it.  Since no central 
authority exists to compel the entire group of interdependent units to coordinate their actions, the 
actors must consider the other decision makers’ options so as to avoid the worst outcome 
possible.  
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The policymaking system for bank regulation in the United States closely resembles such 
a decision making system.  The American system contains many interdependent units that can 
enter or exit the policymaking process at will, but whose objectives ultimately depend on the 
actions of others in the system.  As a result, coordination of decisions can be rather problematic 
given the interdependent decision making units do not share the same criterion.  At times 
legislators and regulators work together on statutory reform whereas at other times they find 
themselves at loggerheads.  Likewise, sometimes the regulatory agencies coordinate their actions 
toward some particular goal, irrespective of what lawmakers prefer, whereas at other times they 
appear to pursue different policy paths. 
Before examining the ways in which others have explained the development of bank 
regulatory policy, it is worthwhile defining some of the central concepts involved.  The banking 
system is simply the collection of commercial banks playing a predominant role in the nation’s 
payments system.  The payments system, of course, refers to the institutional arrangements by 
which payment transactions in the economy are settled.  These payment transactions typically 
involve debiting and crediting the checking accounts of various entities rather than exchanging 
actual currency.  Commercial banks are but one type depository institution that intermediates 
between savers and investors, but they have historically been the entities responsible for 
providing checking accounts.  Checking accounts, which are also known as demand deposits, are 
the closest item to money next to actual currency because they are accounts that individuals can 
withdraw at any time upon demand.  Unlike other types of depository institutions, though, 
commercial banks have traditionally created much of the nation’s money supply through their 
issuing of checking accounts to businesses and individuals and their investment of those funds in 
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shorter-term commercial loans.  Since 1863, commercial banks have had either a state or federal 
charter.   
By defining a commercial bank in this manner, it then becomes possible to distinguish 
commercial banks from other bank-like entities that resemble banks.  Though the class of 
depository institutions known as thrifts, which includes savings and loan associations (S&Ls), 
mutual savings banks, and credit unions, often resemble banks, they technically differ because 
they neither offer actual checking accounts nor do they invest much, if any, of their deposit 
dollars in commercial loans.   Unlike commercial banks which have always been shareholder 
owned, most thrifts historically have been mutually owned.  It was believed that this ownership 
structure would be most beneficial to thrift institutions seeking to instill the quality of “thrift” 
amongst their members.  During the recent financial crisis, however, much of the news focused 
on Wall Street banks such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch.  These are 
investment banks.  Unlike commercial banks, investment banks are not depository institutions.  
Rather than accept deposits and make loans, investment banks provide long-term capital through 
the securities markets either through the investment of their own funds or putting together 
securities packages to market to buyers in the secondary capital markets.  My dissertation will 
clearly indicate when the institution under discussion is something other than a commercial bank.  
By federal regulators, I mean the three agencies responsible for regulating the banking 
industry: these are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve 
System (the Fed), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).1  These three agencies 
maintain the safety-and-soundness of the banking system.  Lawmakers created each of them as 
responses to different crises plaguing the banking system, and, in so doing, gave them different 
powers to accomplish their missions, not to mention different jurisdictions.  The differing 
                                                 
1
 Federal lawmakers established the OCC in 1863, the Fed in 1913, and the FDIC in 1933. 
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jurisdictions and powers sometimes generated situations in which the three agencies did not 
share the same definitions of the public interest.  In other words, elected officials created 
multiple regulatory agencies over a number of years with different powers and jurisdictions, but 
with similar though distinct objectives.  A consequence of this proliferation was necessarily an 
environment in which the agencies became competitive in the use of their powers and the 
definition of their objectives.  Each of the regulators has done this at times to demonstrate that 
their approach is the superior one. 
Various scholars have focused on this competitive relationship between the agencies to 
explain regulatory policymaking.  In an October 1974 speech to the American Bankers 
Association, Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns described the regulatory system’s problem 
as one of a “competition in laxity” that fostered “subtle competition among regulatory 
authorities, sometimes to relax constraints, sometimes to delay corrective measures” (Burns 
1974: 18).  In other words, Chairman Burns was describing a governmental failure known as a 
race to the bottom.  Economists during the last decade have countered Burns’ “competition in 
laxity” argument.  In a Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly article, John 
Weinberg models competitive interactions between two bank regulators depending on the 
distribution of bank charters, regulators’ objectives, and the funding of regulators’ operating 
expenses.  Though he does not test his model against the available historical record, Weinberg 
finds that a race to the bottom occurs when regulators are unable to cover all of their operating 
costs, but a race to the top can occur when these costs are covered by the funding mechanisms of 
the regulators (Weinberg 2002).  The economist Richard Rosen, on the other hand, questions the 
race to the bottom argument by examining the switching of bank charters among regulators in 
the U.S. from 1983 to 1999.  Rosen finds that the differentiation and specialization of regulatory 
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agencies is beneficial (Rosen 2003).  Though interactions between the federal regulators have at 
times generated harmful effects such as competition, this dissertation does not argue that this 
interplay necessarily leads to a race to the bottom.     
If the argument advanced by this dissertation is correct, then policymakers need to 
reconsider the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  This dissertation 
argues that the dominant problem lies with the interdependences of the actors in this policy 
realm, especially the bureaucratic ones.  Rather than address the problems resulting from such 
interdependencies, Dodd-Frank resembles other efforts since the Great Depression to “reform” 
the banking system by imposing limitations on private behavior and expanding the reach mutual 
dependence of governmental bodies.  Despite these reform attempts, though, crises returned to 
the banking sector, most often with those private sector actors operating within the confines of 
the revised law and regulations.  By failing to simplify and harmonize the bank regulatory 
system, the United States invites future problems in its banking system.  
Since the policy implications of my argument differ significantly from those enacted into 
the statutory code as lawmakers responded to the various problems within the banking sector in 
the past several decades, it should then come as little surprise that the policymakers who enacted 
these regulatory reform laws drew upon rather different narratives to explain the banking 
problems and the reforms necessary to prevent their recurrence.  The two most prominent 
explanatory theories have a storied pedigree, yet have reappeared to explain the recent crisis in 
yet another incarnation.  In the first of these explanations, regulation provides the means to 
pursue some “public interest” and correct market failings.  In the second of these explanations, 
though, regulation is “captured.” Capture supposedly occurs through the regulated industry or 
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some other privileged group gaining control over the regulator and using its influence to extract 
benefits from the larger society.   
Furthermore, all the authors of the following explanations express nostalgia for the 
Banking Act of 1933, often referred to as Glass-Steagall.2  In a nutshell, the Banking Act of 1933 
contained two institutional thrusts and several regulatory ones.3  On the institutional side, the 
legislation created a deposit insurance system and reformed the Federal Reserve System.  Then, 
on the regulatory side, it limited banks’ activities, affiliations, and products offered.  The 
following narratives, however, all conceive of Glass-Steagall almost entirely in terms of the 
restrictions it placed on banks activities, by confining them to the business of taking deposits and 
making loans, while largely ignoring the remainder of the law.  By doing so, they are all able to 
conclude that the “repeal” of Glass-Steagall by the Financial Services Modernization Act of 
1999 led to the recent banking crisis.4  In light of this reasoning, what role, if any, did the 
“repeal” of Glass-Steagall have in causing the recent financial crisis or others of the late 
twentieth century?  Since the eighties, a number of scholars have debunked the factual premise 
that banks’ securities activities underlay Glass-Steagall’s creation (Macey 1984; White 1986; 
Shughart III 1988; Benston 1990).  To date, though, scholars have not completed a thorough and 
accurate factual account of Glass-Steagall’s “repeal.”  As my dissertation intends to show, the 
reforms enacted by the GLBA merely brought the banking statutes in line with the banking 
system’s existing rules and regulations.  Furthermore, Glass-Steagall’s ostensible repeal had 
nothing whatsoever to do with the recent financial sector crisis.    
                                                 
2
 The statute commonly referred to as Glass-Steagall actually is titled the Banking Act of 1933, which FDR enacted 
June 16, 1933.  Because there was a Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 altering the percentage of gold backing required for 
U.S. currency, it is technically incorrect to refer to the 1933 law as the Glass-Steagall Act.  Consequently, this 
dissertation will not perpetuate this mistake, rather it will use the terms Glass-Steagall and the Banking Act of 1933 
to refer to the same statute. 
3
 My dissertation will elaborate further one the framework erected by this statute in its second chapter. 
4
 The Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) of 1999 is also known by its alternative title of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999, taking its name from its three main congressional sponsors. 
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 Shortly after JPMorgan Chase purchased the failing investment bank Bear Stearns, 
presidential candidate Barack Obama spoke on March 27, 2008 at Cooper Union concerning the 
nation’s precarious economy.5  In his campaign address, Obama described deregulation’s 
contribution to the worsening banking crisis in the following manner: 
A decade later [than the nineties] we have deregulated the financial sector and we 
face another crisis.  A regulatory structure set up for banks in the 1930s needed to 
change, because the nature of business had changed.  But by the time the Glass-
Steagall Act was repealed in 1999, the $300 million lobbying effort that drove 
deregulation was more about facilitating mergers [alluding to the merger between 
Citicorp and Travelers Group that formed Citigroup in 1998] than creating an 
efficient regulatory framework.  And since then we’ve overseen 21st century 
innovation….Not surprisingly, the regulatory environment failed to keep pace.  
(Obama 2008) 
Barack Obama’s speech represented one of the earliest attempts by a presidential candidate to 
politicize the developing crisis and attribute its causes to deregulation.   According to Obama, the 
latest financial crisis occurred because banking regulation no longer protected against the market 
failings of the banking system.   
 Other public officials and policy experts, though, soon followed with similar explanations 
of the financial crisis.  Unlike Barack Obama, Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) held federal office 
throughout the 1990s and so voted on several of the “deregulatory” bills of the nineties.  In 
Reckless: How Debt, Deregulation, and Dark Money Nearly Bankrupted America, Sen. Dorgan 
blames a particular statute from the late 1990s: 
                                                 
5
 Bear Stearns was one of the five largest Wall Street investment banks whereas JPMorgan Chase was a financial 
services holding company which possessed subsidiaries in commercial banking, investment banking, and other 
sectors of the financial services industry. 
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Of all the shortsighted, greedy, and downright ignorant actions that helped create the 
economic collapse, none was more pronounced than the action of Congress and 
President Clinton to repeal the banking protections that were put in place after the 
bank failures of the 1930s.  That action came in the form of the Financial Services 
Modernization Act [of 1999].  (Dorgan 2009: 33) 
Thus, the North Dakotan attributes the recent banking crisis to market failings resulting from the 
Financial Services Modernization Act’s statutory repeal of Glass-Steagall.  Given the ideological 
tendencies of Obama and Dorgan, however, an individual familiar with American politics and 
policymaking would not find them unexpected. 
 More surprising, though, are Judge Richard Posner’s recently revised views.  Posner 
founded the law and economics movement and was a longtime champion of neoclassical 
economics.  In A Failure of Capitalism, he argues that “excessive deregulation” of the last few 
decades contributed largely to the crisis (Posner 2009: 289).  According to Judge Posner,  
The seeds of failure were sown in the movement to reduce the regulation of banking 
and credit, which began in the 1970s.  They germinated during the Clinton 
Administration, when the housing bubble began and the deregulation of banking 
culminated in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act…and it was decided not to bring 
the new financial instruments, in particular credit-default swaps, under regulation 
even to the limited extent of moving trading in swaps to exchanges, which would 
have given the public information about the scope, risks, and value of these 
instruments.  (Posner 2009: 270-1) 
In this way, removal of banking regulations, particularly Glass-Steagall, created the environment 
in which the market failed.  As all three of these perspectives envision the banking system, and 
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concluded that the crisis occurred because lawmakers repealed existing regulatory statutes 
protecting against market failures. 
 In contrast to these “public interest” views that explain the banking crisis as the result of 
inadequate regulation that caused the market to fail, the “capture” perspective focuses on the 
corruption of government actors and the very regulatory process itself.  Paradigmatic of the 
capture views on the recent crisis are those that focus, in the words of Nobel prize-winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz, “not only [on] capture by special interests but also by particular 
ideologies” (Stiglitz 2010: 50).   These new applications of the capture approach differ from the 
traditional one which focuses almost exclusively on special interests gaining leverage or control 
over their respective regulators and then using their position to extract material benefits.  The 
newer applications stress ideology over material benefits. 
 According to former IMF chief economist Simon Johnson and his coauthor James Kwak, 
bankers now compose a “new oligarchy” (Johnson & Kwak 2010: 6).6  In 13 Bankers, Johnson 
and Kwak argue: 
[A]s banking became more complicated, more prestigious, and more lucrative, the 
ideology of Wall Street—that unfettered innovation and unregulated financial markets 
were good for America and the world—became the consensus policy in Washington 
on both sides of the political aisle.  Campaign contributions and the revolving door 
between the private sector and government service gave Wall Street banks influence 
in Washington, but their ultimate victory lay in shifting the conventional wisdom in 
their favor, to the point where their lobbyists’ talking points seemed self-evident to 
                                                 
6
 In an earlier Atlantic article titled “The Quiet Coup,” Johnson argues similarly that “the finance industry has 
effectively captured our government” (Johnson 2009: 46).  In this process, according to Johnson, “the American 
financial industry gained political power by amassing a kind of cultural capital—a belief system” (Johnson 2009: 
50).  
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congressmen and administration officials.  (Johnson & Kwak 2010: 5-6) (Italics in the 
original) 
Though bankers captured legislators and regulators through material incentives, they more 
importantly achieved a stranglehold on government by gaining adherents to their free market 
creed within policymaking circles.  This ideological capture, according to Johnson and Kwak, 
made repealing Glass-Steagall possible and eliminated “the safest banking system that America 
has known in its history” (Johnson & Kwak 2010: 35).   
 Writing in his recent book Capital Offense, Newsweek’s national economics 
correspondent Michael Hirsh explains that a “free-market fundamentalism” based on the notion 
that “what’s good for Big Finance is good for America” took hold (Hirsh 2010: 19).  According 
to him,  
The main reason the catastrophe occurred is that the people in charge of our 
economy, otherwise intelligent and capable men…permitted themselves to believe, in 
the face of a rising tide of contrary evidence, that markets are for the most part 
efficient and work well on their own. (Hirsh 2010: 26)   
Like Johnson and Kwak, Hirsh argues that an ideological capture occurred by stating, “The Wall 
Street lobby could not have transformed Washington—and the economy—without the idea of 
free-market fundamentalism behind it” (Hirsh 2010: 27) (Italics in the original).  Hirsh, though, 
proceeds to defend Glass-Steagall vis-à-vis those individuals who, mistakenly in his opinion, 
conclude the statute’s repeal played little role in the crisis.  According to him,  
The blinding complexity and interconnections created by derivatives—precisely 
because they were going to overwhelm government supervisors—demanded that 
there be strong firewalls and capital buffers between Wall Street institutions and their 
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affiliates, and between banks and nonbanks and insurance companies.  Otherwise 
there would be no more islands of safety….The repeal of Glass-Steagall took things 
in precisely the opposite direction.  (Hirsh 2010: 183-184) 
Although ideological capture was the main cause of the recent financial crisis, according to these 
authors, the repeal of Glass-Steagall that resulted from this capture certainly helped create a 
financial environment free of necessary safeguards.  
THIS DISSERTATION’S APPROACH 
 To reach its explanations, this dissertation employs a case study revealing the interaction 
among federal banking regulators and other actors interested in the policy realm.  Though the 
American banking system has been characterized as a dual system due to the existence of 
competing state and federal regulators, the federal agencies have gained the dominant position by 
far in the relationship over the last few decades.  Consequently, the legal scholar Kenneth Scott’s 
model of a dual banking system with competition between state and federal regulators is no 
longer accurate, for as Henry Butler and Jonathan Macey succinctly explain, “Federal 
preemption and uniformity, rather than competition and diversity, are the legal norms in banking 
regulation” (Butler & Macey 1988: 678).   
As evidenced by the time periods covered in my case, the evolution of the banking system 
has been anything but a continuous process.  The economist Benjamin Friedman memorably 
described this discontinuous evolution in the following way:  
A time-traveler from 1940, or even 1900, would probably feel more nearly at home 
on first disembarking in the financial markets than in most other major arenas of 1980 
American economic activity.  He would immediately recognize major classes of 
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financial market participants and their chief activities, including banks taking deposits 
and making loans….  (Friedman 1980: 10) 
Consequently, my case study focuses on periods of great change in the banking system.  
Whereas my first chapter covering the period of 1914-1933 depicts a setting with only the OCC 
and Fed, my other three chapters covering the period 1969-1999 depict a setting where the 
Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the OCC wrestled with the return of instabilities and problems in 
the banking system on a scale not seen since the 1930s.   
Although political scientists have attempted to explain bank regulatory policy, they have 
often focused too heavily on the allocation of regulatory responsibilities to the exclusion of other 
significant elements (Meier 1985; Eisner, Worsham, and Ringquist 2000).  In contrast, my 
dissertation focuses not only on the allocation of regulatory responsibilities, but also on the 
content of regulatory statutes and rules, for it is the specific content of these items that defines 
the avenues regulatory agencies have available to accomplish their tasks.  As the banking law 
scholar Kenneth Scott argued in his 1977 Stanford Law Review article on the dual banking 
system, “one cannot understand the working of the [banking] system without at least a general 
knowledge of the correspondence between the distribution of regulatory functions and the 
structure of agency jurisdiction” (Scott 1977: 5).  Therefore, my dissertation devotes 
considerable attention to banking legislation, especially as it influences or alters regulators’ 
jurisdictions and responsibilities.  Since much of the regulatory process, however, occurs after 
the statutes are delegated to the regulators for implementation, I devote particular attention to the 
decisions and rules produced by the agencies, not to mention the actions they take to fulfill their 
responsibilities.  Doing so provides another window into the regulatory agencies and how the 
agencies understand and pursue their goals. 
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THE STRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
Out of the three federal bank regulatory agencies, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) is the oldest dating back to the Civil War era; the National Currency Act of 
1863 established the bureau within the Treasury Department.7  The new bureau, which was also 
known as the Bureau of the Currency, was led by the Comptroller of the Currency.  The 
president appointed the Comptroller to a five-year term subject to the Senate’s advice and 
consent.  In the event that the Comptroller was unable to fulfill his duties or the position was 
vacant, the Deputy Comptroller would discharge the office’s powers.  The following year, 
however, lawmakers revised the statute and replaced it with the National Bank Act of 1864.8   As 
the National Bank Act’s purpose statement indicated, the statute was intended “to provide a 
National Currency, secured by a Pledge of United States Bonds, and to provide for the 
Circulation and redemption thereof” (U.S. Statutes at Large 13 (1864): 99).  Federal legislators 
created both statutes not as regulatory measures per se, but rather as means of providing a more 
reliable and elastic currency and as a way of generating revenue.  Moreover, the standardized 
design of these national banknotes would also help combat the counterfeiting problem that had 
long plagued state banknotes.   
To foster a distribution network, the legislation directed the Comptroller to charter a 
system of national banks.9  Individuals seeking to obtain a charter were required to put up 
specified amounts of capital, but these levels varied depending on the population of the area in 
which the bank was located.  In order to issue banknotes, however, a national bank had to 
                                                 
7
 The OCC predates the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) by nearly twenty years. 
8
 Except for its purpose statement, the National Bank Act was untitled at the time of its enactment.  A decade later 
lawmakers enacted the National-Bank Currency Act of 1874 that officially renamed the 1864 statute the “National-
Bank Act” (U.S. Statutes at Large 18 (1874): 123).  
9
 To distinguish national banks from their state-chartered counterparts, these institutions were required to use the 
terms “National,” “National Association,” or “N.A.” in their corporate titles.  To protect the value of the title, 
national banks are the only types of banks that may use the term “National” in their corporate names. 
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purchase a requisite amount of federal securities to be placed in the hands of the Comptroller.  
Doing so allowed a national banking association the right to issue a specified number of 
banknotes bearing its own corporate title on the bills.  Although the mandate that national 
banknotes be backed by federal securities on deposit with the Comptroller minimized any losses 
to noteholders, national banks received another mechanism whose “only purpose [was] the 
protection of depositors” (Pike 1932: 516).  According to the National Bank Act,  
The shareholders of each association formed under the provisions of this act…shall 
be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for the another, for 
all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association, to the extent of the amount 
of their stock therein, at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount invested in 
such shares.  (U.S. Statutes at Large 13 (1864): 103) 
This mechanism was known as the double liability of bank shareholders.   
To limit conflicts of interest between OCC officials and their constituents, the National 
Bank Act prohibited the Comptroller and his deputy from “be[ing] interested [directly or 
indirectly] in any association issuing national currency under the provisions of this act” (U.S. 
Statutes at Large 13 (1864): 100).  Although the OCC was located within the Treasury 
Department, it was off-budget and self-funding.  During its first half century, the agency funded 
its activities through the sale of banknotes and the fees it assessed for its examinations of 
national banks that it was required to examine to verify their capital backing for their note issue.  
The OCC maintained a flat fee structure on these examinations regardless of a bank’s asset size. 
Like other nonbanking corporations, national banks possessed standard corporate powers, 
such as the right to own property and the right to sue and be sued.  But lawmakers also endowed 
the new entities with other attributes unique to commercial banks.  Drawing upon many of the 
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existing state free banking statutes, the National Bank Act defined a national bank as possessing 
a combination of enumerated and incidental powers: 
[Every association shall] exercise under this act all such incidental powers as shall be 
necessary to carry on the business of banking by discounting and negotiating 
promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving 
deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on 
personal security; [and] by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the 
provisions of this act.  (U.S. Statutes at Large 13 (1864): 101) (Italics added)10 
The OCC became responsible for interpreting the meaning of these powers.  It was largely 
through the use of the incidental powers clause that national associations and the Comptroller 
wishing to expand national banks’ permissible activities relied.  Moreover, national banks did 
not receive their first major statutory grant to enter another financial services industry until 
1913’s Federal Reserve Act when they gained the ability to enter the trust and fiduciary business 
on a very limited extent.  At the same time, they obtained the power to make agricultural loans 
secured by farm land.  
 A half century after establishing the national banking system, federal legislators were still 
dissatisfied with the safety-and-soundness of the banking system, so they created the Federal 
Reserve System in late 1913.11  According to the statute’s preamble, lawmakers sought “[t]o 
provide for the establishment of Federal Reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford 
means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in 
the United States, and for other purposes” (U.S. Statutes at Large 38 (1913): 251).  Yet, as the 
                                                 
10
 National banks’ corporate powers appear under Title 12, Section 24, Paragraph 7 of the U.S. Code. 
11
 In particular, lawmakers were reacting to the effects of the Panic of 1907 in which the banker J.P. Morgan and his 
associates were forced to act as a pseudo-lender of last resort for the nation.  For a recent account of the Panic of 
1907, see Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr.  2007.  The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect 
Storm.  Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
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economist and Federal Reserve historian Allan Meltzer explains, “Omission of a broad statement 
of purpose or policy objective was not an oversight.  The act represented a compromise between 
many different groups that had very different purposes in mind” (Meltzer 2003: 65).  The 
organization’s lack of focus was evident in the construction of the system of reserve banks.  The 
Federal Reserve System was to be a self-funding, independent agency with a public-private 
hybrid governance structure. 
The Federal Reserve Act directed the Treasury Secretary, the Agriculture Secretary, and 
the Comptroller to form a committee, select between eight and twelve cities to serve as locations 
for reserve banks, and then to divide the continental U.S. into districts with each district having 
one reserve bank.  The legislation designed the reserve banks with nine person boards of 
directors.  Each board was divided equally into three groups.  The three Class A members were 
to be selected from stock holding banks within each district, the Class B members were to be 
actively engaged in some commercial activity within each district at the time of appointment, 
and the three Class C members were to be selected by the Federal Reserve Board.  The act 
further imposed a sunset provision on the reserve banks’ charters of twenty years.   Having first 
authorized the creation of a system of reserve banks, lawmakers ordered the creation of a Federal 
Reserve Board (FRB) to help direct the reserve banks.12  The Board consisted of seven members, 
five of whom the president appointed subject to Senate confirmation and two of whom, namely 
the Comptroller and the Treasury Secretary, served in an ex officio capacity.  The presidential 
appointees had staggered terms of ten years in duration.  The Federal Reserve Act, however, 
                                                 
12
 Until 1935, the chairman of the FRB used the title of governor and his vice chairman used the title of vice 
governor.  With the enactment of the Banking Act of 1935, however, the titles were changed to chairman and vice 
chairman, respectively, and the Federal Reserve Board was renamed the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.  The Banking Act of 1935 also removed the two ex officio members from the Board.  Though the Board’s 
name is officially the Board of Governors since 1935, for the sake of brevity, my dissertation will employ both terms 
interchangeably when referring to the entity. 
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failed to specify the specific principal agent relationship between the reserve banks and the FRB, 
thus leading to subsequent coordination problems.  
Designed to operate according to the dictates of real bills, the Federal Reserve was 
supposed to provide a more stable banking system and a more reliable money supply 
“discount[ing] notes, drafts, and bills of exchange arising out of actual commercial transactions” 
(U.S. Statutes at Large 38 (1913): 263).  To replace national banknotes and add currency during 
times of economic duress, the reserve banks gained authority to issue a new paper currency 
backed by government securities known as the Federal Reserve Note.13  In so doing, the Federal 
Reserve Act rendered the Comptroller irrelevant in monetary matters and made him little more 
than a chartering and regulatory authority for banks.  Each reserve bank also obtained authority 
to conduct open markets operations under rules and regulations prescribed by the FRB.  Through 
open market operations, reserve banks could buy or sell government securities, gold, or other 
bills and drafts in the money market, but the decision-making resided in the individual reserve 
banks’ boards.  Although the Federal Reserve’s founders did not envision this policy tool 
becoming its dominant option, the ability it allowed the Fed to affect the money supply through 
the purchase and sale of government securities made it very alluring.  Furthermore, open market 
operations provided the Fed with a means of self-funding by collecting margins on the 
government securities in which it dealt. 
Although the Federal Reserve lacked the authority to charter any banks, its founders 
created an immediate constituency by stipulating that all national banks become members.  They 
also permitted state-chartered commercial banks or savings banks to join the System provided 
these entities met certain examination standards and subscribed to the capital stock of the reserve 
                                                 
13
 National banknotes had been in decline for years as the opportunity cost of investing in federal securities drove 
national banks to minimize their government holdings and instead redirect their resources to more productive credit 
uses; by the mid thirties, national banknotes disappeared entirely from circulation. 
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bank located in their respective districts.  Thereafter, banks belonging to the Federal Reserve 
System were known as “member banks.”  To help the reserve banks determine the quality of 
potential borrowers’ collateral, the Federal Reserve Act required member banks to submit to 
regular examinations; it assigned the Comptroller responsibility for conducting the examinations, 
including those of state member banks.14  Furthermore, the statute changed the OCC’s 
examination fee schedule from that of a flat fee to a variable one based on the size of a bank’s 
assets.  Consequently, the additional examination responsibilities given to the OCC resulted in 
greater revenue for the agency, but also threatened state banks with having to cover the costs of 
two separate examinations.   
To manage the banking system’s role in money creation better, the Fed received two 
policy tools of note. The System obtained the ability to impose reserve requirements, what the 
Federal Reserve Act refers to as “bank reserves,” on member banks.  Reserves required member 
banks to maintain a portion of their deposits interest-free as legal reserves for the protection of 
depositors.  Thus, bank reserves provided both a liquidity protection, but also a means by which 
the Fed could alter the amount of money in circulation by changing the amount of reserves it 
required of members.15  In addition, the legislation directed the Fed banks to create discount 
windows where member banks facing liquidity shortages or having deficient reserve accounts 
could borrow.  The Reserve banks lent to member banks against specified asset categories by 
rediscounting against the item and lending a portion of its value; the rate charged in this process 
is known as the discount rate.  At the Fed’s inception, the discount rate was supposed to be the 
primary means by which it accomplished its monetary objectives.  It was through the discount 
window that the Federal Reserve served as the lender of last resort to members.  As former Fed 
                                                 
14
 The reserve banks, however, received the authority, if the chose to exercise it, to except a state bank examiner’s 
report in lieu of an OCC one. 
15
 In practice, however, the Fed has rarely altered reserve requirements. 
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Chairman Paul Volcker explains, though, the lender of last result role is rather difficult to carry 
out, for “I’m not sure I’ve ever seen a pure liquidity problem.  Typically, significant liquidity 
problems arise because there is some question of solvency, or there would be no lack of willing 
lenders” (Volcker & Gyohten 1992: 204).  Partly because the Federal Reserve failed its role as 
lender of last resort in the early years of the Great Depression, lawmakers responded to the 
banking panics by creating the third and most recent federal regulatory agency. 
 Established by the Banking Act of 1933 to administer the Temporary Deposit Insurance 
Fund, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is the newest of the three federal bank 
regulatory agencies.16  This independent agency had a three member board of directors, 
composed of the Comptroller and two presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation.  
Because Glass-Steagall was primarily a reform of the Federal Reserve System, lawmakers 
required all member banks to join the new system of deposit insurance.  They also gave 
nonmember banks the option of joining, but required those that joined the insurance fund to 
become Federal Reserve members by 1938.  In addition to receiving an appropriation at its 
inception from the Treasury of $150,000,000, the FDIC also generated revenue by requiring the 
banks it insured to purchase stock in the agency.  Because insured banks were not charged 
premiums based on their condition or the riskiness of their assets, a condition now referred to as 
moral hazard was created.  Needless to say, policymakers have been unable to eliminate the 
moral hazard through the years, and the subsequent increases in deposit coverage have only 
increased the agency’s exposure to bank failures.    
The agency became the chief federal regulator of insured nonmember state banks. It did not 
participate in the chartering of banks because doing so might constitute a conflict of interest 
when placing an institution into receivership.  The FDIC has two roles: 
                                                 
16
 The FDIC is oftentimes referred to simply as the “Corporation” in the banking statutes. 
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to purchase, hold, and liquidate…the assets of national banks which have been closed 
by action of the Comptroller of the Currency, or by vote of their directors, and the 
assets of State member banks which have been closed by action of the appropriate 
State authorities, or by vote of their directors…and to insure…the deposits of all 
banks which are entitled to the benefits of insurance under this section (U.S. Statutes 
at Large 48 (1933): 168). 
These dual roles actually represent distinct functions that could just as easily be separate.  
Through the 1950s, the FDIC possessed two tools for resolving bank failures.  These included 
closing the bank permanently and providing a deposit payoff up to the statutorily mandated 
coverage limit or carrying out a purchase and assumption whereby the FDIC sells all the assets 
of the failed bank while providing a subsidy for some portion of the bank’s bad assets.  
Employing the purchase and assumption method allows the FDIC essentially to transfer 
customer deposits above and beyond the deposit insurance limits.  As the economist William 
Keeton explains, “Under the current system, the effective level of coverage depends on two 
factors—the statutory insurance limit and the way the FDIC handles bank failures” (Keeton 
1990: 25).   
PLAN OF THIS DISSERTATION 
 With the preliminaries now complete, I now turn to outlining briefly the contents of my 
remaining chapters.  The next four chapters present the interplay between federal regulators and 
the other interested policy actors.  My second chapter investigates the effect of policymakers’ 
interplay on bank regulation during 1914-1933.  Because the Federal Reserve Banks did not 
commence operations until November 1914, interaction of any sort between federal regulatory 
agencies was moot until then.  In the period before the Depression, the real bills doctrine 
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significantly influenced policymakers’ views of the banking system by dictating that banks 
strictly limit themselves to extending credit for commercial purposes.  With the outbreak of 
WWI and America’s entry into the war in 1917, elected officials and regulators found 
themselves deviating from the doctrine as they enlisted banks’ assistance in the financing of the 
war effort.  It was due in large part to this wartime experience that banks obtained their first real 
experience with other sectors of the financial services industry, such as the securities sector.  
When the First World War ended, banks continued to venture further into the other financial 
services industries with the help of the two federal regulators.  Lawmakers responded to these 
developments with a series of statutory changes updating the U.S. Code so that it was more 
closely in line with the existing regulatory rules.  This process culminated with 1927’s 
McFadden Act that not only granted national banks limited intra-city branching rights, but also 
explicitly approved banks’ authority to engage in the securities business.  Needless to say, real 
bills adherents disapproved of these developments, for they believed that such expansions of 
banking harmed the banking system and fueled speculation.  Because real bills adherents lacked 
the necessary policy influence that followed the stock market crash, they were able to do little 
other than to express their dismay for much of this period.   
My chapter proceeds to recount the process by which lawmakers responded to the 
worsening banking system through a series of bills, ultimately culminating in the Banking Act of 
1933 that created the FDIC and separated commercial banking from other financial services 
industries.  Although the chapter’s principal story ends with Glass-Steagall’s enactment, the 
narrative reviews the contents of a few subsequent New Deal pieces of banking legislation that 
significantly affected the structure and distribution of the banking regulation throughout the rest 
of twentieth century.   
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 Following WWII, the banking system settled into a stable, yet profitable period that 
lasted for nearly three decades.  My third chapter then examines the Nixon/Ford/Carter years of 
1969-1980.  During this period, volatile interest rates arose and wreaked havoc on a banking 
industry constrained by Glass-Steagall’s rate ceilings and activity restrictions that limited banks 
to deposit taking and loan making.  Furthermore, bank failures reappeared on a scale not seen 
since the Great Depression.  In response to these developments, bankers sought new activities 
and products to meet their profitability needs.     
 Because federal lawmakers failed to enact legislation expanding banks’ permissible 
activities, regulators instead dominated this process.  This interplay heightened as a result of 
1970’s statutory reform that gave the Fed complete regulatory authority over bank holding 
companies.  Meanwhile, regulators also contended over the resolution methods used to resolve a 
number of prominent bank failures of the era.  As the seventies concluded, legislators extended 
the domestic banking regulatory framework to encompass foreign banks operating in the U.S.  
Then, in President Carter’s last year in office, federal lawmakers enacted the first in a series of 
major pieces of regulatory reform legislation.   
My fourth chapter examines the twelve years of the Reagan and Bush presidencies.  The 
period commenced with interest rates at all time, double-digit highs and banks struggling to 
remain solvent given the rate differentials they faced.  Just after the Fed relented and rates begin 
falling, the LDC debt crisis occurred revealing other potential flaws in the banking system as 
large American money center banks had lent vast sums internationally to earn returns greater 
than domestic lending allowed.  Although thrifts had begun showing serious financial problems 
when Reagan took office, their condition worsened such that by the middle of the 1980s 
hundreds were failing.  Soon after, banks began failing in large numbers too.  Because the bank 
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and thrift failures increased at the end of Reagan’s second term, the brunt of resolving the 
failures fell on his successor. 
The period 1981-1992 proved to be one of the most active since the New Deal as 
reflected by significant banking legislation.  In Reagan’s second year in office, lawmakers 
enacted another major deregulatory bill; this one focused on the thrift industry, yet it still 
contained a number of important provisions for the banking sector.  The other four pieces of 
major banking legislation all essentially sought to strengthen and extend banking regulation in 
the face of first the LDC debt crisis and then the bank and thrift crises.  Although the two major 
pieces of banking legislation promoted by the Bush Administration originally sought to 
modernize the banking system, opposition within Congress ultimately forced the administration 
and its Capitol Hill supporters to abandon these efforts.  Throughout this entire period, there was 
significant interplay among regulators seeking to resolve the many bank failures.  Faced with 
more legislative inaction in the face of their efforts to expand banks’ activities and grant them 
more possible revenue streams, regulators took it upon themselves as they interacted with one 
another to expand their constituents’ business activities.      
  Chapter 5 investigates the banking system of the Clinton years.  The nation only just 
exited a recession and the banking and thrift industries were still littered with hundreds of 
failures.  Consequently, the new president entered office having to complete the task of resolving 
all these failures.  The Democratic Party controlled both Houses of Congress and the White 
House prior to Clinton’s first midterm election, creating new lawmaking possibilities after years 
of divided government.   
 The period 1993-1999 proved to be a very active time as regulators interacted with one 
another to influence the direction of the banking system.  Although the number of bank failures 
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declined after Clinton took office.  The regulators maintained their interplay as they used their 
statutory authority to write new rules and thereby shape the banking industry.  By far, most of 
the interaction in this realm occurred between the OCC and the Federal Reserve, which struggled 
to reshape the banking system.  Two pieces of legislation were particularly significant, measures 
repealing banking regulations that existed since the 1920s and 1930s.  The first of these repealed 
the 1927 McFadden Act limiting intrastate and interstate bank branching. The second, Gramm-
Leach-Bliley, repealed some of the remaining provisions of Glass-Steagall.  In so doing, 
however, Gramm-Leach-Bliley basically updated the statute books so that they accorded with the 
existing body of regulations.  My fifth chapter concludes by discussing the changes in the 
regulatory structure that resulted from Gramm-Leach-Bliley.      
 In the concluding chapter, I begin by reviewing the process by which U.S. banking 
regulation evolved as interplay between the regulators and other actors.  Then, I consider what 
contribution, if any, the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and Glass-Steagall’s “repeal” made 
to the recent financial crisis.  Finally, I draw upon my case to discuss a few likely developments 
in bank regulation in light of the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Act. 
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2. BANKING REGULATION WITH TWO FEDERAL AGENCIES: 1914-1933 
 This chapter presents banking regulation as it evolved through the interplay of two 
regulatory agencies and lawmakers from the outbreak of WWI until President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s first year in office.  Since Glass-Steagall established the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) in 1933, the two federal regulatory agencies involved in this era were the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Reserve.   
This chapter begins by introducing the real bills doctrine, the leading banking theory of 
the time, through which key policymakers interpreted events.  It proceeds to examine the ways in 
which commercial banking expanded beyond the confines of the real bills doctrine.  This 
evolution occurred through statutory reforms, most notably a series of statutes expanding the 
types of assets the Federal Reserve could discount for member banks, and regulatory rulings 
offered by the two federal agencies.  Throughout the twenties, commercial banks continued to 
expand the extent of their activities, not to mention establish affiliates for the purposes of 
entering the securities business.  From the stock market crash of 1929 until the enactment of the 
Banking Act of 1933, the chapter focuses on the interplay among lawmakers since the two 
regulators had basically proven themselves ineffective at stemming the banking crises. 
In the period recounted here, commercial banks enjoyed their widest range of powers 
from 1927 until 1933.  It was the McFadden-Pepper Act (McFadden Act) of 1927 that codified 
many of the previous regulatory rulings by the Comptroller of the Currency, including the ability 
of national branch to engage in intra-city branching to a limited extent and the power to engage 
directly in the securities business.  The statute also altered other aspects of the regulatory 
structure by granting the Federal Reserve banks permanent charters.  Despite the McFadden 
Act’s conferral of securities powers, adherents of the real bills doctrine still dominated banking 
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policy, and disapproved of banks expanding beyond demand deposits and short-term commercial 
loans.  Because no other theory of banking displaced them and they were the only individuals 
issuing warnings before the stock market crash of 1929, their perspective greatly influenced 
subsequent legislative responses.  It was this doctrine that Sen. Carter Glass (D-VA) championed 
through the early thirties that produced Banking Act of 1933 with it banking restrictions.  
Though the Democrats controlled both elected branches of the federal government when the 
Banking Act was enacted, compromises with a number of key personnel such as Rep. Henry 
Steagall (D-AL) forced Glass and his supporters to compromise their banking doctrine and 
include other reforms like a deposit guarantee.  
BANKING FROM WWI THROUGH THE LATE TWENTIES  
 To understand the banking system during the first third of the twentieth century, it is 
necessary to begin with the real bills doctrine.17  This theory, after all, greatly influenced 
policymakers’ views on the proper role of banks in the economy.  Real bills dates back to Adam 
Smith; he memorably illustrated the doctrine using the following analogy: 
The coffers of the bank, so far as its dealings are confined to such customers [i.e. 
merchants], resemble a water pond, from which, though a stream is continually 
running out, yet another is continually running in, fully equal to that which runs out; 
so that, without any further care or attention, the pond keeps always equally, or very 
nearly equally full.  (Smith 1979: 304)  
The doctrine view the money and banking systems as self-adjusting.  According to the economist 
Lloyd Mints, individuals espousing the real bills theory believed, 
                                                 
17
 This theory was also known by other names such as the “commercial loan theory of banking” and the “qualitative 
theory.” 
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If only “real” bills are discounted, the expansion of bank money will be in proportion 
to any extension in trade that may take place, or to the “needs of trade,” and that, 
when trade contracts, bank loans will be correspondingly paid off.  Closely associated 
with this point of view is the doctrine that, if only commercial loans are made, the 
currency will have a desirable elasticity and the banks will at all times be in a liquid 
condition.  (Mints 1945: 9)   
As a result, real bills dictated commercial banks concentrate on extending credit for short-term 
purposes in commerce and trade, thereby providing commercial loans.  The theory’s implication, 
as Susan Hoffman explains, is that “bankers, not the government, determine the money supply” 
(Hoffman 2001: 105).  Though the Federal Reserve Act gave Fed officials the discount function, 
their role was supposed to be rather passive as the statute limited the types of assets against 
which they discounted.     
Lawmakers created the Federal Reserve System in December 1913, but the Reserve 
Banks did not commence operations until November 16, 1914.  Though the Federal Reserve and 
Comptroller of the Currency shared jurisdiction over the banking industry and space in the 
Treasury Building in Washington, conflicts arose almost immediately between the two 
regulatory agencies over the examination of member banks.  The Federal Reserve Act, after all, 
had assigned the Comptroller’s Office the duty of examining member banks and altered its fee 
structure so that banks no longer paid a flat rate but rather paid based on the amount of assets 
they possessed.  Making matters worse, the Comptroller of the Currency at the time, John 
Skelton Williams, notified all member banks “to send the Federal Reserve Agents of their 
districts a duplicate of the next report of condition, omitting certain schedules such as interest 
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rates charged, number of depositors, bills rediscounted, and liabilities of directors as payers or 
endorsers” (Robertson 1995: 107).  According to OCC historian Ross Robertson,  
[I]t was the position of the Comptroller’s staff…that Federal Reserve officials were 
not empowered to scrutinize highly confidential portions of examination reports.  The 
only information really necessary for Reserve Bank use, they held, was that required 
in the extension of credit via the discount window.  (Robertson 1995: 108) 
Though this struggle may appear non-political, it resulted partly from the Federal Reserve’s 
corporate structure.  Because three directors of each reserve bank were drawn from the 
respective district’s banking industry, there was little to constrain them from abusing their 
positions and exploiting the examination report information.  This conflict over bank 
examinations persisted through the late thirties.     
This competition between the OCC and the Fed undeniably reflected a coordination 
problem, but it was by no means the most important type of competition affecting the banking 
industry’s evolution.  Instead, the more significant yet less noticed competition influenced the 
activities in which member banks engaged.  Whereas the Comptroller exercised more direct 
control over national banks’ activities, the Federal Reserve influenced member banks indirectly 
by conducting the rediscounting of banks’ assets.  Although the Fed controlled the rate charged 
in the discounting process, lawmakers controlled the determination of what assets were 
permissible for discounting.  The resulting interplay form these two agencies resulted in a 
competition that contributed to the banking industry’s expansion beyond the confines of real 
bills.   
By enacting amendments to the Federal Reserve Act on September 7, 1916, lawmakers 
revised both the national banking and Federal Reserve Systems, thereby leading the banking 
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system further from the principles envisioned by real bills.  First, the statute granted national 
banks the authority to enter the insurance industry by declaring, 
[I]n addition to the powers now vested by law in national banking associations 
organized under the laws of the United States any such association located and doing 
business in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand 
inhabitants, as shown by the last preceding decennial census, may, under such rules 
and regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the 
agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company authorized by the authorities of 
the State in which said bank is located to do business in said State.  (U.S. Statutes at 
Large 39 (1916): 753) 
Second, the legislation empowered national banks to issue mortgages and “make loans secured 
by improved and unencumbered real estate located within one hundred miles of the place in 
which such bank is located, irrespective of [Reserve] district lines” (U.S. Statutes at Large 39 
(1916): 755).  The statute limited national banks to devoting no more than twenty-five percent of 
their capital to such real estate loans.  The amendments also expanded the Federal Reserve’s 
discounting powers so that member banks could receive advances secured against good collateral 
rather than discounting their existing assets.  This new tool proved helpful when the Fed later 
tried to sell war bonds, for it allowed member banks to purchase more government bonds in 
anticipation of reselling them in the near future.  Thus, banks could borrow on the government’s 
obligations rather than against their own assets. 
When the United States entered WWI in April 1917, the Federal Reserve’s role evolved 
as the institution became the Treasury’s fiscal agent.  The Fed sacrificed some of its 
independence in the process, but gained prominence as it assumed the role of a more traditional 
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central bank.  To finance the war, the Treasury issued enormous amounts of debt through a series 
of bond drives.18  The Reserve Banks and their chief executives organized the bond drives and 
enlisted member banks help selling the bonds to the American public.  As the Federal Reserve 
explained its wartime policies of promoting bond sale afterwards,  
From the outset, [the FRB] recognized its duty to cooperate unreservedly with the 
Government to provide funds needed for the war and freely conceded that the great 
national emergency made it necessary to suspend the application of well-recognized 
principles of economics and finance which usually govern banking operations in 
times of peace.  (Federal Reserve Board 1921: 11)  
Thus, the Fed did everything in its power to discount loans and provide advances to facilitate the 
purchase of the government bonds.  Perhaps the economic historian Harold Moulton was right 
when he wrote, “The most that can be said against the system is that it made the financing of the 
war too easy, encouraging the use of bonds for that purpose” (Moulton 1938: 392). 
It was through the bond drives of the First World War that many banks gained significant 
exposure and experience to the securities industry.  As the political economist Nelson Peach 
explains, 
[N]ot only did they become familiar with the technique of distributing securities, but 
they gained many contacts with investors and won their confidence, partly because of 
their patriotic mission, partly because they offered bonds of unquestioned soundness.  
Individuals, formerly prejudiced against all types of securities, became security 
minded and potential customers for future issues of corporate securities.  The banks, 
having once overcome the traditional skepticism of large masses of people who had 
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 The federal bonds were known as Liberty Bonds and Victory Bonds. The federal government issued four rounds 
of Liberty Bonds: the first one in May-June 1917, the second one in October 1917, the third one in April-May 1918, 
and the final one in September-October 1918.  The Victory Bonds were issued in April-May 1919. 
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saved money, found it easy to approach them a second time with other securities.  
(Peach 1941: 32-33) 
Although many banks distributed the war bonds through the traditional commercial bank 
structure, others developed different organizational forms for the purpose.   
One option was for banks to create an internal bond department.  Because the bond 
department structure was internal to the bank, it lacked corporate separateness and its profits and 
losses were directly reflected on the bank’s balance sheet.  Being merely a division of the 
commercial bank, the department had the same officers and directors.  Since the department was 
internal to the bank, it was limited to dealing solely in debt obligations.  Though debt obligations 
were technically securities, they represented fixed claims rather than residual claims.  National 
banks were allowed to invest and deal in such fixed claims from their very inception with the 
requirement that they possess U.S. government securities before issuing banknotes. 
For those banks desiring to enter more areas of the securities industry than simply the 
bond business, though, the affiliate structure was preferable.  An affiliate was a separately 
incorporated and capitalized entity, hence it possessed a corporate separateness from its parent 
bank.19  Though banks created affiliates for a host of different activities, this corporate form first 
became popular as a means for national banks entering the trust business.   The fiduciary 
business was popular among state-chartered institutions, for it allowed them to engage in almost 
all financial services activities, but national banks explicitly lacked such authority.  Trust 
companies were nothing more than state-chartered banks.  Therefore, national banks created trust 
affiliates as state-chartered banks to compete in the trust business.  In 1903, the First National 
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 In recent decades, the banking industry has had a similar organization known as the “Section 20” subsidiary.  This 
entity is a subsidiary of the bank holding company, so it is regulated by the Board of Governors, yet it is affiliated 
with the banks within the holding company.  These “Section 20” subsidiaries were permitted to engage in activities 
impermissible to banks under Glass-Steagall’s Section 20. 
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Bank of Chicago gave birth to the first trust affiliates when it chartered the First Trust and 
Savings Bank of Chicago (White 1984: 93).  With the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act, 
national banks received the authority to conduct fiduciary business, thereby leading a number of 
them to absorb their trust affiliates.20  Some national banks, however, wanted to preserve their 
ability to engage in other aspects of the securities business still prohibited to them, so these ones 
absorbed their trust affiliates and spun off their securities activities by establishing securities 
affiliates.   
The securities affiliate, though, definitely predated enactment of the Federal Reserve Act 
that allowed national banks to absorb portions of their trust affiliates and spin off other segments 
of them.  Even though state-chartered banks could engage in a wider range of activities, such as 
the trust business, even their charters prohibited certain activities.  As a result, national banks 
developed the securities affiliate, which they chartered under general state incorporation laws 
rather than banking laws.  In early 1908, the First National Bank of New York incorporated First 
Securities Company, the first significant securities affiliate (Osterweis 1932).  Some three years 
later in July 1911, the National City Bank of New York chartered the National City Company to 
serve as its securities affiliate.  According to the Harold van Cleveland and Thomas Huertas, co-
authors of an institutional history of Citibank, National City Corporation differed from other 
securities affiliates in two important ways: National City Bank, being the nation’s biggest bank, 
formed the largest affiliate, and the affiliate quickly became a holding company for stocks of 
bank located across the country (Cleveland & Huertas 1985: 64).  The other large New York 
City based commercial bank, the Chase National Bank of New York, did not charter its securities 
affiliate the Chase Securities Corporation (CSC) until May 1917.  The CSC dealt principally as a 
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 When national banks absorbed their trust affiliates, they often changed their corporate titles from “national bank” 
to “national bank and trust company.” 
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corporate underwriter and manager of large securities issues for the first ten years of its existence 
(Wilson, 1986: 13).  In other words, the CSC conducted little, if any, securities business with the 
general public during the period.  According to the banking industry expert Steven Osterweis, 
“the growth of the [securities affiliate] movement was moderate until the post-war decade of 
common stocks when it was given a great impetus” (Osterweis 1932: 125).  The growth of 
commercial banks’ involvement in the securities industry can be seen in the following table.  The 
data on this type of commercial bank activity is somewhat sparse in part because the activities 
fell outside of the purview of federal authorities.   
Table 1: Number of Commercial Banks Engaged in the Securities Business, 1922-33 
 National National State State  
Year Directly 
Engaged 
Security 
Affiliate 
Directly 
Engaged 
Security 
Affiliate 
Total 
1922 62 10 197 8 277 
1923 78 17 210 9 314 
1924 97 26 236 13 372 
1925 112 33 254 14 413 
1926 128 45 274 17 464 
1927 121 60 290 22 493 
1928 150 69 310 32 561 
1929 151 84 308 48 591 
1930 126 105 260 75 566 
1931 123 114 230 58 525 
1932 109 104 209 53 475 
1933 102 76 169 32 379 
Source: Peach, W. Nelson.  1941.  The Security Affiliates of National Banks.  Baltimore, MD; Johns Hopkins Press.  
P. 83.   
 
The changing needs of the banking system were not lost on policymakers.  From the First 
World War onwards, federal lawmakers enacted a number of statutory revisions for the Federal 
Reserve and the national banking systems.  To aid financing U.S. involvement in the war, for 
instance, Washington amended the Federal Reserve Act in June 1917.  This bill expanded the list 
of assets that the Reserve Banks could discount, thereby making extensions of credit easier.  Yet 
it also sought to entice state nonmember banks to join the Federal Reserve, promising “any bank 
becoming a member of the Federal Reserve System shall retain its full charter and statutory 
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rights as a State bank or trust company, and may continue to exercise all corporate powers 
granted it by the State in which it was created” (U.S. Statutes at Large 40 (1917): 234).  In late 
September of the following year, legislators passed another bill amending the Federal Reserve; 
this law further expanded national banks’ fiduciary powers and explicitly declared national banks 
to have trust powers equal to their state-chartered competitors.  Then, in 1920 and 1921, to help 
finance the remaining government war bonds still circulating, lawmakers enacted measures 
specifically extending discounting authority to encompass Liberty Bonds.  The federal 
government thus made the securities business more enticing and profitable for banks purchasing 
or distributing government bonds.  On March 4, 1923, federal lawmakers enacted yet another 
legislative reform of the Federal Reserve System.  The Agricultural Credits Act of 1923 was 
designed to make more credit available for the struggling agricultural industry, which had been 
suffering since the decline of commodity prices following the war.  In addition to creating new 
facilities to provide direct extensions of credit to farmers, this statute granted the Reserve Banks 
the ability to discount and make advances to “producers of staple agricultural products in their 
raw state” (U.S. Statutes at Large 42 (1923): 1479).  Policymakers were once again facilitating 
the Federal Reserve and member banks in extending credit for purposes other than commercial 
loans.       
This legislative trend essentially culminated on February 27, 1927 when President 
Coolidge signed the McFadden Act.21  The statute provided national banks limited branching 
authority; it granted national banks intra-city branching rights provided that their respective 
state-chartered counterparts possessed the same ability.  The law also permitted state banks 
converting to national banks or the merger of two or more national associations to keep their 
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 Although commonly known as the McFadden Act of 1927, the law’s complete title is the McFadden-Pepper Act 
based on its two congressional sponsors, House Banking Committee Chairman Louis T. McFadden (R-PA) and Sen. 
George W. Pepper (R-PA). 
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existing offices and operate them as branches.  Though the law is chiefly remembered as the first 
one granting national banks the right to open branches, it did so only to a very limited extent.   
Aside from the branching matter, the McFadden-Pepper Act brought about a number of 
other significant changes to the banking system.  It repealed the Federal Reserve Act’s twenty-
year charter for Reserve Banks; it also changed national banking association charters to an 
indefinite length.  Continuing the trend of broadening discount authority, the McFadden Act 
granted the Reserve Banks greater leeway to discount bank assets and provide advances to 
members, thereby encouraging member banks to extend credit for other purposes than mere 
commercial ones.   
Most importantly, McFadden codified many of the securities powers acquired by national 
banks and their affiliates over the preceding decade.  The relevant section of the statute stated,  
That the business of buying and selling investment securities shall hereafter be 
limited to buying and selling without recourse marketable obligations evidencing 
indebtedness of any person, copartnership, association, or corporation, in the form of 
bonds, notes and/or debentures, commonly known as investment securities, under 
such further definition of the term ‘investment securities’ as may by regulation be 
prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency.  (U.S. Statutes at Large 44 (1927): 
1226) 
The McFadden Act proceeded to limit national banks to investing no more than twenty-five 
percent of their capital stock and unimpaired surplus in the securities of any single debtor.  The 
statute, however, exempted securities issued by the federal or state governments from this 
limitation.  Nearly four months after the McFadden Act became law, the Comptroller issued 
regulations on June 30 defining “marketable” securities.  According to him, “marketable” 
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securities met three criteria: they would be of a large enough quantity so that a market for them 
would be possible; they would be issued in such a way as to uphold the marketability of them; 
and, the agreement under which they were issued would separate the party paying the obligation 
from the party performing the fiduciary responsibility (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
1928: 11).  Not only did more commercial banks enter the securities business in McFadden’s 
wake, but those banks all ready active in the securities industry altered their activities.  The 
Chase Securities Corporation, for instance, experienced a change in policy and expanded its 
business from underwriting corporate issues to retail distribution of securities to individual 
Americans (Wilson 1986: 13).   
 Although the 1920s was supposedly a decade marked by a robust American economy, the 
banking industry as evidenced by the number of suspensions experienced significant trauma.  
Though these difficulties affected all commercial banks, state-chartered ones experienced more 
of the effects than nationally chartered ones.  Moreover, nonmember banks suffered considerably 
more suspensions than member banks did.  As the economist Walter Spahr explained in a 1932 
American Economic Review article,  
(1) The heaviest failures, absolutely and relatively, are among the state banks; (2) the 
failures are greatest among banks with small capitalization; (3) they are heaviest in 
small towns and villages; [and] (4) they are heaviest among banks outside the Federal 
Reserve system. (Spahr 1932: 215) 
Not only did hundreds of banks suspend payments and fail, but the state-level deposit insurance 
programs either failed or ceased operations by the close of the decade.  In the aftermath of the 
Panic of 1907 while federal policymakers were contemplating reforms that culminated in the 
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Federal Reserve, eight states instituted deposit insurance programs for state-chartered banks.22  
The eight states were Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, Texas, Mississippi, South Dakota, North 
Dakota, and Washington.23  The deposit insurance programs all derived most of their funding 
from assessments levied on the state-chartered banks that were members.  Some of the programs 
made membership optional whereas others made it mandatory.  Irrespective of membership, 
though, the suspensions and failures that afflicted banks in rural America proved devastating for 
these funds and caused them all to cease operations by decade’s end.  Washington was the first 
deposit insurance program to shut down in 1921 whereas Texas was the last one to do so in 
1930.   
 The problems afflicting the health of the banking system, though, did not go unnoticed by 
policymakers.  One of the most respected legislative banking experts, Sen. Carter Glass (D-VA), 
though he supported the McFadden Act for its branching provisions, came out strongly against 
the ills of the banking system towards the end of the decade.  Drawing upon his adherence to the 
real bills doctrine, he expressed concern for “the economic integrity of the Federal Reserve 
banking system” as increasing amounts of money were diverted to finance stock purchases 
(Glass 1929).  Further on in that same August 1929 letter to the editor, Glass argued, incorrectly 
it turned out, that “the [Federal Reserve] board and the banks are definitely required by law not 
to permit the stock market to control them by illegally appropriating trust funds which belong to 
commerce and industry” (Glass 1929).  Needless to say, warnings such as this one failed to have 
much of an impact as the overall economy still appeared to be doing well and the brunt of the 
bank suspensions and failures were occurring mainly in rural areas among nonmember banks.  It 
                                                 
22
 A U.S. Attorney General’s ruling from July 1908 prohibited national banks from joining the funds. 
23
 The dates of each respective state establishing its fund were as follows: OK in 1908, KS in 1909, NE in 1909, TX 
in 1909, MS in 1914, SD in 1915, ND in 1917, and WA in 1917.   
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would take a more drastic event, or series of events, to make people reconsider banking reform 
and the principles underlying it as informed by the real bills theory.   
THE STOCK MARKET CRASH, THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION, AND 
POLICYMAKERS’ RESPONSES 
Although the stock market had begun its incredible expansion in March 1928, it did not 
peak until September 3, 1929.  From this point onward as reflected in the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJIA), the stock market declined for the next month and a half before it finally crashed 
initially “Black Thursday,” October 24, then continued on “Black Monday,” October 28,” and 
“Black Tuesday,” October 29, 1929.  Economic catastrophe did not ensue immediately, but a 
recession had definitely begun by the last quarter of the year.  The market collapse of late 
October undeniably made headlines and even stoked panic among the public, but an economic 
collapse the likes of which ultimately developed was not foreseen. 
 Elected officials apparently failed to recognize the severity of the developing economic 
storm, for they were rather slow to act.  Though the federal government was under the 
Republican Party’s unified control, President Herbert Hoover, for instance, remained silent on 
the subject until December when he delivered his first annual message to Congress.  In the 
address, Hoover suggested creating a joint-legislative-executive commission to examine the 
entire country’s financial system and to consider separating commercial and investment banking.  
Needless to say, members of the president’s party on Capitol Hill did not take up his overture. 
As 1930 began, economic circumstances were deteriorating.  A full-fledged economic 
depression had not yet materialized, but deflationary effects were appearing and economic output 
was declining.  In addition, the money supply was contracting as evidenced by declining deposit 
and loan amounts.  While the banking system was not experiencing a crisis, failures continued 
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plaguing the industry, but these struck predominantly rural, nonmember banks.  As a result, the 
banking industry was not attracting significant calls for reform.  Operating in fits and starts, 
securities markets in the springtime appeared, at least for a short time, to recover some of their 
lost values.   
Though President Hoover made little effort at reforming the nation’s banking system 
along the lines outlined in his December 1929 congressional address, the two Houses of 
Congresses mounted initial attempts at reform.  Beginning February 25, 1930, the House 
Banking Committee, which Rep. Louis T. McFadden still chaired, held hearings on the relatively 
narrow matter of the structure of the banking industry.  Three committee members had all ready 
submitted bills: HR 8367 prohibited banking groups and chains entirely; HR 8363 permitted 
branch and chain banking, but subject to certain limitations; and, HR 8005 granted branching 
rights to banks nationwide.  The witnesses testifying before the committee reflected a lack of 
consensus within the banking industry.  The divergent testimony and views of members 
prevented the committee from reporting any legislation, thereby leaving the issue of branching 
unresolved.   
Rather than confine itself to the changing structure of the banking industry, the Senate 
considered a much broader reform of the Federal Reserve System.  This broader legislative 
project originated with Sen. William H. King’s (D-UT) S.Res. 71 in April 1929 requesting the 
Banking Committee or one of its subcommittees examine a list of twenty-one questions he had 
prepared concerning member banks and the Fed.  The questions included investigating whether 
legislative reform was necessary to prevent speculative uses of bank credit and what the effects 
of branch and chain banking were.  The Senate Banking Committee, however, postponed the 
matter until the latter half of the year.  Although interest in S.Res. 71 had increased due to the 
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stock market crash, the Senate became tied up with other legislative matters, so the committee 
delayed it further until spring 1930.  Just as the Banking Committee was about to act on S.Res. 
71, though, it approved a substitute resolution sponsored by Sen. Carter Glass in April which the 
Senate then approved in May.  Because Glass was one of the drafters of the original Federal 
Reserve Act and therefore recognized by both parties as a banking expert, Chairman Peter 
Norbeck (R-SD), a progressive, appointed the Virginian chair of the special subcommittee 
conducting the investigation.  It was from this platform that Glass would begin drafting and 
introducing legislation that ultimately became the Banking Act of 1933.   
Chairing a subcommittee investigating the Federal Reserve System, Glass hired H. Parker 
Willis his old friend and collaborator from the 1913 Act as his committee aide.24  With the help 
of Willis, Sen. Glass then introduced a banking reform bill (S. 4723) on June 17 to guide the 
subcommittee as it worked.  Interestingly enough, the bill did not require the separation of 
commercial and investment banking, nor did it provide for deposit insurance or a resolution 
mechanism for failed banks.  Though S. 4723 did not mandate Federal Reserve membership for 
all banks, it sought to entice state banks to join by instituting interest on member bank reserves.  
The bill provided national banks with branching rights equal to those of their state-chartered 
competitors in their respective states.  Finally, the Glass bill clamped down on speculative uses 
of credit by restricting national banks’ loans to individuals involved in the securities business 
with oversight provided by the OCC and by restricting member banks similarly with Federal 
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 According to the Chicago economist J. Laurence Laughlin, Rep. Glass selected Willis for the role of 
subcommittee expert based on his acquaintance with him as noted economics professor at Washington & Lee 
University where his two sons had attended (Laughlin 1933: 105).  Willis was a Chicago educated economist; he 
taught at W & L from 1989-1905, entered journalism thereafter, served as first Secretary of the Federal Reserve 
Board, and then became a noted banking professor at Columbia.  Willis, like Glass, came to be one of the nation’s 
most respected banking authorities. 
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Reserve oversight.  This bill marked the first iteration of what eventually became Glass-Steagall.  
The subcommittee hearings on S. 4723, however, did not begin until December 1930.  
Meanwhile, the first of three panics struck the banking system.25  Although this panic 
lasted only from October until December, it claimed nearly 650 commercial bank casualties.  
The crisis’ nadir appeared when two of the country’s largest banking institutions failed; these 
two failures represented the notorious side of banking.  One of these institutions was Caldwell 
and Company, a chain of banks headquartered in Tennessee, but tied to banks all over the 
southeastern U.S.  The November failure of this banking chain directly led to the suspension of 
forty banks.  The family that controlled the Caldwell chain had engaged in all sorts of extra-
banking affairs, such as the newspaper business, insurance, and even bribery of elected officials.  
Fraud played a significant role in the bank’s failure.  
Worse still was the Bank of the United States’ (B.U.S.) failure; this state-chartered bank 
began in the New York garment district and grew to encompass nearly sixty branches around the 
metropolitan area.26  The B.U.S.’s collapse represented the nation’s largest bank failure to date; 
the institution’s failure also indicted the affiliate structure, for the firm had a large securities 
affiliate network.27  The bank’s name misled countless depositors, many of whom were 
immigrants, for it mistakenly implied the U.S. stood behind the institution.  The Bank of the 
U.S.’s failure shocked the American public and generated runs on other New York banks.        
Needless to say, the midterm election could not have occurred at more inauspicious 
moment for Republican lawmakers.  Not only was the national economy on a downward spiral, 
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 The terms “banking panic” and “bank run” are often used interchangeably, but it is possible to distinguish 
between them in a useful manner.  A “bank run” occurs when depositors or note holders rush to a bank and demand 
payment of the bank obligations they hold whereas a “banking panic” refers to the same phenomenon but involving 
a large number of banks.  A “banking panic,” however, does not need to entail a run on every bank in a banking 
system.    
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 Franklin D. Roosevelt was governor of New York when this state-chartered bank failed. 
27
 Two of the bank’s senior executives, President Bernard K. Marcus and Vice President Saul Singer, received 
prison terms at Sing Sing for fraudulent interference with their affiliates. 
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but also key segments of the country were experiencing the worst banking panics in decades.  As 
a result, voters were bound to hold Republicans accountable at the ballot box.  Though they held 
both Houses of Congress, Republicans did so with the slimmest of majorities; they controlled 
each chamber by a single seat.  The narrow Republican House majority endured little more than 
a year.   
Just as the first banking panic was concluding, the third session of the 71st Congress was 
beginning; this session ran from December 1, 1930 until March 3, 1931.  As a result of the 
ostensible calming in the banking sector, the political impetus for banking reform lessened 
somewhat.  The improved situation proved short-lived, for the second banking panic erupted 
from March to June of 1931.  This panic struck hardest in New York, Pennsylvania, and the 
Midwest.  Because many of the money-center banks, in addition the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, were located in New York City, this panic proved especially harmful not only in the 
domestic banking system, but also in the international one.  European central banks, for instance, 
even felt the panic’s effects as New York had difficulty maintaining the fixed exchange rates 
entailed in the gold standard. 
Unfortunately for the banking system, the timing of the second panic coincided a nine 
month period in which Congress was out of session.  As a matter of fact, the 72nd session did not 
begin until December 7, 1931.  Thus, it should not be surprising that the elective branches of the 
federal government accomplished almost nothing during 1931 pertaining to banking reform.  
President Hoover certainly could have demanded a special session of Congress, for Republicans 
still controlled both Houses for part of the year.  For whatever reason, though, Hoover chose not 
to do so.  He instead addressed the nation’s worsening economic situation through executive 
branch initiatives entailing voluntarism on the part of the citizenry.  For example in the autumn 
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months, Hoover persuaded New York bankers to create the National Credit Corporation (NCC), 
which resembled WWI’s War Finance Corporation, to assist fragile banks.  Collaborative efforts 
such as this one, however, proved unsuccessful now as bankers and other members of private 
industry were fearful of lending good money after bad to aid troubled institutions. 
Having spent much of the year on his own combating the Depression, President Hoover 
finally sought congressional assistance when the 72nd session began in December.  By this time, 
however, a handful of Republican Representatives had died, and Democrats successfully gained 
four seats through the special elections that delivered them a majority.  When Congress 
reconvened in December for Hoover’s annual message, four House special elections to fill the 
seats of deceased members eliminated the slim Republican majority and instead gave the 
Democrats control.  It was this change in party control that ousted Rep. Louis T. McFadden, 
Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, and replaced him with Rep. Henry B. 
Steagall (D-AL).   
 During his fourth year in office, Hoover collaborated significantly more with Capitol 
Hill.  The two elective branches of the federal government began the year, for instance, by 
enacting the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) Act.  This law established a temporary 
government agency to extend financing to banks.  To prevent the Federal Reserve System from 
taking bad assets onto its balance sheet, Sen. Glass used his senatorial position to restrict the 
agency to funding its activities through the bond market.    Consequently, the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation was handcuffed despite the worsening economic conditions.  Furthermore, 
the limitations placed on the RFC thwarted it from filling in as a lender of last resort to the 
banking system, something the Fed had failed to do following the stock market crash. 
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Nearly a month after enacting the RFC Act, President Hoover signed the Glass-Steagall 
Act.28  Working across the aisle with two Congress’ leading banking experts, Hoover prevailed 
upon Rep. Steagall and Sen. Glass to shepherd a bill relaxing the type of collateral member 
banks could borrow against through the reserve banks.  This widening of acceptable assets 
provided for another way for the Fed to serve as lender of last resort, yet it also provided a means 
for the Fed to expand the money supply.  Rep. Steagall was more than willing to comply with 
Hoover’s wishes since doing so permitted an inflating of the money supply whereas Sen. Glass 
was somewhat reluctant at first to comply.  The bill’s inflationary aspects troubled Glass because 
they departed from his views on sound money and real bills.  The Virginian eventually agreed to 
sponsor the legislation provided that he could include a sunset provision for the Fed powers of 
March 3, 1933.  The measure’s overall effect was inflationary; it foreshadowed banking 
legislation to come over the next few years.          
Meanwhile, Sen. Glass was busy pursuing his own proposed banking legislation.  In 
January, he introduced the second version of his bill (S. 3215) reforming the Federal Reserve 
System.  This bill mandated Federal Reserve membership for all commercial banks, contained a 
Liquidation Corporation to resolve bank failures, regulated group banking and bank holding 
companies, granted national banks statewide branching authority, prohibited member banks from 
underwriting securities, limited the extension of reserve bank credit for securities activities, 
raised the discount rate, removed the Treasury Secretary from the FRB, recognized the authority 
of the OMPC, and directed the OCC to examine all bank affiliates.  The proposed legislation 
contained no deposit insurance fund.  Because the bill generated significant protest during the 
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 The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, of course, is not to be confused with the Banking Act of 1933, which many 
individuals mistakenly also refer to as the “Glass-Steagall Act.” 
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committee hearings, however, Glass revised it and introduced another version in the middle of 
March.   
Completion of February 1932’s Glass-Steagall Act delayed the revision of Sen. Glass’ 
third banking bill (S. 4115).  Although the Federal Reserve membership mandate and branch 
banking provisions of the previous bill generated the most complaints from witnesses in the 
committee hearings, both provisions remained in the bill’s third incarnation.  Moreover, the bill 
also permitted trade area branching within fifty miles of a bank’s head office irrespective state 
lines.   
This version still contained a Liquidation Corporation to resolve the assets of failed 
banks.  Nonetheless, it also contained some new provisions.  For instance, S. 4115 lowered the 
amounted of capital required for rurally situated national banks, not to mention national banks 
succeeding failed banks.  Perhaps most important of all, it was in this bill that Glass introduced 
his required separation of commercial and investment banking.  This proposed legislation 
abandoned the pretense of regulating member banks’ securities affiliates, and instead required 
their separation within three years.  Needless to say, Glass appeared to generate even more 
animosity from the banking system with this latest bill.  Bankers disliked its divestiture 
requirements.  The Federal Reserve Board, joining other bankers in their complaints, found fault 
with the required separation and instead preferred limiting extensions of credit between banks 
and their affiliates.  The Board also disliked the notion of funding the Liquidation Corporation 
through the Federal Reserve System and member banks, so it proposed funding it through the 
Treasury instead.  The implication of this proposal, of course, was that the full faith and credit of 
the U.S. government would be at stake.  Finally, the Comptroller disliked the bill because of its 
greater focus and burdens imposed on national banks
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Strong opposition prevented S. 4115 from getting out of committee, so Sen. Glass 
mounted yet another legislative attempt in mid April when he introduced S. 4412.  Two of the 
most contentious aspects of the previous bill (S. 4115) still remained: namely the forced 
separation of member banks and their securities affiliates within three years and statewide 
branching rights.  Furthermore, most of the provisions remained from the prior version.  In an 
effort to accommodate the FRB, however, Glass strengthened the Board’s control over the 
foreign transactions of the twelve reserve banks.  He also included restrictions on loan advances 
to bank affiliates.  Unlike the previous three Glass bills, this one received floor action in May.  
Nonetheless, S. 4412 engendered intense animosity from opponents that fellow senators 
submitted over fifty amendments.  Glass even amended his own proposed legislation during the 
debate to prohibit interstate branching and extend the deadline by two years on the divorce 
provision.  Because of intense opposition and Glass’ ill health, though, the Senate postponed 
further consideration of S. 4115 until year’s end. 
 While Glass was embroiled in a Senate battle over his proposed banking legislation, Rep. 
Henry Steagall was championing a banking bill with deposit insurance as its centerpiece.  On 
March 7, 1932, he introduced his first deposit insurance bill (H.R. 10241).  This bill created a 
Federal Bank Liquidating Board (FBLB) to insure bank deposits and to appoint agents to handle 
the liquidation of failed banks’ assets.  In doing so, it eliminated the existing system of double 
liability of national bank stockholders and replaced it with a clearer, and supposedly more 
efficient payment timetable.  The bill required the FBLB to make its first payment to depositors 
within sixty days of a bank’s failure and to complete its final payment to them within one year.  
The FBLB insured all member banks and obtained its funding from payments received from 
member banks, reserve banks, and the Treasury.  Though the bill did not provide for increased 
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oversight of bank activities or restrictions on various activities, it sought to improve the health of 
small, rural banks by requiring them to have capital levels of at least $50,000 and a ten percent 
surplus.  During the Banking Committee’s hearings in March and early April, however, the 
FBLB provisions of the bill generated particular controversy, thereby causing Chairman Steagall 
to revise the proposed legislation.       
On April 12, Rep. Henry Steagall introduced his second deposit insurance bill (HR 
11362).  This second bill clearly sought to attract wider legislative support by lowering the 
payments from insured banks and by permitting the RFC to loan funds to the FBLB, not to 
mention opening the insurance to all banks regardless of Federal Reserve membership.  In 
exchange for lowering insurance premiums, however, the proposed legislation delayed the 
FBLB’s repayment timeframe: the agency was now required to make its first payment within 
ninety days and its final one within eighteen months.  To protect the health of the deposit 
insurance system, this bill authorized the FBLB to remove the officers of national banks, under 
certain circumstances, if they were engaging in detrimental behavior.  Seven days after its 
introduction, the House Banking Committee reported HR 11362.  Then, on May 25 the full 
House began debate on HR 11362.  In the floor debate, Rep. Louis McFadden led opposition to 
the bill.  Rep. Louis McFadden led the opposition which challenged the proposed legislation on 
the grounds that in ran contrary to the dictates of sound banking and that the state level 
experiences with deposit guarantee had not ended well.  Nevertheless on May 27, the House 
passed Steagall’s bill; it then proceeded to the Senate where it died in the Banking Committee 
without being considered.   
Since economic conditions continued to worsen through the middle of the year, the 
federal government enacted two other emergency measures.  Before adjourning in mid July for 
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the upcoming presidential election, legislators attached emergency related provisions to two 
broader bills.  One was a rider attached to the Home Loan Bank Act; it expanded the monetary 
supply by allowing national banks to issue more national banknotes.  The other one was 
connected to the Emergency Relief and Construction Act; House Speaker John Nance Garner 
(D-TX) attached the amendment broadening the RFC’s lending abilities in return for publicly 
disclosing the recipients of the agency’s aid.  Once in operation, this disclosure measure 
undoubtedly caused further damage to the economy and the banking system as it instilled fear 
among the general public upon discovering which institutions received assistance.  Though 
elected officials only enacted emergency measures, the House and Senate also made efforts 
during the year to institute deposit insurance and reform the Federal Reserve System.   
When the 72nd Congress reconvened in December for its second session, it truly was a 
lame duck.  Franklin D. Roosevelt had just defeated incumbent President Hoover in a landslide 
election and carried large numbers of Democrats into Congress on his coattails.  Even though the 
new Democratic administration and the Democratic House and Senate majorities did not take 
office until early March 1933, Senator Glass still sought to gain passage of his banking reform 
bill that the senate had postponed from June.  After continued prodding from Glass, Senate 
leaders finally acceded to the Virginian’s wish of debating S. 4412.  Debate began on the Glass 
bill in early January, but it quickly came to a halt as Sen. Huey Long (D-LA) mounted a 
filibuster for days to thwart the provisions allowing in-state branching across county lines.  
Needless to say, Glass’ two major concessions were unable to sway enough senators to invoke 
cloture.  He agreed to amend to bill by extending the divestiture period from three to five years 
and by constraining new intrastate branching powers of national banks to states providing 
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reciprocal ones to state-chartered institutions.  Sen. Long’s filibuster thus effectively killed the 
fourth Glass bill. 
While congressional action on banking reform ground to a standstill, the Depression 
exhibited no signs of abating.  Although the third and most significant banking panic began in 
October 1932, it did not reach its apex until early March 1933.  In the process, numerous states 
declared bank holidays for state-chartered institutions to calm the worried public. 
 One of the worst hit states, if not the epicenter, was Michigan.  Two extremely troubled 
banking groups dominated the Wolverine State: the Guardian Group and the Detroit Banking 
Group.  Both holding companies were less than ten years old and had directors in common with 
the automobile industry.  In fact, the Ford family controlled a large portion of the Guardian 
Group’s stock, and Henry Ford was one of the largest depositors in both groups.  The 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation had been providing emergency assistance to both holding 
companies since before the start of 1933, but the groups’ financial situations became more 
precarious in February as the banking panic was developing in Michigan.  The onset of the panic 
further sapped the Guardian Group’s resources as public fears grew about the banks’ declining 
asset values, causing the Guardian Group to seek out additional RFC assistance. 
To raise capital levels, the corporation proposed a large loan contingent upon the group 
raising several million dollars worth of collateral from its principal investors.  The banking 
group, though, was unable to find the requisite money.  When President Hoover and RFC 
officials then approached Henry Ford about his contributing another four and a half million 
dollars in equity, he adamantly refused.  In response, Ford threatened to withdraw millions of 
dollars from his own personal accounts in both holding companies, thereby worsening the 
situation even more.  As a result on Valentine’s Day 1933, Michigan Governor William 
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Comstock ordered an eight-day state banking holiday.  Seven days later, though, the governor 
extended the state banking holiday indefinitely.  Because many of the banks from surrounding 
Midwestern states such as Ohio and Illinois held large reserves in Michigan banks, the panic in 
Michigan soon engulfed the entire region.  At this time, though, individual states were declaring 
their own moratoria to control the spreading panic.  This federalist approach was problematic, for 
the states lacked jurisdiction over the national banks located within their borders. 
Just as the banking panic in the upper Midwest was reaching its height, the Senate 
Banking Committee’s investigation into the banking industry was revealing some of its most 
shocking details.  Though the Banking Committee had created the investigative panel at 
President Hoover’s request in April 1932, the panel and its first two chief counselors maintained 
a low profile by focusing their energies on examining the securities market and the evils of short 
selling.  As the banking historian Vincent Carosso explained of the early component.  The 
“Senate Bear Hunt,” as the banking historian Vincent Carosso explains, “failed to uncover any 
Democratic conspiracy or other organized raids designed to discredit Hoover and destroy public 
confidence in his efforts to bring about recovery” (Carosso 1970: 324).  Not until Committee 
Chairman Peter Norbeck appointed Ferdinand Pecora lead counselor on January 24, 1933 did the 
panel refocus its investigation on the evils of the commercial banking industry.  Unlike his two 
predecessors and the senators serving on the panel, Pecora was aware of the broad investigative 
authority granted by the original Senate resolution and used it to expand the inquiry.   
Broadening the investigative panel’s inquiry, Pecora began in mid February by taking 
testimony from individuals associated with.  After having spent a few days in mid February 
examining the Insull failure, Pecora next turned his attention to the National City Bank and its 
securities affiliate National City Company.  This marked Pecora’s first investigative foray as the 
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lead counsel of the Senate panel into the commercial banking industry.  In hearings spanning 
from February 21 until March 2, testimony revealed numerous abuses by the nation’s largest 
commercial bank and securities firm such as circumventing a federal law in 1911 prohibiting 
national banks from engaging in the securities business, promoting questionable securities to the 
public in an overly aggressive manner, and compensating executives excessively.  Ferdinand 
Pecora’s memoirs conclude that “the two chief instruments which facilitated these abuses [by 
National City] were the investment affiliate and the secrecy with which the management was 
allowed to operate” (Pecora 1939: 130).  Though the 73rd Congress renewed the mandate for the 
Banking Committee’s investigation upon taking office, Pecora’s damage to the banking industry 
was done.  National City Company was the largest retailer and distributor of securities at the 
time, but, four days after the investigation concluded looking into the bank, National City 
announced it was liquidating its securities affiliate.  The following day, the Chase National Bank 
announced the voluntary divestiture of its securities affiliate the Chase Securities Corporation 
(CSC).  In the wake of the down securities market and startling revelations, the owners of the 
two largest securities companies announced on March 8 and 9 that they were voluntarily closing 
their businesses.  
Because of the environment in which he entered office, President Franklin Roosevelt 
could not avoid using his inaugural address to confront Americans’ many economic worries.  In 
his March 4 inaugural, he maintained that the United States would recover under his leadership, 
but he emphasized, 
[I]n our progress toward a resumption of work we require two safeguards against a 
return of the evils of the old order: there must be a strict supervision of all banking 
and credits and investments, so that there will be an end to speculation with other 
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people’s money; and there must be provision for adequate but sound currency.  
(Roosevelt 1938: 13) (Italics added)29 
Thus, Roosevelt signaled his support for significant banking reform, something that Senator 
Carter Glass had been advocating for the past few years, and his predecessor had been fighting. 
Since Michigan declared its bank holiday, President Hoover had been seeking to alleviate 
the spreading panic by declaring a nationwide bank holiday, but President-elect Roosevelt 
provided no clear indication as to the action’s constitutionality or that he would uphold it.  
Consequently, Hoover vacillated over the matter and failed to act, allowing the nation’s banks to 
sink deeper into trouble.  Even though he provided no guidance to Hoover on a national bank 
moratorium, President Roosevelt drew upon 1917’s Trading with the Enemy Act on March 6 
when he declared a nationwide bank holiday.30  The holiday required all banks, regardless of 
their chartering authority, to suspend their operations for the four day period spanning from 
March 6 through March 9.  Roosevelt later extended the bank holiday. 
Though the president had called legislators into session the day after his inauguration, 
Congress did not convene its special session and launch the “first hundred days” until March 9.  
Congress began that very day by enacting retroactive legislation approving FDR’s emergency 
bank holiday, not to mention providing for the inspection and orderly reopening of the nation’s 
                                                 
29
 Roosevelt reused the phrase in a March 29 speech when he asked Congress for federal securities legislation based 
on the “ancient truth that those who manage banks, corporations and other agencies handling or using other people’s 
money are trustees acting for others” (Roosevelt 1938: 93-94).  The Progressive legal scholar Louis Brandeis 
popularized the phrase “other people’s money” by using it as the title of a series of articles he published in 1913 for 
Harper’s Weekly concerning the Money Trust.  Although it is unknown whether he intentionally borrowed the 
phrase from Adam Smith, it is quite probable that he was aware of Smith’s usage.  In The Wealth of Nations, Smith 
writes, “The directors of such companies [i.e. joint-stock companies], however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own” (Smith 1981: 741) (Italics 
added).  Roosevelt, though, would reuse the phrase a few weeks later in a March 29 congressional speech in which 
he requested  
30
 Savings banks did not need the holiday because they all ready possessed the legal means to restrict payments to 
depositors since they held only time deposits rather than demand deposits. 
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commercial banks.  Toward this end, both chambers approved the speedily drafted Emergency 
Banking and Relief Act with little debate; the bill became law March 9.   
Two days after the Emergency Banking Act became law, Sen. Glass introduced the fifth 
version of his banking bill (S. 245).31  This version resembled the measure the Senate debated in 
January, except for one crucial addition; it contained a deposit guarantee mechanism.  Evidently 
fearing that the recent events of the Midwestern banking panic made some type of deposit 
guarantee unavoidable, Sen. Glass sought to address the issue before it once again defeated his 
reform attempt.   
The Roosevelt Administration approved of the broad outlines of this version, except for 
three aspects.  First, FDR believed branching should occur within individual counties rather than 
on a statewide basis depending on state law.  Second, the president opposed eliminating the 
Treasury Secretary’s ex officio reserve board position.  Third, and most importantly, he 
vehemently disapproved of deposit insurance.  In an “off the record” comment during his first 
press conference on March 8, President Roosevelt explained his reasoning on the grounds that 
“The general underlying thought behind the use of the word “guarantee” with respect to bank 
deposits is that you guarantee bad banks as well as good banks.  The minute the Government 
starts to do that the Government runs into a probable loss” (Roosevelt 1938: 37).  Although 
inhabitants of this time period did not possess the concept “moral hazard” that now exists, 
Roosevelt’s comments appear to indicate he had a fear that deposit insurance would have 
difficulty distinguishing between good and bad banks, thereby the information shortage would 
contribute to greater government losses. 
                                                 
31
 Having turned down Franklin Roosevelt’s offer to become Treasury Secretary, Sen. Carter Glass (D-VA) instead 
became Appropriations Committee Chairman.  Because Glass took the Appropriations Chair, Sen. Duncan Fletcher 
(D-FL) became Banking Committee Chairman.  Fletcher, though, made special arrangements so that Glass could 
chair a Banking subcommittee on which all the Banking Committee members served and thereby still direct the 
Senate’s banking reform efforts. 
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Sen. Glass’ banking subcommittee marked up S. 245 over the following several weeks.  
To ease legislative passage, the Virginian sought to accommodate some of the administration’s 
concerns.  Though he refused to budge on statewide branching, he and his subcommittee 
compromised over deposit insurance.  Understanding that Roosevelt opposed deposit insurance, 
especially anything guaranteeing 100% of all bank deposits, they made a few alterations.  First, 
the subcommittee introduced a graduated scale for the deposit guarantee; the scale guaranteed 
100% of deposits beneath $10,001, 75% of deposits between $10,000 and $50,000, and only 
50% of deposits above $50,000.  Second, the subcommittee limited the Treasury’s initial 
contribution to the insurance and liquidation corporation’s capital base to $150 million; thereby 
limiting taxpayers’ exposure.  Third, Glass’ subcommittee delayed the operation of any 
insurance corporation until July 1, 1934.  In addition to these three concessions, the panel also 
deleted the provision stripping the Treasury Secretary of his Federal Reserve Board seat.   
  Having assuaged the Roosevelt administration, the subcommittee added a few other 
provisions.  First, the subcommittee decided that excessive competition to attract deposits 
contributed to the speculation of the crash, so it imposed interest rate ceilings on savings and 
time deposits while prohibiting the payment of interest on demand deposits.  Second, members 
of the subcommittee introduced other provisions interlocking directors and officers from serving 
banks and other non-financial firms and banks and securities firms.  Second, subcommittee 
members introduced a provision prohibiting interlocking directors.  In other words, individuals 
serving on bank boards as directors would be prohibited from serving as directors of nonbanking 
firms.  Third, the subcommittee reduced the period for banks to divest their securities activities 
from five years to two.    
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After the subcommittee finished making these changes, Sen. Glass on May 10 introduced 
a sixth version of his bill (S. 1631).  Three days later, the full Senate Banking Committee 
considered the measure.  Before reporting S. 1631 on May 17, the committee added two more 
items.  First, the panel added protections for banks’ minority shareholders.  Second, the 
committee attached a provision separating commercial banking and insurance by prohibiting 
bank officers from making insurance policies.  The Banking Committee, however, rejected an 
attempt by Sen. William G. McAdoo (D-CA), President Wilson’s former Treasury Secretary, to 
institute the deposit insurance program immediately.  
While the Senate was considering Glass’ latest bill, Rep. Steagall on May 16 introduced 
another banking bill (HR 5661), which the House Banking Committee approved within three 
days.  Steagall’s bill differed from the Senate’s one in a few ways.  First, rather than delegating 
authority to the Federal Reserve Board to set interest rate ceilings on time deposits without any 
specific limits, the House version established a maximum rate of 3% that the FRB could not 
exceed.  Second, Steagall’s bill strengthened the Fed’s open market operations by preventing 
individual reserve banks from engaging autonomously in such operations.  Third, HR 5661 
omitted any branch banking provisions.  Fourth, so as not to disadvantage nonmember banks, the 
bill established a new government corporation to provide deposit insurance.  When Steagall’s bill 
reached the House floor on May 20, the chamber completed debate in only four hours.  Finally, 
three days later the House of Representatives easily approved the legislation by the margin of 
262 to 19.   
On May 19, the Senate began debating Glass’ bill.  During the debate, the major point of 
contention among senators concerned the deposit guarantee.  Employing a brilliant parliamentary 
ploy, Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-MI) introduced an amendment to force a vote on creating a 
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deposit insurance fund that would immediately cover deposits up to $2,500 at all banks without 
any prior examination.  With the assistance of Vice President John Nance Garner, the Senate 
adopted Vandenberg’s amendment.  Vandenberg’s provision, of course, makes perfect sense in 
the context of the recent banking panic experienced by Michigan.  On May 25, the upper 
chamber finally approved the banking bill by voice vote.    
A few days later on June 1, the conference committee convened.  With the special 
legislative session’s end fast approaching, however, conferees relatively quickly worked out the 
necessary agreements to produce a report eleven days later.  The conference report largely 
followed the Senate version except for deposit insurance.  The deposit guarantee provisions drew 
upon HR 5661 instead.  In addition, the conferees eliminated the double liability of national bank 
shares going forward, formally created the Federal Open Market Committee to conduct open 
market operations, and increased the amount of shares that member bank directors were required 
to have.  Given the nation’s recent ordeals with banking panics and the legislative impetus on 
Capitol Hill for significant reform, final congressional approval was merely a formality.     
When the conference committee submitted its final report, congressional approval was 
merely a formality.  On June 13, the Senate passed the conference report by voice vote whereas 
the House approved it with only six lawmakers voting “nay.”  Three days later President 
Franklin Roosevelt signed the Banking Act of 1933.   
The resulting legislation has received praise from numerous scholars for its role in 
creating a healthy banking system.  Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, for instance, argue in 
their coauthored Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960: 
Federal insurance of bank deposits was the most important structural change in the 
banking system to result from the 1933 panic, and, indeed in our view, the structural 
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change most conducive to monetary stability since state bank note issues were taxed 
out of existence immediately after the Civil War.  (Friedman and Schwartz 1963: 
434) 
On the opposite side of the political spectrum, scholars such as institutional economist John 
Kenneth Galbraith contend, “With this one piece of legislation the fear which operated so 
efficiently to transmit weakness was dissolved….Rarely has so much been accomplished by a 
single law” (Galbraith 1997: 191-192).  Because the Banking Act contained a number of 
important reforms, not the least of which was deposit insurance, it is worth reviewing briefly the 
statute’s contents. 
The Banking Act basically contained two institutional thrusts and several regulatory ones.  
First, Glass-Steagall established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to administer 
a deposit insurance fund.  The statute authorized the FDIC to open a Temporary Federal Deposit 
Insurance Fund on January 1, 1934; this fund insured deposits up to $2500.  Then, the statute 
required a permanent fund replace the temporary one on July 1, 1934.  Unlike the temporary 
fund, the permanent one contained a sliding scale for coverage whereby “100 per centum of such 
net amount not exceeding $10,000; and 75 per centum of the amount, if any, by which such net 
amount exceeds $10,000 but does not exceed $50,000; and 50 per centum of the amount, if any, 
by which such net amount exceeds $50,000” (U.S. Statutes at Large 48 (1933): 173).  Though 
such a sliding scale for deposit insurance never went into effect, opponents of the insurance 
provision were largely responsible for it as a way of avoiding a blanket guarantee of deposits.   
Second, Glass-Steagall reformed the Federal Reserve System.  It lengthened the terms of 
Federal Reserve Board members from ten to twelve years and specified that the Board’s main 
offices would be located in D.C.  The Banking Act also formally created a Federal Open Market 
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Committee (FOMC) composed of one representative from each of the twelve reserve banks and 
meeting at least four times annually in the nation’s capital, but it did not provide for a means of 
the Board compelling reserve banks to participate in open market operations, only that they 
would have to abide by rules laid down by the Board.  So as to constrain the Fed’s open market 
operations, the statute mandated that the paper “eligible for open-market operations shall be 
governed with a view to accommodating commerce and business and with regard to their bearing 
upon the general credit situation of the country” (U.S. Statutes at Large 48 (1933): 168).   
On the regulatory side, Glass-Steagall instructed the Fed to create interest rate ceilings for 
member banks’ deposit accounts; it effectively prohibited interest on demand deposits with a 
statutorily impose rate of zero percent.  The law granted mutual savings banks the authority to 
join the Federal Reserve System.  It required bank holding companies owning 50 percent of the 
stock in two or more member banks to register with the FRB if the holding companies wished to 
exercise their shares.  Glass-Steagall also equalized branching restrictions so that national banks 
had the same branching rights in their respective home states as state-chartered institutions had.  
The statute eliminated the double liability imposed on national bank shareholders resulting from 
any future offerings of additional shares.  By adding Sec. 23A to the Federal Reserve Act, the 
Banking Act imposed certain “firewalls” on the transactions between member banks and their 
affiliates.  For instance, Sec. 23A limited banks in the extensions of credit made to their 
affiliates; they were prohibited from extending more than ten percent of surplus plus capital to 
any one affiliate whereas they were prohibited from extending more than twenty percent of 
capital plus surplus to all affiliates combined.  Finally and most memorably, the law separated 
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commercial from investment banking.32  To achieve this separation, Glass-Steagall employed 
four particular sections: Section 16 limited national banks’ securities activities, Section 20 
prohibited affiliations between Fed member banks and securities firms, Section 21 prohibited 
securities firms from accepting deposits, and Section 32 prohibited member banks and securities 
firms from sharing directors.33       
Because Glass-Steagall’s permanent deposit insurance plan was behind schedule in the 
summer of 1934, federal lawmakers on June 16 enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Extensions Act.  This statute postponed the permanent fund’s starting date an entire year to July 
1, 1935.  It also doubled the temporary fund’s amount of coverage effective July 1, 1934 from 
$2500 to $5000, not to mention preempted the permanent plan’s sliding scale for taking effect.34    
Just as the permanent deposit insurance plan was scheduled to begin operations the following 
year, federal lawmakers enacted on June 28, 1935 yet another statute extending the temporary 
deposit fund until August 31.   
Meanwhile, legislators were engrossed in passing another seminal banking bill.  Unlike 
the Banking Act of 1933, the Banking Act of 1935 was truly an administration bill as its Federal 
Reserve components largely reflected the wishes of the newly appointed Governor of the Federal 
Reserve Marriner Eccles.  Enacted on August 23, 1935, the Banking Act of 1935 contained three 
separate titles: Federal Deposit Insurance, Amendments to the Federal Reserve Act, and 
Technical Amendments to the Banking Laws.   
                                                 
32
 Whereas many scholars and policymakers employ the term “Glass-Steagall” to mean only the four sections of the 
Banking Act of 1933 separating commercial and investment banking, I use the term to refer to the law in its entirety.  
Interestingly enough, the GLBA only repealed Sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall; Sections 16 and 21 still remain. 
33
 Section 5(c) extended Glass-Steagall’s Section 16 limitations on banks’ securities activities to state [Fed] member 
banks.  Although Section 16 prohibits national banks from investing in securities, it makes some exceptions by 
introducing the distinction between eligible and ineligible securities. 
34
 The law exempted mutual savings banks failing to qualify under the required assessments and examinations from 
receiving the benefit of the doubling of coverage. 
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The Banking Act of 1935’s first title terminated the temporary deposit insurance fund and 
replaced it with another permanent plan.  It also automatically admitted all those banks insured 
under the temporary plan unless they notified the federal government in writing within thirty 
days of their desire to withdraw from the system.  Going forward, the statute raised the standards 
of admission for any other banks wishing to gain insurance for their deposits; the FDIC would 
now consider a bank’s capital position, the prospects for profitability, its management, and the 
needs of the community it was seeking to serve.  The statute also required the FDIC to prohibit 
the payment of interest on demand deposits and to limit the interest rates nonmember insured 
banks paid on other accounts.  Moreover, the FDIC even gained the ability to bail out troubled 
depository institutions: 
Until July 1, 1936, whenever in the judgment of the board of directors such action 
will reduce the risk or avert a threatened loss to the Corporation…the Corporation 
may, upon such terms and conditions as it may determine, make loans secured in 
whole or in part by assets of an open or closed insured bank, which loans may be in 
subordination to the rights of depositors and other creditors, or the Corporation may 
purchase any such assets or may guarantee any other insured bank against loss by 
reason of its assuming the liabilities and purchasing the assets of an open or closed 
insured bank” (U.S. Statutes at Large 49 (1935): 699). 
Although the statute maintained the preexisting coverage limit of $5,000 per account, it 
eliminated insured banks’ stock subscriptions and replaced them with an annual assessment rate 
of one-twelfth of one percent of total deposits.   
 As for the Federal Reserve, the Banking Act of 1935 made some significant changes to 
the.  The Banking Act’s second title made a number of important alterations to the Federal 
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Reserve System.  First, it renamed the Federal Reserve Board and the members of the Board, 
reduced the Board’s membership from eight to seven members by removing the Treasury 
Secretary from his ex officio seat, and increased the term of office for the Governors from twelve 
to fourteen years.  Likewise, the law renamed the head officials of each of the reserve banks 
“president” rather than “governor” and gave the Board veto power over each bank’s board of 
director’s choice for bank president.  The Banking Act also granted the Board of Governors the 
ability to alter member banks’ reserve requirements within a narrow range.  The measure further 
expanded the assets that the reserve banks could discount, thereby giving them some discretion 
to influence member banks’ choice of assets.  Finally, the statute reorganized the structure of the 
FOMC so that the FRB now controlled open market operations.  It achieved Board domination 
by altering the FOMC’s membership to include all seven Board members and five of the reserve 
bank presidents on a rotating basis.     
 As for other amendments to the banking laws, the most notable change was Sec. 304’s 
order that thereafter provided national banks gave six months notice, double liability of bank 
shareholders would cease to exist. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter recounted bank regulatory policy’s development from the opening of the 
Federal Reserve System through the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935.  It showed this evolution 
resulted from the interplay of regulators, elected officials, and other actors involved in the bank 
policy realm.  Although statutory changes played a significant role, regulatory actions and 
rulings also played a large role.  Throughout the period covered here, the real bills doctrine 
dominated banking thought and provided an idealized vision of a banking system, yet the reality 
diverged noticeably from this theory.  Additionally, federal lawmakers were complicit from 
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WWI onwards as they enacted a series of statutes expanding the types of assets Federal Reserve 
members could discount, thereby encouraging member banks to extend credit for purposes other 
than commercial loans.  This process culminated in 1927’s McFadden Act which not only 
provided national banks with very limited branching rights, but also updated the banking statutes 
to incorporate the right to engage in the securities business.   
During this period, the Fed had only a very limited regulatory role pertaining to acting as 
lender of last resort, a responsibility at which it failed miserably following the stock market 
crash, and setting reserve requirements form member banks.  The OCC, on the other hand, 
possessed a significant regulatory role over national banks which it used to expand the activities 
and powers of these depository institutions.  Neither of these two federal agencies had any 
authority over many of the nation’s banks.  Furthermore, both agencies failed to work together, 
and, in so doing, necessarily contributed to the banking crises of the early thirties.   
With regulators unable or unwilling to handle the crises in the banking system following 
the stock market crash, federal lawmakers became involved in the policymaking process.  
Throughout much of the Hoover administration, President Hoover generally tried to handle 
banking policy on his own with as little input from Congress as possible, and when he did work 
with Congress on legislation, the results tended to leave action in private hands rather than 
governmental bodies.  Needless to say, competing proposals held by members of the House and 
Senate further complicated banking reform during the Hoover presidency.  Following his 
inauguration, President Roosevelt resolved differences between the White House and Congress 
by delegating regulatory reform to Sen. Glass.  Although Democrats controlled both the 
executive and legislative branches by 1933, disagreements between House and Senate Democrats 
necessitated compromise over the two main reform proposals.  As a result, the Banking Act of 
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1933 joined restrictions on banks activities based on the real bills doctrine with deposit 
insurance.  The Banking Act of 1935 excoriated much of Sen. Glass’ real bills principles, yet left 
the activity restrictions in place.  As the remaining chapters will show, this regulatory structure 
had tremendous longevity.   
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3. POLICYMAKERS RESPOND TO WEAKNESSES IN BANKING REGULATION: 1969-
1980 
 This chapter presents bank regulatory policy during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter 
administrations.  Before investigating this twelve year period, however, this chapter recounts the 
seminal revisions to banking law from the mid 1930s through 1966 that fundamentally altered 
the regulators’ constituencies, objectives, and relationships.  These statutory reforms primarily 
concerned the FDIC and the Federal Reserve.  Then, the chapter turns to the enactment of the 
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970.  This statute closed the loophole by which 
one bank holding companies (obhcs) were unregulated, and, in so doing, established the Federal 
Reserve as the sole regulator of all bank holding companies.       
 Soon after lawmakers completed this major statutory revision, though, bank failures 
reappeared of a size and scope not experienced before.  To cope with some of these failures, the 
FDIC began experimenting with a previously unused resolution mechanism to provide financial 
assistance and thereby avoid closing the banks.  This action marked the start of what ultimately 
became known as the too big to fail doctrine.  Ironically enough, the FDIC first use this 
resolution mechanism in the 1971 failure of Unity Bank and Trust Company, of Roxbury, 
Massachusetts.  Unity was a small, single office bank, but the FDIC was unable to find any 
buyers for the failed bank and feared repercussions from closing a minority bank serving a 
minority neighborhood.  This resolution mechanism, though, had enormous ramifications for the 
other two regulators, especially as they began the process of issuing rulings permitting banks to 
expand into other avenues of business.  Overall, however, the federal regulators were relatively 
restrained in the use of their rulings to expand bank’s activities; this was likely due in part to 
their having to cope with the increase in significant failures of banks under their supervision. 
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Nonetheless, the twelve years described in this chapter were a busy time for lawmakers 
as they mounted persistent efforts to reform banking regulation and update the outmoded laws.  
During this period, the Nixon White House and then the House Banking Committee mounted 
huge studies of the banking system and possible regulatory reforms, but legislators proved 
unable to act upon most of the proposals.  Elected officials, though, did enact a handful of 
relatively minor statutes altering the regulatory landscape, including ones increasing from $5,000 
to $20,000, granting banks and thrifts in certain northeastern states the ability to offer NOW 
accounts, and extending the domestic bank regulatory structure to apply to foreign banks 
operating in the United States.  Faced with continued problems in the banking system and a 
federal court decision threatening to overturn a host of financial offerings from bank and thrift 
institutions, lawmakers in 1980 finally enacted major regulatory reform with the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA).  Among other things, this 
legislation extended the Fed’s powers to set reserve requirements over all depository institutions 
excluding credit unions regardless of membership status, authorized the new transaction accounts 
that depository institutions were experimenting with in lieu of checking accounts, increased 
deposit insurance coverage limits fivefold, and phased out interest rate ceilings over a five year 
period.  This statutory reform marked the start of the so-called “deregulatory” period, which is 
the point at which this chapter concludes.   
PRELUDE TO THIS PERIOD 
 Although the two decades following WWII are often overlooked because of the banking 
system’s stable and profitable performance, significant changes occurred to the structure and 
distribution of regulation with the enactment of a handful of banking statutes.    
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The first of these changes occurred in late September 1950 when President Truman signed 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) of 1950.  Essentially, the legislation broke off section 
12B of the Banking Act of 1933 that created the FDIC, and gave the agency its own statute.  
With the exception of a brief time from 1935-1936, the FDIC only had two resolution methods.  
This law gave the agency another means to handle bank failures by creating the “essentiality” 
provision contained in section 13(c): 
[T]he Corporation, in the discretion of its Board of Directors, is authorized to make 
loans to, or purchase the assets of, or make deposits in, such insured bank, upon such 
terms and conditions as the Board of Directors may prescribe, when in the opinion of 
the Board of Directors the continued operation of such bank is essential to provide 
adequate banking service in the community.  (U.S. Statutes at Large 64 (1950): 888-
889) 
In this way, the agency gained the ability to operate as a pseudo-lender of last resort.  The statute 
also reduced the premiums of insured banks through a rebate system that credited depository 
institutions’ payments for the upcoming year at the conclusion of each calendar year.  Finally, 
FDIA doubled the level of deposit insurance coverage from $5,000 to $10,000.   
 Lawmakers, however, apparently were still unsatisfied with the depositor protection 
provided by the FDIC a decade a half later, for they enacted another bill increasing the coverage 
amount by fifty percent.  Although the Financial Institutions and Supervisory Act of 1966 dealt 
primarily with issuing federal bank and thrift regulators temporary powers to handle unsafe 
banking practices and to remove bank and thrift officers engaging in such activities, the law also 
raised deposit coverage from $10,000 to $15,000.  The increase came from the House Banking 
and Currency Committee, which had tried to double the amount, but the conference committee 
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subsequently cut the increase in half.  Thus, in nearly thirty years of existence, the FDIC’s 
coverage limits had more than tripled in absolute dollar amounts, making the agency’s potential 
liability much greater in the event of bank failures.   
 Nearly six months after the FDIC gained its statutory independence, the Federal Reserve 
received its operating independence from the Treasury.  Aided by the conflicting problems of 
financing the Korean War and maintaining a stable monetary policy, the two agencies ultimately 
reached the Treasury-Fed Accord in March 1951 that freed the central bank from maintaining a 
fixed price on the federal government’s securities beyond the next issue.  In conjunction with a 
new Fed Chairman concerned with the independence of the institution, the Fed was now ready to 
devote its full energies to managing the money supply free from outside interference.   
 Through the mid fifties, policymakers had been contending with the spread of the holding 
company movement within the banking industry.  A bank holding company (bhc) is nothing 
more than a holding company controlling or owning one or more commercial banks.35  This form 
of banking organization was previously known as group banking.  According to the economist 
Allan Meltzer,  
Heightened political interest in monetary policy induced the System to look for 
external supporters in Congress and among the public.  Banks and financial 
institutions under regulatory control became a source of support, particularly after the 
1956 Bank Holding Company Act increased the Board’s power to approve or reject 
applications for new bank powers.  (Meltzer 2009: 46) 
The FRB solved this spreading problem and acquired a new constituency when the Bank 
Holding Company Act (BHCA) of 1956 made it the sole regulator of bank holding companies.   
                                                 
35
 Bank holding companies can be identified by their corporate titles which often contain one of the following terms: 
banc, bancshares, or corp. 
 69 
Enacted May 9, 1956, the BHCA introduced several important items.  First, it defined a 
bank holding company (bhc) as: 
any company (1) which directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to 
vote, 25 per centum or more of the voting shares of each of two or more banks or of a 
company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of this Act, or (2) 
which controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors of each of two 
or more banks….  (U.S. Statutes at Large 70 (1956): 133) 
This definition, however, applied neither to single bank holding companies nor to partnerships.36  
Thus a new loophole was created.  Furthermore, the act defined a “bank” as “any national 
banking association or any State bank, savings bank, or trust company” (U.S. Statutes at Large 
70 (1956): 133).  In this way, lawmakers defined banks according to the type of charter they 
possessed, yet doing so delegated the matter of determining the activities that constituted 
banking to the chartering authorities.   
The BHCA required all entities qualifying as a bank holding company to register with the 
Board of Governors.  The Fed also gained authority to issue all the necessary rules and orders 
necessary to implement the act.37  Henceforth, any entity seeking to form a bank holding 
company needed to obtain the FRB’s prior approval.  Likewise, the act required holding 
companies to receive prior approval before merging with another bhc or acquiring upwards of 
five percent of another bank’s voting shares.  The statute included the Douglas Amendment, 
named after Sen. Paul H. Douglas (D-IL), prohibiting bhcs from acquiring banks located outside 
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 Single bank holding companies are often referred to as one bank holding companies (obhcs).  In contrast, the 
BHCA only regulated bank holding companies owning multiple banks, also known as multi bank holding companies 
(mbhcs). 
37
 The Federal Reserve developed Regulation Y to promulgate rules for bank holding companies and their activities.   
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of their home state unless the state laws of the target bank explicitly authorized such purchases.38  
The BHCA provided aggrieved parties with the right of judicial review from the U.S. Court of 
Appeals in their respective districts.   
More importantly, the legislation made it unlawful thereafter for any bank holding 
company to acquire any corporation that was neither a bank nor another bhc.  Furthermore, it 
required holding companies to divest their interests in nonbanking companies within two years, 
but authorized the Board to issue no more than three one year extensions.  The BHCA, however, 
did not entirely prohibit bank holding companies from engaging in nonbanking activities, for it 
provided several exceptions for their subsidiaries.  The most important of these exceptions 
included sec. 4(c)(6) which stated: 
[The prohibitions in this section shall not apply] to shares of any company all the 
activities of which are of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature and which the 
Board after due notice and hearing, and on the basis of the record made at such 
hearing, by order has determined to be so closely related to the business of banking or 
of managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto and as to make it 
unnecessary for the prohibitions of this section to apply in order to carry out the 
purposes of this Act.  (U.S. Statutes at Large 70 (1956): 137)(Italics added) 
Afterwards, the Board narrowly interpreted the phrase “so closely related to the business of 
banking” by considering it in relation to the specific banks within the group that it severely 
limited affiliations with nonbanking interests.  Finally, the BHCA imposed a series of provisions 
in section 6 making it illegal for banks, regardless of Fed membership, to extend credit or loans 
to any of the nonbanking affiliates in the group.  Section 6 thus made Glass-Steagall’s section 
                                                 
38
 The Douglas Amendment appeared as section 3(d) of the BHCA. 
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23A irrelevant as it provided no circumstances under which credit could be extended among 
affiliates.   
 The Federal Reserve’s bank holding company authority underwent revisions a decade 
later with the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1966.  For the purposes of the 
Board’s subsequent actions concerning bhcs, three revisions were of most importance.  First, 
section 3(c) of this statute amended section 2(b) of the BHCA to read as follows, “‘Bank’ means 
any institution that accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand” 
(U.S. Statutes at Large 80 (1966): 236).  In this way, lawmakers began refining the definition of 
a bank from one based on the type of charter to one based on the activities engaged in.  Second, 
the act revised the BHCA’s section 4(c), moving what had been the sixth paragraph to the eighth 
paragraph.  The wording of this paragraph remained practically unchanged.  Third, section 9 of 
this statute totally repealed the BHCA’s section 6, thereby making section 23A operable again.  
This revision represented a liberalizing of inter-affiliate transactions.   
THE NIXON/FORD YEARS 
 As President Nixon entered the White House in 1969, banking regulation was once again 
attracted Capitol Hill’s attention.  Though the BHCA controlled the spread of mbhcs, obhcs had 
grown significantly over the last five years.  The Nixon Administration had promised legislators 
that it would offer bills in both Houses to reform holding company regulation, but it missed a 
number of deadlines, leading House Banking and Currency Committee Chairman Wright Patman 
(D-TX) on February 17 to offer his own bill (HR 6778).  Rep. Patman’s bill closed the loophole 
that exempted obhcs.  Among other things, HR 6778 extended bank holding company regulation 
to obhcs under the Federal Reserve Boards’ jurisdiction and mandated the holding companies 
divest all their nonbanking activities regardless of when they began them.   
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 Citing the worrisome “trend toward the combining of banking and business,” President 
Nixon finally announced on March 24 two identical administration bills (HR 9385 and S 1664) 
that he was sending up to Capitol Hill.  In contrast to the Patman bill which gave sole regulatory 
responsibility to the Fed, the administration’s bills divided the responsibility among the three 
federal regulators.  Rather than mandate the divestiture of nonbanking activities, the Nixon bills 
exempted nonbanking activities begun prior to July 1, 1968.  Furthermore, the administration 
measures delegated the determination of permissible nonbanking activities, such as operating a 
mutual fund, to the court system.  Upon its introduction to in the House, Patman expressed his 
disapproval of the proposed legislation by saying, “The Administration bill has crippling defects 
right at the nerve center of this entire legislative effort” (Congressional Quarterly 1970a).   
 A few weeks after the introduction of the Nixon Administration bill, the House Banking 
Committee began hearings on the proposed legislation.  Spanning from April 15 until May 9, 
Patman’s Committee held some fourteen days worth of hearings.  During this process, the 
committee heard testimony from numerous witnesses from the regulatory agencies, the banking 
industry, banking trade groups, and consumer groups.  The main concerns involved allocating 
regulatory authority and handling obhcs’ all ready acquired nonbanking activities.   
 On June 27 by a 29-5 vote, the Banking Committee approved HR 6778.  Though the 
approved version maintained much of Patman’s original bill, such as concentrating regulatory 
oversight of all bank holding companies in the Federal Reserve, it contained a few noteworthy 
changes.  The committee inserted a “functionally related” test for the Board of Governors to use 
when determining the permissibility of bhcs’ nonbanking activities.  The committee also added a 
prohibition against holding company subsidiaries selling mutual fund shares and serving as an 
 73 
insurance agent.  Furthermore, the committee included a grandfather date that upheld obhcs’ 
nonbanking activities entered into before February 17, 1969.   
 The Banking Committee passed HR 6778 in mid summer, but the House did not approve 
the bill until November 5.  The House passed version still granted the Board of Governors all 
regulatory oversight of bank holding companies.  It also maintained the Banking Committee’s 
“functionally related” test, not to mention the specific prohibitions against certain holding 
company nonbanking activities.  It redefined a bank holding company as a company controlling 
one or more banks, rather than as one holding at least twenty-five percent of the voting shares.  
House members amended the grandfathering date, rolling it back from February 17, 1969, to 
May 9, 1956, the day on which the BHCA was enacted.  By rolling back the date in this way, the 
House required any single bank holding companies that acquired nonbanking activities since the 
original BHCA to divest themselves of them.  With the congressional session drawing to a close, 
HR 6778 proceeded to the Senate where it waited until the following year for consideration. 
 Before year’s end, though, lawmakers completed work on one other banking bill of note.  
With the current statutory authority to establish interest rate ceiling about to expire, Congress 
needed to extend regulators’ Regulation Q authority.  Otherwise, commercial banks and thrifts 
might outbid one another for funds, thereby endangering the health of the banking system.  The 
Senate first passed a bill (S 2577) in mid November extending interest rate control authority until 
September 22, 1970, and providing another source of mortgage financing through the federal 
government.   
Following on the Senate’s action, Rep. Patman and nineteen Banking Committee co-
sponsors introduced a bill (HR 15091) on December 4 that extended rate ceiling authority March 
22, 1971, employed the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to establish a secondary market for 
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mortgages, permitted national banks to make mortgage loans with only ten percent down for 
periods of up to thirty years, and, most importantly for regulatory purposes, raised the deposit 
insurance coverage limit from $15,000 to $25,000.  The House approved HR 15091 thirteen days 
later by a margin of 260-136, but a number of Republicans voted against the measure.  
According to Congressional Quarterly, the Republican member of the Banking Committee in 
particular opposed HR 15091 because they were of the understanding that the bill would only 
pertain to Regulation Q authority (Congressional Quarterly 1970b).   
With Christmas nearly a week away, a conference assembled the following day and 
reached an accord.  Conferees adopted the House extension for interest rate ceilings, dropped the 
provision granting national banks greater mortgage lending powers, and lowered the House bill’s 
deposit insurance increase by $5,000 to $20,000.  Both chambers the next day easily approved 
the conference report.  President Nixon signed the Credit Control Act of 1969 on December 23.  
This statutory change was primarily important because it raised FDIC coverage, thereby 
increasing the federal government’s contingent liability in the event of bank failures.     
 As 1970 began, the issue of banking reform and the perceived threat of one bank holding 
companies and their expansion persisted on the minds of lawmakers.  President Nixon signaled 
on February 2 his continued interest in banking reform when he included in his first Economic 
Report the announcement that he intended to appoint a presidential commission on the structure 
and regulation of the banking system.   
Nearly two months passed without any further action on the proposed bank holding 
company legislation when President Nixon announced on April 21 that he was appointing Reed 
O. Hunt to chair his presidential commission.  A week later in a planning meeting of the 
commission held at the Treasury Department, though, Hunt announced that the commission 
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would be unable to produce any study of the obhc problem until early 1971 at the soonest.  
Consequently, members of Congress hoping for presidential guidance would have to wait quite a 
bit longer.   
 It was in this context that the Senate Banking and Currency Committee considered 
proposed legislation on the regulation of one bank holding companies.  In addition to HR 6778 
which the House had all ready passed, the Banking Committee had a bill (S 1052) introduced by 
Sen. William Proxmire (D-WI) closely resembling the original HR 6778 and the Nixon 
Administration’s bill (S 1664).  In more than ten days of hearings beginning May 12, the 
committee heard testimony on the policy issue; it received testimony from administration 
officials, the federal banking regulators, banking trade group representatives, members of the 
banking industry, and members of competing industries.  Among the regulators, the principal 
concern revolved around the assignment of regulatory jurisdiction.  Whereas the Comptroller of 
the Currency insisted that lawmakers should divide the responsibility among the three federal 
regulators, the FDIC, somewhat surprisingly, came out in favor of assigning one agency the 
responsibility, reasoning, “It might be extremely difficult to achieve unanimity among the three 
agencies” (Congressional Quarterly 1971).  The Fed, of course, had basically favored 
consolidating the responsibility under it from the start. 
 The Senate Banking Committee eventually reported a bill (HR 6778) on August 10.  The 
committee’s bill resembled the House’s by granting the Board sole regulatory authority.  It 
defined a bank holding company as any company determined by the FRB to have control over a 
bank or controlling twenty-five percent or more of the election of a bank’s directors.  Unlike its 
House counterpart, this one did not prohibit specific nonbanking activities, rather it delegated 
those decisions to the Board.  As for obhcs’ nonbanking activities, the bill permitted retention of 
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activities begun before March 24, 1969, thereby establishing a much later grandfathering date 
than the House.  The Senate Banking Committee’s HR 6778 mandated the divestiture of 
nonbanking activities begun after that date, but granted the holding companies at least five years 
to comply and the option of receiving an additional five year extension with the FRB’s 
permission.  It also prohibited banks from tying in extensions of credit to the purchase of other 
services from affiliated companies within the banking group.  Finally, it created a “public 
benefit” test for the Board to use when determining whether to permit nonbanking activities. 
 The next month on September 16, the Senate approved HR 6778 by a 77-1 margin; Sen. 
Proxmire was the lone dissenting vote.  With the exception of a few alterations, the upper 
chamber passed the bill as reported by its Banking Committee.  Of greatest significance, the 
Senate adopted one of Proxmire’s amendments moving back the grandfather date from March 
24, 1969 to June 30, 1968.  The chamber also exempted a certain class of trust companies 
chartered under Missouri law along with Rhode Island chartered mutual savings banks.  
Although the Senate maintained the anti-tying provisions of the bill, it amended them to exclude 
transactions involving solely bank-related products such as deposits, loans, and fiduciary 
services. 
 The conference committee, however, did not convene until mid November. The most 
significant disagreement to be resolved concerned what criteria would determine the nonbanking 
activities of holding companies.  The Senate’s version of HR 6778 contained both a 
“functionally related” and a “public benefits” test whereas the House version contained only the 
former.  Furthermore, the Senate bill did not prohibit any specific nonbanking activities.  The 
other major point of contention surrounded the grandfathering of nonbanking activities.  The 
House approved measured required divestiture of nonbanking activities begun since the 
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enactment of the original Bank Holding Company of 1956 whereas the Senate measure 
contained the more recent date of June 30, 1968.  The Senate conferees ultimately prevailed not 
only in gaining adoption of their grandfathering date, but also weakening the determination of 
permissible nonbanking activities going forward by requiring the FRB to apply both the 
“functionally related” and “public benefits” tests.  Although the House’s version contained more 
stringent anti-tying provisions, the conference adopted the Senate’s version instead with its 
exemptions for typical bank products.  Likewise, the conference kept the Senate’s grant of legal 
standing to bhcs’ competitors to bring judicial review challenges.  The conference submitted a 
final report on December 15. 
 With the end of the first session of the 91st Congress fast approaching, the two chambers 
wasted little time approving the conference report.  Even though House conferees acquiesced in 
most of the Senate’s demands for the proposed legislation, Rep. Patman defended the bill in the 
House claiming, “the version of the bill that is now being presented…is substantially similar to 
the bill originally introduced by me in February 1969” (Congressional Quarterly 1971).  The 
House easily approved the report December 16 with only four members opposing.  The next day 
the Senate followed suit by voice vote.  Even Sen. Proxmire, who provided the sole nay vote 
earlier, evidenced a change of mind and voted for the report, stating, “the bill recommended by 
the joint House-Senate conference committee is a fair compromise and represents an effective 
approach to regulating one-bank holding companies” (Congressional Quarterly 1971).  With 
congressional approval completed, President Nixon signed HR 6778 December 31.   
 In addition to assigning the Federal Reserve Board sole regulatory responsibility, the 
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 introduced other important changes to the 
structure and distribution of banking regulation.  First, the legislation redefined a bank holding 
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company as any company having control over one or more banks.  Such control included acting 
directly or indirectly through another entity to vote at least twenty-five percent of the voting 
shares, controlling the selection of a majority of a bank’s directors, or having been determined by 
the Board to be exercising a controlling influence on one or more banks.  Partnerships were still 
exempted from this definition.  Second, the statute redefined “bank,” which appeared in sec. 2(c) 
of the original BHCA, to mean “any institution…which (1) accepts deposits that the depositor 
has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the business of making commercial 
loans” (U.S. Statutes at Large 84 (1970): 1762).  By defining banks as depository institutions 
that made both commercial loans and provided demand deposits, lawmakers had inadvertently 
created the “nonbank bank” loophole, whereby firms could perform either function and avoid 
being classified as a bank.  Third, to differentiate banks from other depository institutions, the 
law defined a “thrift institution” to mean “(1) a domestic building and loan or savings and loan 
association, (2) a cooperative bank without capital stock organized and operated for mutual 
purposes and without profit, or (3) a mutual savings bank not having capital stock represented by 
shares” (U.S. Statutes at Large 84 (1970): 1763).  This redefinition of thrift institutions 
resembled the way in which the BHCA originally defined banks based on their charter type.   
Fourth, and most importantly for the purposes of determining the interests bank holding 
companies may have in nonbanking organizations, the statute replaced Sec. 4(c)(8) of the BHCA 
with the following: 
[The prohibitions of this section shall not apply to] shares of any company the 
activities of which the Board after due notice and opportunity for hearing has 
determined (by order or regulation) to be so closely related to banking or managing 
or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.  In determining whether a 
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particular activity is a proper incident to banking or managing or controlling banks 
the Board shall consider whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding company 
can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public…that outweigh possible 
adverse effects.  (U.S. Statutes at Large 84 (1970): 1765)(Italics added) 
By inserting this new section into the statute, legislators granted the Board of Governors greater 
leeway to interpret holding companies’ activities, thereby liberalizing the activity restrictions.  
 With the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, federal lawmakers 
successfully updated banking law to close one loophole through which banking organizations 
were expanding into nonbanking activities.  The day before the House approved the conference 
report for HR 6778, however, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case of Investment 
Company Institute v. Camp.39  The case arose out of two separate but related actions by the 
Comptroller of the Currency, one involving a rule generated permitting banks to establish and 
run collective investment funds and the other involving an order granted to the First National 
City Bank of New York permitting the establishment and operation of such a fund.40  Basically, 
the case concerned banks’ attempt to enter the mutual fund industry.   
In reaching its ruling which it delivered in April 1971, the Court considered Glass-
Steagall’s legislative history and the restrictions it imposed on banks’ activities; this was the 
institution’s first interpretation of the Banking Act’s activity restrictions.  The Justices began by 
drawing on their holding from the previous year’s case of Association of Data Processing 
Service Organizations v. Camp, in which they held that aggrieved parties that suffer from the 
competition posed by bank entry into their industry have legal standing to sue (397 U.S. 150 
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 The Investment Company Institute (ICI) is the trade group representing investment companies, which include 
mutual funds, and investment trusts.  From 1971 onwards, the ICI was a repeat litigant against the banking industry.  
The trade group was established following the 1940 enactment of the Investment Company Act. 
40
 These two original controversies arose in the sixties from actions taken by the OCC under William B. Camp’s 
predecessor James J. Saxon. 
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(1970)).  The Supreme Court then considered the mutual funds and determined they fell within 
the meaning of the term “securities” prohibited by the Banking Act, so it overturned the 
Comptroller’s two actions.  Furthermore, the majority opinion indicated that the most troubling 
aspect was the Comptroller’s post hoc rationalizations of his rule-making exercise:  
[T]he Comptroller adopted no expressly articulated position at the administrative 
level as to the meaning and impact of the provisions of Sections 16 and 21 as they 
affect bank investment funds.  The Comptroller promulgated Regulation 9 without 
opinion or accompanying statement.  ICI v. Camp 401 U.S. 617 (1971) 
The Justices temporarily halted banks’ expansions into other financial services industries, but 
their reasoning did not preclude all expansions, rather it appeared to indicate the need to provide 
adequate justification on the part of the regulatory agency.  The Court may have preserved the 
Glass portion of the Banking Act, but the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was 
about to pervert the Steagall component irrevocably. 
 Although an action undertaken by the FDIC in July 1971 involved the first use of another 
method for handling bank failures rather than an expansion of the banking industry’s activities, it 
had far-reaching effects as the subsequent four decades have shown.  Prior to this date, the FDIC 
used two methods for handling failures: either it closed the bank and paid off depositors or it sold 
off the bank’s assets, thereby transferring the accounts to another bank.  Because the Unity Bank 
and Trust Company of Roxbury, Massachusetts was a very unappealing acquisition due to its 
clientele and neighborhood, a payoff would have most likely been the only available option.  As 
a result, Unity’s closure threatened to deprive the community of banking services, and, according 
to regulators, might even lead to racial unrest.  According to FDIC board member Irvine 
Sprague, “In 1971 no one could be sure that the failure of a black bank in a rundown urban 
 81 
center would touch off a new round of 1960s-style rioting.  The Watts…and Detroit race 
riots….came very readily to mind when we though about Unity” (Sprague 1986: 38).  Working 
with area bankers and the Massachusetts Banking Commissioner, since Unity was a state-
chartered institution, the FDIC crafted a plan to bring in new bank management and provide 
loans from both the private sector and the federal government; it announced its plan on July 27.41  
Thus began the FDIC’s foray into bank bailouts, yet this action received scant notice.42    
 Meanwhile, pursuant to its recently altered BHCA authority, the Board of Governors 
announced Regulation Y changes.  Having considered the meaning of the phrase “so closely 
related to banking,” the Fed determined that “acting as insurance agent or broker in offices at 
which the holding company or its subsidiaries are otherwise engaged in business (or in an office 
adjacent thereto)” fell within the statute’s meaning and was therefore permissible (57 Fed. Res. 
Bull. 674-675, August 1971).  This new regulation represented a very generous grant of powers, 
for it did not make the expansion of activities contingent upon operating out of a small 
community where one of the subsidiary banks conducted business.    
 Less than six months after Unity, the FDIC reused its newly discovered resolution tool to 
prevent the insolvency of Detroit’s Bank of the Commonwealth.  The Detroit bank had been 
experiencing significant problems for some years now.  Unlike Unity, Commonwealth had over 
a billion dollars worth assets, so its failure would be considerably more harmful.  Federal 
regulators had earlier forced out top executives and directors, and in January 1971, Chase 
Manhattan Bank, Commonwealth’s largest creditor, took possession of the bank.  Within a few 
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 For nearly a decade afterwards, Unity Bank limped along without paying off its private sector creditors or the 
federal government.  As a result, the state banking commissioner later closed the institution and the FDIC took it 
into receivership on June 30, 1982; this time the FDIC sold off the assets to another bank to facilitate a merger.  The 
bank evidently was no longer “essential” to its community. 
42The FDIC does not refer to these transactions as “bailouts,” rather it labels them instances of “open-bank 
assistance.”  
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months Chase tired of its creditor position and approached the FDIC about a means of getting 
back its investment plus expenses.  According to Sprague, agency officials at the agency initially 
balked at the proposal.    After months of negotiations between Chase and the regulators, though, 
the issue that led Sprague to become the second vote for an “essentiality” finding was Chase’s 
agreement to suffer some loss (Sprague 1986: 71).43   The FDIC and Fed announced their rescue 
plan January 18, 1972, which included a loan from the Corporation and limits on shareholders’ 
dividends.  The FDIC’s legal counsel justified its action on two grounds, namely 
“Commonwealth’s service to the black community of Detroit and concentration” in the city 
(Sprague 1986: 72).  This second federal bailout, though, even with its much larger size, still did 
not trigger much reaction from the public or elected officials.   
Responding to the volatility of interest rates and consumer demands for alternative 
interest bearing deposit outlets, the Consumer Savings Bank of Worcester, Massachusetts in July 
1970 proposed negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts (Gibson 1975: 19).  The NOW 
account innovation was simply a savings account permitting withdrawals using drafts written to 
third parties, thereby providing a means of payment much like a checking account, but unlike a 
demand deposit, paying interest.44   On September 28, 1970 the state banking commissioner 
denied Consumer Savings’ application.  The mutual savings bank quickly filed suit in state court.  
In early May 1972, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ultimately decided the case for 
Consumer Savings, arguing “We do not agree with the commissioner that use of the negotiable 
withdrawal order create a new account” (Consumer Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Banks 361 
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 The FDIC employed the “essentiality” doctrine two more times before decade’s end.  The next instance occurred 
on September 9, 1974, when the FDIC declared American Bank & Trust of Orangeburg, SC, “essential.”  This 
finding lasted only four days, at which time the agency closed the bank.  Then, on March 15, 1976, the FDIC 
declared Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware “essential” and provided assistance.  Farmers Bank, however, was 
unusual in that DE owned nearly half the stock and was one of the bank’s largest depositors. 
44
 Depository institutions offering NOW accounts reserved the right to require 30-90 days notice before permitting 
withdrawals, so technically speaking, these accounts differed from actual demand deposits in the eyes of the law.   
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Mass. 717 (1972)).  About a month later Consumer Savings Bank began offering customers 
NOW accounts; ten other Massachusetts mutual savings banks followed suit the next month, 
and, in September New Hampshire mutual savings banks began offering them (Gibson 1975: 
19).  According to one Federal Reserve banking analyst, Massachusetts mutual savings banks 
were in a unusual position because so many of them were both state-chartered and state-insured 
that the federal government had little control over them (Gibson 1975: 19).  Thus began the 
banking community’s innovations in transaction services, innovations that would ultimately blur 
the distinctions between different types of depository institutions established by Glass-Steagall. 
 The banking industry, though, was also busy trying to expand through other means.  
Bankers Trust New York Corporation (BTNYC), for instance, tried expanding across state lines 
in Florida by establishing a new holding company nonbanking subsidiary providing investment 
advisory services.  Before the Federal Reserve Board ruled on the application, Florida had 
enacted a law clearly targeting Bankers Trust by prohibiting out-of-state corporations from 
owning investment advisory firms unless they were operating before December 21, 1972. As a 
result, the entire Board rejected the proposal on April 19, 1973, concluding, “[T]he recently 
enacted legislation was intended to, and does, prohibit the performance of investment advisory 
services in Florida by non-Florida bank holding companies” (59 Fed. Res. Bull. 365, May 1973).  
Though Bankers Trust’s interstate expansion plans were thwarted, the bank holding company 
still had other options available as the Board assumed the constitutionality of all Florida’s 
actions.   
With federal regulators’ Regulation Q authority scheduled to expire June 1, Rep. Fernand 
St. Germain (D-RI) had introduced a bill (HR 6370) at the end of March extending the authority 
through the end of 1974.  Nearly a month later the House easily approved the measure, but in so 
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doing, it attached a Banking Committee amendment prohibiting NOW accounts nationwide.  On 
a vote of 76-0 nearly two weeks afterwards, the Senate passed similar legislation extending 
federal authority over rates, but unlike the House, it attached an amendment prohibiting mutual 
savings banks, except for those in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, from offering NOW 
accounts.  The two differing amendments produced by the House and Senate surrounding the 
provision of NOW accounts tied up the conference committee for months even as rate ceiling 
authority was about to expire. 
 Because rate ceiling authority expired June 1, legislators warned depository institutions 
not to raise rates to meet market levels since they still planned to extend the authority.  Toward 
this end, in late June both chambers hurriedly enacted measures to extend the authority 
temporarily until August 1, 1973, by which time they hoped to have resolved their conference 
differences on HR 6370.  Then, on July 31, House and Senate conferees finally reached an 
agreement on HR 6370; President Nixon signed the legislation three days later.  The compromise 
extended federal authority over interest rates until the end of 1974 and granted all federally 
chartered bank and thrift institutions located in New Hampshire and Massachusetts the authority 
to offer NOW accounts.  Under this agreement, Massachusetts and New Hampshire depository 
institutions would provide an experimental laboratory for this new type of transaction accounts.    
 As the following year began, the President’s Commission on Financial Structure and 
Regulation report attracted much of the attention of the policymaking community. The 
President’s Commission, more commonly known as the Hunt Commission after its chairman 
Reed O. Hunt, had submitted its report following completion of its eighteen month study late last 
December, but Congress had all ready adjourned.  The presidential commission was composed 
of twenty individuals a number of whom were corporate executives in the banking and finance 
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industries, though it also contained economists and even a representative from the AFL-CIO.45   
The Commission was especially concerned with “protecting financial institutions from 
disintermediation” (U.S. Senate 1973: 15).46  
 To alleviate the strains on the banking system, the Hunt Commission put forth a number 
of policy recommendations for lawmakers’ consideration.  On the regulation of interest rates, the 
commission suggested eliminating the controls on time and savings deposits, but not the one 
setting the rate at zero percent for demand deposits.  The panel also suggested expanding the 
powers of depository institutions to engage in a wider array of activities, ranging from making 
other types of loans to investing in various types of securities.  The Commission proposed 
making charter conversions easier for all types of depository institutions and lifting the 
branching limitation to allow intrastate branching.  Another proposal sought to make Federal 
Reserve membership mandatory for all state-chartered commercial banks, S&Ls, and mutual 
savings banks that offer transaction accounts.  The Commission also recognized the need to 
develop more uniform standards for how the FDIC handled bank failures and to consider criteria 
other than the least cost when determining how to handle bank failures.  The panel advocated 
creating a new agency to oversee all the state-chartered depository institutions and renaming the 
OCC the Office of the National Bank Administrator and granting it the responsibility for 
overseeing all federally chartered banks.   
 Toward the end of the year, the failure of the United States National Bank (USNB) of 
San Diego, California startled the American public and the policymakers.  There had been little 
warning from the OCC prior to its closure on October 18, 1972.  USNB had assets of 
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 Alan Greenspan, the future Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, was one of the twenty 
commissioners. 
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 The term “disintermediation” was a fairly new one tracing its origins back to a New York Times article that stated, 
“the refinancing got high marks from Wall Street because of the Government’s effort to lessen “disintermediation” – 
heavy withdrawals from savings institutions for direct investment in the securities market” (Allan 1968: 67).    
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approximately $1.2 billion when it became insolvent, and its downfall marked the largest bank 
failure since the Great Depression.  Since the late 1950s, USNB was engaged in questionable 
lending to insiders and firms affiliated with its directors; this behavior triggered repeated 
regulatory criticism, but the bank had always managed to satisfy the regulators’ complaints.  
Rather than being a casualty of the recession and the economic times, however, U.S. National’s 
failure ultimately resulted largely from “self-dealing” (White 1992: 26).  Until November 1972, 
however, OCC examiners had not classified the bank in the problem category in danger of 
failure.  The OCC then took another eleven months before finally placing the institution into 
receivership.  As a result, the Comptroller’s office received heavy criticism from the media and 
lawmakers in Washington for its apparent lack of thoroughness in the examining process and 
lack of promptness in taking action.   
With U.S. National’s failure fresh in the public consciousness, the House Banking 
Committee wasted little time in January 1974 reporting a banking bill (HR 11221).  Most 
importantly, the measure raised deposit coverage limits from $20,000 to $50,000; in addition, it 
fully guaranteed the time and demand deposit accounts of governmental units without regard to 
the amount.  The purpose of such increases in deposit insurance was not only to reassure the 
American public, but, more importantly, to entice more funds into the banking system during a 
time of high interest rates.  Nearly two weeks afterwards on February 5, the full chamber 
approved HR 11221 by nearly a two hundred vote margin.   
The Senate, however, was in little hurry to act on the measure, for not until June 4 did the 
Senate Banking Committee report is version of HR 11221.  The Banking Committee made 
several changes from the House version.  Chief among them concerned the deposit coverage 
limits on which it removed the unlimited federal guarantee on the time and demand deposits of 
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local governmental units and the $50,000 limit for individuals that it lowered to $25,000.  
Against the wishes of Sen. William Proxmire (D-WI), the soon-to-be chairman, the committee 
attached an amendment allowing a limited number of federally chartered S&Ls, to demutualize 
and convert to stock corporations.  In addition, the Senate Banking Committee included an 
amendment extending through 1975 federal banking agencies’ authority to establish interest rate 
ceilings.  Then, nine days later the Senate passed its version of HR 11221 by a margin of 89-0.   
Because of the two HR 11221s, House and Senate members convened a conference.  At 
the beginning of October, conferees reached an accord when House members accepted most of 
the Senate amendments added to HR 11221.  Most notably, the two chambers diverged widely 
on the increased coverage limits of federal deposit insurance.  Whereas the House wanted a limit 
of $50,000, the Senate desired a limit of $25,000; the conferees agreed to increase the coverage 
limit to $40,000.  The conference committee also increased coverage for governmental unit 
deposits to $100,000.  In addition, the conferees accepted the Senate’s extension of federal 
authority to set rate ceilings.  The committee also acquiesced in the Senate’s attachment of the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act amendment that essentially prohibited depository institutions from 
discriminating based on sex or marital status.  On October 9 and 10, respectively, the House and 
Senate approved the conference report with only a single House member voting against the bill.  
President Gerald Ford, who had taken office August 9 following Richard Nixon’s resignation 
over Watergate, signed the bill October 28.     
 Meanwhile, on the day the House approved the conference report for HR 11221, Franklin 
National Bank (FNB) of New York failed.  This bank had been among the nation’s twenty 
largest banks and had had nearly $5 billion in assets at its height.  At its height, FNB held 
approximately $5 billion in assets and was among the nation’s twenty largest banks.  Unlike 
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USNB which collapsed largely due to insider dealing, FNB failed because of its overexposure to 
the international lending markets.  Although Franklin National began on Long Island, it 
expanded into New York City in the sixties to compete with the money center banks.  When 
American banks were squeezed by rate ceilings in the late sixties and seventies, FNB followed 
the other money center banks to Europe where it could pay market rates of interest.  To meet the 
extremely high interest rates, the bank took to speculating in foreign exchange (FX) markets.  
When U.S. inflation surged in the mid seventies, though, Franklin National’s bet on the 
American dollar cost the institution dearly.  Following its holding company’s May 1974 
announcement that it would cease dividend payments, a run ensued.  As a result, the bank lost 
over a billion dollars in a little over a month.  The Federal Reserve reluctantly provided FNB 
advances to stem the panic, while the Comptroller decided how to handle the failing bank.  The 
OCC did not close the institution for another four months.  The failure of Franklin National 
raised the new specter for regulators of what to do when such a large bank verged on insolvency.  
Since they had never really faced such an issue before, they had no plans in place.  For that 
matter, neither did elected officials as they were too busy with Watergate and the political fallout 
from the midterm elections to pay much attention at the time to the bank failure.   
 When the 94th Congress convened in January 1975, the political landscape had changed 
dramatically with the arrival to Capitol Hill of many freshman Democrats and the turnover of the 
House and Senate Banking Committee Chairmanships.  In the upper chamber, Sen. William 
Proxmire (D-WI) became chairman of the Banking Committee when Sen. John J. Sparkman (D-
AL) vacated the position to take the helm of the Foreign Relations Committee.  In the lower 
chamber by contrast, freshmen Democrats revolted against the seniority system and deposed a 
handful of committee chairman, including Rep. Wright Patman; in his place, Rep. Henry S. 
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Reuss (D-WI) became Chairman of the Banking Committee.  Even with this changed political 
landscape, though, both chambers pursued banking industry reform, having not tackled the 
problem late the prior year.   
Because the House Banking Committee had begun its own comprehensive study of the nation’s 
banking system, it did not participate in any comprehensive banking reform; instead, it focused 
on legislation narrowly tailored to reduce inflationary pressures.  Out of this legislative effort in 
the spring, Chairman Reuss introduced a bill (HR 6676) requiring the credit allocation activities 
of the twenty largest American commercial banks be tracked by regulator.  The measure required 
the group of banks to report the amount of loans they made to individuals in nine delineated 
categories.  Fearing that such a bill would entangle the federal government in the credit 
allocation process, House members on June 23 defeated it in a floor vote.  
 Even though the House had deferred any comprehensive banking reform legislation until 
the completion of its study, the Senate pushed ahead with a bill (S 1267).  By the time the Senate 
Banking Committee reported its measure on November 20, ten banks had all ready failed in the 
year to date, the first time bank failures had reached double-digits since WWII.47   The Senate 
bill resembled the Hunt Commission’s policy recommendations.  The measure phased out 
Regulation Q ceilings within five and a half years, but in the interim, it did not eliminate the 
existing differential between banks and S&Ls.  Unlike the Hunt Commission, however, S 1267 
ended the prohibition against checking account interest.  The bill also allowed thrifts to offer 
checking accounts and commercial banks and thrifts nationwide to offer NOW accounts, thereby 
eliminating many of the distinctions between the depository institutions.  Furthermore, the 
measure expanded the investment and lending powers of banks and thrifts, not to mention 
permitting federal S&Ls to convert to stock corporations.  On December 11, the Senate easily 
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 Two more banks failed in the latter half of December, bringing the annual failure total to twelve. 
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approved S 1267.  In passing the bill, however, the chamber made some minor revisions, most 
notably postponing elimination of the prohibition against paying interest on checking accounts 
for a year.  Because the House failed to act on the bill preferring to wait until the completion of 
its study in 1976, the proposed legislation went nowhere. 
 A few days before the Senate Banking Committee reported S 1267, Sen. Proxmire 
introduced some incremental banking reforms with another bill (S 2672) extending the existing 
prohibitions against instituting certain local taxes on out-of-state depository institutions.  The 
Senate Banking Committee reported this more modest bill November 20.  The full Senate then 
considered and approved the measure December 8; the full House followed suit eight days later, 
but, in the process amended it.  Because of these amendments and the action occurred at the end 
of the congressional session, the bill lingered until early February when the Senate agreed to the 
House version and added amendments and the House concurred in the resulting legislation.  On 
February 27, 1976, President Ford then signed S 1267.  In addition to extending the prohibitions 
against taxing foreign banking institutions, PL 94-222 granted all federally chartered banks and 
thrifts in CT, ME, RI, and VT the ability to offer NOW accounts, thereby extending NOW 
account authority to all the New England states and creating an experimental laboratory in which 
to test the financial innovations.   
With the two largest American bank failures having occurred within the last two years, 
the Senate was trying to deal with the nation’s problem banks so that policymakers were not 
caught unaware again.   Though the issue of troubled banks is typically too esoteric for the 
general public, a number of newspaper stories early in the year exposing the names of 
endangered depository institutions generated much concern and demand for legislative action.  
One of the first such instances appeared January 11 on the Washington Post’s front page when 
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the paper ran a story titled “Citibank, Chase Manhattan on U.S. Problem List” in which it 
disclosed the “privileged” information (Kessler 1976).   
 In March the House Banking Committee proposed a number of bills, the most important 
of which imposed the system of federal banking regulation of foreign banks operating in the 
United States (HR 13876).  Unlike American banks which were separated not only from other 
areas of commerce, but also from the other financial service industries, foreign banks were 
structured differently with no separation from these other industries.  As a result, they had not 
been subjected to the bank regulatory system as domestic banks had.  Foreign banks thus avoided 
deposit insurance, branching restrictions, and activity limitations.  Instead, the individual states 
had taken sole responsibility for chartering and regulating foreign banking entities.  By extending 
federal regulatory authority, legislators hoped to eliminate foreign banks’ competitive 
advantages.  Although the House ultimately passed the measure in late July, the bill died in the 
Senate.   
 The month before the House approved HR 13876, the Banking Committee released the 
entirety of its long-awaited Financial Institutions in the Nation’s Economy (FINE) Study.  The 
project originated in April 1975 when the House Banking Committee selected the economist 
James Pierce to lead a group of academic experts examining the banking system and suggesting 
possible reforms.  The study, which was composed of individually authored papers, was intended 
to inform the committee and provide a starting point for reforms.  The study provided Congress 
with a means of recapturing from the executive branch the issue of banking regulation. 
The FINE Study presented its policy proposals in the first chapter titled “Discussion 
Principles.”  Central to this study’s proposal was the notion that “the present system must give 
way to a single, strong Federal Depository Institutions Commission that will better serve the 
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public interest and the interest of the financial community here and abroad” (U.S. House 1976: 
16).  In this way, FINE sought to consolidate regulatory authority for all depository institutions, 
regardless of state or federal charter, in this one federal agency.  This agency even received 
regulatory oversight of foreign banks operating in the United States, thereby extending the bank 
regulatory structure to foreign competitors.  With the creation of this agency, the Federal Reserve 
relinquished its regulatory oversight of banks and bank holding companies, but it gain greater 
authority over the monetary system by the requirement that all depository institutions join the 
Federal Reserve System.   
FINE focused not only on the architecture of the banking system, but also on providing 
depository institutions the requisite powers so that they could compete safely and effectively in 
the contemporary environment.  One such power included interstate branching by all federally 
insured depository institutions provided that individual states did not prohibit it.  The Federal 
Depository Institutions Commission, though, would regulate all interstate branching.  The study 
recognized that fluctuating interest rates had a deleterious effect on depository institutions, for 
“artificial ceilings on interest rates paid to depositors reduce the incentive to save, discriminate 
against small savers, and have not succeeded in preventing disintermediation” (U.S. House 1976: 
7).  To position depository institutions to meet the challenges posed by fluctuating interest rates, 
it advocated eliminating all Regulation Q ceilings and the statutory prohibition against the 
payment of interest on checking accounts.  The study proposed that the Federal Depository 
Institutions Commission handle the phasing out of these rate controls.  FINE proposed expanding 
the list of powers available to depository institutions, such as authorizing thrifts to offer 
transaction accounts and make more commercial loans, thereby making them behave more like 
banks.  It also suggested making the process easier for thrifts to convert to banks.  This 
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conversion process entailed thrifts demutualizing, and, in so doing, gaining access to more 
capital.  With the 1976 presidential election less than six months away, however, the legislative 
impetus for banking reform receded, and no action of any note occurred concerning FINE before 
year’s end. 
THE CARTER YEARS  
With the federal government back under the Democrats’ unified control, lawmakers 
returned to banking policy in 1977.  The year’s major legislative initiative, though, which took 
nearly six months to complete, did not begin as a bill having anything to do with banking.  
Instead, the measure originated as a housing and urban aid bill.  In one of the Carter 
administration’s earliest actions, the Housing and Urban Development Secretary Patricia Roberts 
Norris asked Congress in testimony February 24 to increase federal housing programs 
substantially and extend the community development block grant program for another three 
years.    
In response to the HUD Secretary’s request, House Banking Chair Reuss and several 
colleagues introduced a bill (HR 6655) in late April to redevelop urban areas by streamlining the 
urban grant process.  The Banking Committee quickly passed the measure on May 2, and the 
House followed suit on May 11.  Because the bill concerned large grants for urban renewal, the 
main area of dispute surrounded the funding formula.  Throughout its legislative development in 
the House, the bill lacked any anti-discriminatory provisions applying to depository institutions 
and had nothing to do with banking regulation.   
A mere five days after the House passed HR 6655, the Senate Banking Committee 
approved its own version of the bill (S 1523).  In the process, Banking Chairman Proxmire 
attached a provision from an earlier anti-redlining bill (S 406) he had sponsored requiring federal 
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regulators to consider a depository institution’s record of meeting its surrounding communities’ 
credit needs when deciding on branching applications.48  Following two days of debate in which 
disagreement surrounded the funding formula, the Senate on June 7 passed the bill (S 1523).  
Proxmire’s redlining provision, however, elicited opposition from senators, such Robert Morgan 
(D-NC), who feared it would lead to the allocation of credit and inefficiencies due to its 
additional paperwork.  
Even though a conference convened on June 28, it did not reach a final agreement until 
late September.  Continued disagreements over the block grant formula caused this delay.  
Nevertheless, the House conferees acquiesced in the Senate’s anti-redlining measure.  President 
Carter signed the bill (HR 6655) into law October 12.  Though the CRA gave regulators up to 
390 days to implement it, it “require[d] each appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency to 
use its authority when examining financial institutions, to encourage such institutions to help 
meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the 
safe and sound operation of such institutions” (U.S. Statutes at Large 91 (1977): 1147).  Thus, 
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was born as Title VIII of the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1977.  Although this piece of social regulation ran only a page and a half in 
length and played a rather innocuous role during its first decade, it grew significantly during the 
nineties until it became another means of imposing regulatory burdens on the banking industry.   
 Soon after the start of 1978, the House followed up on its recent FINE Study when 
Banking Committee member St. Germain introduced a bill (HR 10899) extending the regulatory 
structure to cover foreign banks operating in the U.S. by assigning the Federal Reserve the 
oversight duties.  The most controversial aspect of the bill in the House revolved around whether 
                                                 
48
 Redlining refers to the discriminatory practice by lenders of denying borrowing requests by homeowners and 
businesses based on race or ethnicity.  The term originated from the practice whereby lenders would outline in red 
whole neighborhoods on a map in which they would not loan money, especially mortgages. 
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foreign banks branched across state lines.  Because domestic banks were prohibited from 
branching across state lines, members of Congress ultimately decided upon limiting foreign 
banks’ branching to their foreign operations only.  Representatives also required foreign banks to 
subscribe to federal deposit insurance for all individual bank retail depositors.  The House 
approved the proposed legislation in early April, but the Senate delayed consideration until 
August.  When the Senate finally took up the bill, its principal action involved amending it to 
authorize the Federal Reserve to impose reserve requirements on foreign banks equal to what it 
imposed on domestic institutions.  Given that HR 10899 focused on regulating foreign banks by 
subjecting them to regulation similar to domestic banks, it was rather non-controversial such that 
both Houses agreed to the alterations by mid August, clearing the way for the bill to become law 
in mid September as the International Banking Act of 1978.  In addition, the legislation extended 
the BHCA’s nonbanking restrictions to foreign banks.   
 With the 95th congressional session about to end in mid October, Reps. St. Germain, 
Reuss, and Annunzio (D-IL) co-sponsored a bill (HR 14279) a mere week beforehand containing 
a single title extending Regulation Q authority for another year.  This measure was so non-
controversial that the House approved it the next day.  The bill arrived in the upper chamber 
October 12, at which point the Senate Banking Committee Chairman substituted a much longer 
bill with fifteen titles.  Most of the provisions had all ready been passed by the Senate.  The full 
Senate then approved the newly expanded bill the same day and returned it to the House.  After 
attaching a few additional provisions it had approved earlier in the year, the House on October 
15 agreed to the amended bill; the Senate concurred in the bill the same day.  On November 10, 
President Carter signed the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act 
(FIRIRCA) of 1978.   
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In addition to extending Regulation Q authority for another year, the legislation 
authorized federally chartered New York banks and thrifts to provide NOW accounts.  The 
statute also authorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) to begin offering mutual 
savings banks the option of obtaining a federal charter.  Moreover, those savings banks selecting 
the federal charter gained the option of converting from a mutual organization to a stock one.  To 
aid regulatory agencies in handling problem banks, FIRIRCA permitted the federal regulators to 
issue bank executives and directors, rather than just the depository institutions themselves, cease-
and-desist orders when engaging in unsound or illicit activities.  The statute gave the FDIC 
additional powers to extend loans or purchase the assets of troubled federally insured banks and 
thrifts.  Furthermore, Title X of the bill ordered the creation of an interagency body, the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), to establish uniform regulatory standards.  
The FFIEC included the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the FHLBB, the FSLIC, the NCUA, and the 
OCC.  The interagency council, though, did not commence operations until March 10, 1979.    
 By that time, several regulatory agencies had all ready issued rulings permitting their 
subjects to provide some new transaction services to customers.  Needless to say, the agencies 
themselves instigated these legal challenges as they persuaded members to sue their regulatory 
counterparts.  On April 20, 1979, in the consolidated case of ABA v. Connell; IBAA v. FHLBB; 
USLSA v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the D.C. Court of Appeals decided the 
fate of three financial product innovations: automatic transfer services from savings to checking 
accounts in commercial banks, share drafts in credit unions, and remote service units in savings 
and loan associations.49  In a per curiam opinion, the court ruled that the respective federal 
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 An automatic transfer service (ATS) is a prearranged service that transfers funds from a savings to a checking 
account to maximize interest earnings or cover needed withdrawals as checks come in for clearing.  Share drafts 
accounts are interest bearing transaction accounts provided through credit unions; they are akin to thrifts’ negotiable 
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regulatory agencies lacked the statutory authority to approve these innovative financial 
products.50  The court reasoned that 
[t]he net result [of approving these innovations] has been that three separate and 
distinct types of financial institutions created by Congressional enactment to serve 
different public needs have now become, or are rapidly becoming, three separate but 
homogeneous types of financial institutions offering virtually identical services to the 
public, all without the benefit of Congressional consideration and statutory 
enactment.  686 F.2d 953 (D.C. App. Ct. 1979) 
The Court of Appeals reversed the district courts’ rulings upholding the financial product 
innovations and remanded the cases for further action.   Because the court realized that American 
consumers had grown accustomed to these financial products, it delayed its order until January 1, 
1980.  
To avoid the ensuing disruptions caused by the court rulings taking effect, lawmakers had 
to act by year’s end.  In a congressional address on May 22, President Jimmy Carter advocated 
enactment of “comprehensive financial reform legislation” to repair “a system which has become 
increasingly unfair to the small saver” (Carter 1980: 928).  The president sought to reform 
America’s depository institution system which had suffered large outflows of money as 
depositors sought to avoid rate ceilings that prevented the intermediaries from meeting the 
market rates of interest.  President Carter, however, advocated not only removing interest rate 
ceilings, but also expanding “new investment powers” so that depository institutions gained the 
ability to pay the high market rates of interest (Carter 1980: 929).  Toward that end, he asked 
                                                                                                                                                             
order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts.  A remote service unit is merely another name for an automated teller 
machine (ATM).   
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 The litigants included the American Bankers Association (ABA), Lawrence B. Connell, Jr. of the National Credit 
Union Administration, the Independent Bankers Association of America (IBAA), the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board (FHLBB), and the United States League of Savings Associations (USLSA). 
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Congress to act on four particular items: the elimination of all interest rate ceilings, the authority 
of all federally insured depository institutions to provide interest-bearing transaction accounts, 
the ability of all federal thrift institutions to offer adjustable rate mortgages and to invest up to 
ten percent of their deposits in consumer loans (Carter 1980).  The first two items applied to 
banks whereas the last two applied only to thrifts.  Curiously absent was any mention of changes 
to federal deposit insurance.    
 Nearly four months elapsed before legislators seriously followed up on Carter’s reform 
proposals.  On September 11, the House easily passed a narrowly tailored bill (HR 4986) titled 
the “Consumer Equity Act.”  Besides overturning the D.C. Appeals Court ruling by authorizing 
the three new financial products, the proposed legislation extended NOW accounts to banks and 
thrifts across the U.S. 
 Not until mid October did the Senate Banking Committee report legislation.  The 
Banking Committee version differed significantly from the House passed bill because it not only 
imposed reserve requirements on all banks offering NOW accounts, but also phased out interest 
rate ceilings. On November 1, the upper chamber with fewer than ten senators opposing easily 
approved its reform bill.  During floor debate, NOW accounts proved to be the most 
controversial issue because they entailed mandatory reserve requirements and elimination of the 
thrift industry’s quarter percent interest rate advantage.51  To resolve this controversy, the Senate 
stripped the reserve requirement extension from the bill.  Then, to assuage his large constituency 
of thrifts, Sen. Alan Cranston (D-CA) amended the bill exempting California S&Ls from 
providing NOW accounts.  Unrelated to this controversy, but undoubtedly beneficial to thrifts, 
Cranston also contributed a provision raising the federal deposit insurance limit from $40,000 to 
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 The thrift industry benefited from a quarter point interest rate differential over banks ever since the Interest Rate 
Control Act of 1966 extended Regulation Q ceilings to thrifts. 
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$50,000 to allow the ailing industry to attract deposits more easily in the distressed economic 
times.   
 On November 7, the House Banking Committee amended the Senate bill by attaching a 
previously passed measure concerning Fed membership.  If Fed defections ceased, the bill would 
permit reserve requirement reductions.  Conversely, if Fed membership continued to decline, the 
measure would impose on all banks mandatory reserve requirements.  The full chamber 
approved the revised bill later that day and requested a conference.  The conference committee 
convened on December 5, but was unable to reach an accord.  The principal disagreements 
surrounded the Senate’s elimination of rate ceilings and the House’s Fed membership provisions.  
Describing the impasse created by these two issues, the House Banking Committee Chairman 
Henry S. Reuss (D-WI) said “The irresistible force seems to have met the immovable object” 
(Congressional Quarterly 1980a).  These disagreements remained through year’s end and 
thwarted legislative passage. 
 Just as federal lawmakers were responding to a recent court order, the FRB also found 
itself responding to a court decision from earlier in the year.  On March 19, 1979, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals decided Florida Association of Insurance Agents v. Board of 
Governors.  The case was a class action lawsuit brought by an insurance agents’ trade group 
against the FRB for a series of decisions permitting bank holding companies to enter the 
insurance agency business.  The court overturned the Fed decisions on the grounds that the 
Board did not adequately consider the public benefits in each application.  In the court’s view, 
“The basic principle is clear that the Board cannot ignore the applicability and effect of state law 
inasmuch as it bears upon the public interest determination by the Act” (Florida Association of 
Insurance Agents v. Board of Governors 591 F.2d 334 (1979)).  As a result of this federal court 
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decision, the Federal Reserve Board in November revised its Regulation Y.  Effective December 
5, the Board’s revised Reg Y permitted “bank holding companies or their nonbank subsidiaries 
with a principal place of banking business in a community with a population of 5,000 or less to 
sell any type of insurance in such a community” (65 Fed. Res. Bull. 903, November 1979).  
Thus, the Fed constrained future insurance agency activities severely to small municipalities in 
which the bhcs all ready conducted their main banking business. 
 Since permanent legislation preempting the court ruling remained stuck in conference, 
Congress moved to authorize the services temporarily.  Toward this end, both chambers passed 
an authorization right before Christmas, and, on December 28, President Carter signed the 
legislation.  Public Law 96-161 temporarily authorized the three types of transaction services 
from December 31, 1979 until April 1, 1980.  Although Congress bought another three months 
with P.L. 96-161 to delay a court order temporarily, it needed to complete long-term action when 
its next session resumed.   
The temporary authorization of P.L. 96-161, however, failed to address the Federal 
Reserve or the circumstances that caused it to undertake its fundamental change in monetary 
policy targeting bank reserves.  In early February 1980, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker 
testified before the Senate Banking Committee.  According to him, the defection of banks from 
the system had become an “avalanche” (Congressional Quarterly 1981a).  Given that the Federal 
Reserve paid no interest on required reserves balance, maintaining the interest-free balances at 
the Fed, especially in times of high interest rates, became very costly.  Unless lawmakers 
addressed Fed membership, banks defecting threatened the effectiveness of the Fed’s new 
monetary policy, not to mention unfairly burdening the remaining members.   
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 With legislation fundamentally reforming the banking system held over in conference 
through the start of the next year, the conferees reconvened on March 5 and successfully 
resolved their differences.  Sometime during the lengthy negotiating session that went deep into 
the night, the House Banking Committee Chairman Fernand St. Germain (D-RI) attached a 
provision raising the deposit insurance limit to $100,000 (Liscio 1989; Wall Street Journal 
1991).52   This $60,000 increase far exceeded the one Cranston had attached to the Senate bill.  
With the differences between the two chambers worked out, the bill’s final passage was rather a 
formality with the House approving the conference report easily March 27, the Senate following 
suit by voice vote the next day, and President Carter signing the legislation three days later.  The 
bill’s official title was the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
(DIDMCA) of 1980 (P.L. 96-221). 
In addition to the deposit insurance increase, the legislation had several other important 
provisions divided among seven subheadings.  Among the more important of them were the first 
four.  The first title concerned monetary control; it extended reserve requirements to all 
depository institutions, phased in the requirements for non-members over an eight year period, 
lower reserve requirements for existing members, extended reserve requirements to foreign 
branches and subsidiaries of U.S. banks, and extended Fed services, including the discount 
window, to all depository institutions, but required the central bank to charge for the use of its 
services.  The second title possessed the label “Depository Institutions Deregulation.”53   This 
section provided for the phasing out of interest rate ceilings over six years by creating a 
                                                 
52
 Curiously enough, news of St. Germain’s culpability in raising the deposit insurance limit came to light nearly ten 
years afterwards when journalists disclosed it in their discussions of causes of the S&L crisis.  St. Germain was 
notorious for his support of the thrift industry; the first job he took upon leaving public life involved lobbying for the 
USLSA.   
53
 This section of the statute dealing with the withdrawal of the government from an area of activity was the only 
one to fall under the “Deregulation” heading. 
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Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee (DIDC), which was composed of the chairmen 
of the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the FHLBB, the NCUA, the Treasury Secretary, and the 
Comptroller of the Currency, to handle the government’s withdrawal from the sphere of dictating 
interest rates.54   The third heading authorized not only NOW accounts on a nationwide basis, but 
also all three of the transaction service innovations overturned by the 1979 appeals court ruling.  
This section of the bill effectively eliminated one of the main distinctions separating commercial 
banks from other depository institutions.  The fourth section expanded the powers of thrifts to 
make consumer loans, to make mortgage loans without regard to geographic constraints, to offer 
trust services, to offer credit card services, and to invest in a variety of securities such as 
corporate debt obligations and commercial paper. 
 As federal lawmakers were enacting the most far-reaching legislation affecting banking 
in nearly fifty years, the nation’s twenty-third largest bank verged on insolvency; it had over $9 
billion in assets.  Even though federal regulators were closely monitoring First Pennsylvania 
Bank, N.A. (First Pennsy) since at least 1979, its condition began spiraling downward in late 
March 1980.55  To halt further deterioration and losses to the deposit insurance fund, the FDIC 
on April 28 declared the bank “essential” and offered it an assistance package rather than close it 
or sell off its assets.  According to the FDIC’s official history, “In this case, the FDIC’s 
determination of “essentiality” was based mainly on size” (FDIC 1984: 95).  Because of existing 
laws against interstate banking and branching and First Pennsy’s large size, regulators could not 
find any buyers to assume the bank’s deposits, so they had no alternative, in their view, to bail 
out the firm. 
                                                 
54
 The voting members of the DIDC included the Treasury Secretary, and chairmen of the Federal Reserve, the 
FDIC, the FHLBB, and the NCUA.  The Comptroller of the Currency also was a member, but he lacked a vote. 
55
 Notice the N.A. in the bank’s name indicating it was a National Association and thereby regulated and chartered 
by the OCC. 
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According to FDIC Chairman Irvine Sprague, “There was strong pressure from the 
beginning not to let the bank fail.  Besides hearing from the bank itself, the other large banks, 
and the [C]omptroller, we [the FDIC] heard frequently from the Fed” (Sprague 1986: 88).  In 
spite of the intense lobbying efforts, in Sprague’s view, the FDIC Board did not decide on a 
bailout until it had exhausted all its other resolution options (Sprague 1986: 92).  The bailout 
package provided $500 million in loans with $175 million from other banks and $325 million 
from the FDIC.  As a condition of its loan of $325 million, the FDIC required the bank to issue it 
warrants that were convertible to bank stock; it received warrants equivalent to twenty million 
shares.56  
On June 9, 1980, the Supreme Court ruled that bank holding companies could expand 
across state lines through nonbanking subsidiaries. The controversy had originated with an April 
1973 Board of Governors order rejecting BTNYC’s application to provide investment advisory 
services in Florida.  Rather than sue the Board, though, the bank holding company sued the state 
for violating the Commerce Clause.  In the case before it, the Court found that Florida violated 
the Commerce Clause.  According to the majority opinion, “Under the Florida statute, 
discrimination against affected business organizations is not evenhanded because only banks, 
bank holding companies, and trust companies with principals operations outside Florida are 
prohibited from operate investment subsidiaries or giving investment advice within the State” 
(Lewis, Comptroller of Florida v. BT Investment Managers, Inc.  447 U.S. 27 (1980)).  Thus, the 
Supreme Court signaled to bank holding companies wishing to expand across state boundaries 
that any state laws discriminating against out-of-state competition would be highly suspect.  In 
                                                 
56
 The warrants led to a shareholder’s suit of the FDIC for lacking the authority to impose such conditions in its 
financial assistance package.  The case of Philip Zinman v. FDIC 567 F. Supp. 243 (U.S. District Ct. 1983) is the 
only legal challenge to the agency’s “essentiality” power, but the District Court ruled solely that the liberal 
construction of the statute permitted the regulator to impose whatever conditions it desired. 
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the process, the Court strengthened the Federal Reserve as it approved expanded activities of 
holding companies. 
CONCLUSION 
   
 This chapter recounted the 1969-1980 period of bank regulatory policy, a period that was 
marked by the appearance of significant turmoil affecting the industry.  This turmoil, of course, 
was nothing compared to what struck the banking industry during the subsequent twelve years.  
Nonetheless, during this period regulators scrambled to resolve the mounting bank failures, 
particularly a handful of the nation’s largest banks.  These events led lawmakers to place 
mounting pressure on the regulators, but it was the largely unnoticed resolution mechanism 
developed by the FDIC during this era that had the largest impact on subsequent regulation.  The 
FDIC employed its “essentiality” power to extend financial assistance to a number of banks and 
thus prevent them from closing.  This process began with tiny Unity Bank and Trust and ran 
through First Pennsy, but would develop further in the next twelve years.  This focus on 
resolutions, though, is not to say that the other two regulators were absent or uninvolved, rather 
they were simply restrained in their efforts to expand the activities available to banks.  The 
Federal Reserve, though, did make some early attempts to expand the business activities open to 
banks by granting affiliations through the holding company structure, but these efforts were 
nothing like what followed over the next two decades. 
 Even though federal lawmakers played a prominent role in the events of these years, they 
responded retroactively to developments in the banking system.  Both the White House and 
Congress conducted extensive studies of the banking system and its regulatory troubles, yet they 
failed to enact many of the proposals, thus leaving most regulatory policy change in the hands of 
regulators.  Aside from 1970’s BHCA Amendments and 1980’s DIDMCA, most of the banking 
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legislation was rather limited in scope and merely updated the statutory code to accord with 
contemporary regulations.  Elected officials, though, did enact regulatory statutes, such as the 
CRA, imposing new social responsibilities and objectives on banks and bank regulators.  Though 
relatively innocuous at the time, later generations of lawmakers would seize upon them to 
influence the goals and operation of the banking system. 
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4. BANKING REGULATION’S TWELVE TUMULTUOUS YEARS: 1981-1992 
 This chapter investigates banking regulation during the administrations of Ronald Reagan 
and George H.W. Bush.  The twelve years examined here include the most legislatively 
productive period as measured in terms of major banking statutes since FDR’s administration.  
Seminal pieces of legislation included the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982, which granted thrifts 
and banks additional powers and sped up the phase out of interest rate ceilings, the Competitive 
Equality Banking Act (CEBA) of 1987, which closed the nonbank bank loophole by redefining 
what constituted a bank and pledged the government’s full faith and credit behind all insured 
deposits, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989, 
which granted the FDIC the right to increase premiums and to seize the assets of a healthy bank 
when any affiliated bank fails, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) of 1991, which, among other things, allowed the FDIC to establish premiums 
accounting for a bank’s risk level and to intervene promptly when a bank’s capital fell below 
accepted levels. 
Though the deregulatory period is considered to have begun in banking in 1980 with 
enactment of DIDMCA, it supposedly continued through the period here and the subsequent one 
under Clinton.  Nevertheless, this characterization of this nearly twenty year period is quite 
misleading, for policymakers almost never repealed regulations without replacing them with 
some other type of regulations.  Moreover, lawmakers instituted entirely new regulations relating 
to capital requirements and extended social regulations relating to consumer protection and 
extending credit to inner-cities and poorer communities. 
 Throughout this entire twelve year period, all three federal banking regulators were 
actively involved in the policymaking process.  The FDIC was busy coping with increasing 
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numbers of bank failures.  Though most of these resolutions elicited little attention from 
lawmakers or the public, the agency’s extension of financial assistance to Continental Illinois in 
1984 and to a handful of other large banks in the remaining years of this period triggered a loud 
outcry and charges that these banks had become too big to fail.  Because the FDIC lacked both 
the means to alter premiums for much of this period and the inability to accurately monitor 
banks’ assets, a moral hazard problem existed.  This problem was only worsened, though, by 
actions of the OCC and Federal Reserve.   
These two agencies employed their statutorily granted authority to expand the activities 
available to banks.  The OCC, for instance, used its power to find securities brokerage and 
insurance agency as “incidental” to banking.  Likewise, the Fed used its power to permit banks to 
affiliate through the holding company with firms that were engaged in prohibited securities 
activities provided that the revenue from these units remained less than 5 percent.  The approval 
of such arrangements really began in 1984 when the Fed approved an application by a bhc to 
engage in commercial paper; it then quickly spread to other bhcs, then expanded to include other 
types of securities.  Over the course of the period, the revenue limit doubled and the list of 
“ineligible” securities grew.  Furthermore, the Fed in 1984 crafted a “source of strength” policy 
that it used to justify all these decisions.  Interestingly enough, both the Fed and OCC 
rationalized their expansions of banks’ powers as means of creating stronger depository 
institutions.  
THE REAGAN YEARS 
 Because 1980’s Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
(DIDMCA) failed to improve the banking and thrift industries enough, lawmakers needed 
additional banking legislation following President Reagan’s inauguration.  Not until October 
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1981, however, did members of Congress make significant progress on banking policy to address 
the industry’s crisis.  On the third day of the month, the House Banking Committee reported the 
Depository Insurance Flexibility Act (HR 4603).  The bill, championed by House Banking 
Committee Chairman St. Germain, was an emergency measure granting the FDIC and FSLIC 
additional powers to aid to troubled banks and thrifts and to arrange acquisition partners for 
failing depository institutions.  On October 28, the House approved the bill.  In passing HR 4603, 
though, the House attached two amendments: one amendment limited the simplified acquisition 
procedure to troubled thrifts and the other amendment required federal regulators to follow an 
order of merger preference.  This merger preference order sought acquisitions between similarly 
chartered institutions in the same state, then in a different state, then a depository institution of a 
different charter in the same state, and finally an institution with a different charter outside the 
state.   
 Meanwhile also in October, the Senate Banking Committee Chairman Jake Garn (R-UT) 
introduced the Financial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act of 1981 (S 1720).  In 
addition to providing federal regulators with emergency powers to deal with failing depository 
institutions, Garn’s bill extended the powers of commercial banks to thrifts so that they gained 
alternative means of revenue to make commercial loans, invest in real estate, invest in corporate 
debt, and offer checking accounts.  Furthermore, S 1720 granted banks and thrifts entry into the 
mutual fund and insurance industries and granted national banks authority to underwrite and 
trade municipal revenue bonds.  With the end of the year approaching, though, Sen. Garn 
decided to wait until the following year to accomplish major banking reform, so he put aside 
both his own legislative proposal and the House’s Depository Insurance Flexibility Act.  Thus, 
legislators achieved little progress in 1981 on the banking front.   
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 Although Sen. Garn had prioritized banking reform with his far-reaching S 1720, his 
inability to garner enough committee support restrained him from passing anything.  Instead, 
Chairman Fernand St. Germain and the House Banking Committee initiated legislative reform by 
approving a bill (HR 6267) May 11; the Net Worth Guarantee Act provided financial aid to the 
nation’s troubled S&Ls.  The measure authorized the Treasury to guarantee the net worth of 
thrifts whose equity to assets ratio fell below two percent.  In committee debate, St. Germain 
defended his bill arguing, “This is a no-cost situation.  It’s not a bailout” (CQ Almanac 1983).  
He was not completely honest in his advocacy of the legislation, for the bill would entail large 
Treasury outlays if the federal government exercised its net worth guarantees in the event of 
thrift failures.  Nevertheless, St. Germain carried the measure in a party line vote, and, in so 
doing, defeated a Republican alternative that guaranteed the troubled thrifts’ net worth, but only 
up to two percent of their assets.  The House approved HR 6267 on May 20.  Rep. Frank Wylie 
(R-OH) put forth the Republican alternative guaranteeing only a portion of S&Ls’ net worth 
using a sliding scale.  Democrats, though, rallied around St. Germain’s bill and defeated the 
Republican substitute.  Thus there was a Democratic initiative to buttress the ailing thrift 
industry through a federal guarantee. 
 Since he still lacked the votes, Sen. Garn in late July abandoned the Financial Institutions 
Restructuring and Services Act of 1981 (S 1720).  The Senate Banking Committee reported a 
revised bill (S 2879) on August 19 that was a cleansed version of Garn’s S 1720.  To attract 
support for S 2879, Garn removed the provisions granting banks access to mutual funds and 
insurance.  Needless to say, the removal of these aspects disappointed members of the banking 
industry who now viewed the bill as little more than a handout for the thrift industry.  The 
resulting bill mainly provided assistance to troubled thrifts.  Rather than create a net worth 
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guarantee, the bill permitted thrifts to exchange their capital notes with the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for 
interest bearing promissory notes.  The legislation also granted the FDIC and FSLIC greater 
powers for arranging mergers for failing depository institutions.  It expanded the portfolio 
choices available to thrifts by expanding available asset categories and hastened the removal of 
Regulation Q interest rate ceilings.  When the bill reached the floor in mid September, the Senate 
approved it without any dissent.  To ease passage, the Senate amended the proposed legislation 
to eliminate the rate differential between banks and thrifts, limit thrifts’ checking account 
authority, and broaden bank service corporations’ powers.   
 While Sen. Garn was engrossed in redrafting a bill that would pass the Senate, the 
Comptroller of the Currency handed down an interpretive ruling that reverberated throughout the 
banking and securities industries.  Back in April, Security Pacific National Bank of California 
(Security Pacific) had applied to establish a de novo subsidiary that would engage in discount 
brokerage.  Though countless banks provided some form of brokerage activities for years, 
Security Pacific’s proposal went much farther by offering the service to the general public rather 
than just its own customers, executing the trades itself, and submitting trades without first 
receiving payment from the customer.  The Comptroller approved Security Pacific’s application 
finding that it violated neither Glass-Steagall nor the McFadden Act.  According to the 
Comptroller, the brokerage subsidiary did not violate Glass-Steagall’s section 16 as long as it 
“maintain[ed] its agency” status in the transactions (OCC 1982: 42).  In other words, the 
subsidiary could not buy securities for its own account.  Likewise, the subsidiary accorded with 
section 32’s affiliation prohibition against firms “principally engaged in” impermissible activities 
because securities brokerage was not on the list (OCC 1982: 42).  In a speech before the ABA 
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nearly two months later, Comptroller Conover provided one of the few window’s on his Office’s 
views perspective on approving new banking powers, “Very simply, if a bank can make a strong 
case that a proposed activity is legal, our inclination is to approve it.  We followed that policy 
this past year in approving…discount brokerage subsidiaries for two others” (Conover 1982).57   
 With the midterm elections fast approaching, the two chambers convened a conference, 
and within five days, the conferees brokered an agreement.  The House was the last of the two 
bodies to accept the conference report on October 1, and President Reagan signed the bill into 
law on October 15 as the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.  St. Germain’s 
Net Worth Certificate Program found its way back into the bill.  In addition, the legislation 
expanded S&Ls’ lending powers in agricultural, commercial, and consumer loans; it permitted 
thrifts to offer checking accounts to private depositors and businesses which all ready conducted 
business with the institutions.   Garn-St. Germain directed the DIDC to create a new type of 
insured account, a money market demand account (MMDA), to compete directly with money 
market mutual funds (MMMFS).  The statute increased the available areas in which thrifts could 
invest.  To benefit national banks, the legislation increased the amount they could lend to any 
individual or entity from ten to fifteen percent of their capital and surplus.  Finally, the law gave 
state-chartered industrial banks the option of applying for federal deposit insurance.   
 While Congress was preoccupied with Garn-St. Germain, Mexico announced in August 
1982 that it could no longer meet its debt service arrangements with international 
moneylenders.58  Lending to less-developed countries (LDCs) increased significantly over the 
seventies as American banks escaped domestically imposed rate ceilings through the use of 
                                                 
57
 The two banks to which Conover was referring included Security Pacific and Union Planters National Bank of 
Memphis. 
58
 Debt service refers to the payment of interest and principal on a loan or other borrowed funds.   
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Eurodollar accounts.59  During the 1970s, of course, money center banks were especially flush 
with cash as the OPEC nations recycled petrodollars through them.  Because of the rampant 
inflation afflicting the U.S. dollar, the LDCs actually borrowed at negative real interest rates.  
Repayment was easy so long as commodities, like their principal export of oil, were high and the 
dollar was weak.  Because of the Fed’s successful war against inflation, the borrowers lost the 
ability to repay their loans with inflated dollars.  Making matters worse, as the dollar 
strengthened the loans’ variable rates skyrocketed and the value of oil collapsed.   
 The federal regulators, however, had all ready begun preparing for the coming foreign 
debt crisis.  Expressing their concern “about the secular declines in the capital ratios of the 
nation’s largest banking organizations, particularly in view of increased risks both domestically 
and internationally,” the three banking agencies in December 1981 announced capital adequacy 
guidelines (68 Fed. Res. Bull. 34, Jan. 1982).  Whereas the FDIC established a minimum capital 
adequacy standard of 5 percent, the Fed and OCC adopted two standards: 6 percent for 
community banks (those with less than $1 billion in assets) and 5 percent for regional banks 
(those with assets of $1 billion or more).60  The promulgation of these capital adequacy 
guidelines represented a new direction for banking regulation since capital was meaningless 
before this time other than as an initial requirement for obtaining a banking charter.  After 
commencing operations, a bank would have no concern for its capital levels or ratios. 
 Although BankAmerica Corporation had announced it decision to acquire the discount 
brokerage Charles Schwab a few days before its competitor Security Pacific announced plans of 
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 Eurodollars were simply offshore dollar-denominated accounts and therefore not subject to rate ceilings. 
60
 These guidelines did not apply to the seventeen American multinational banking organizations, which were also 
the most heavily exposed to the LDC debt crisis.  Aware of this omission, the Federal Reserve and the OCC later 
amended the guidelines in June 1983 to apply to the seventeen multinationals (69 Fed. Res. Bull. 539, Jul. 1983).  
The regulators established a minimum standard of 5 percent capital to assets for these largest 17 banking 
organizations.    
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opening a brokerage subsidiary, the Board of Governors did not approve its application until 
January 7, 1983.  Charles Schwab was a large discount brokerage having offices in 26 states and 
D.C.  In approving the acquisition, the Fed relied upon the Comptroller’s recent interpretation of 
Glass-Steagall’s section 16 in accepting the Security Pacific proposal.  The Board based its order 
on the grounds that “Schwab’s brokerage functions do not constitute the “public sale” of 
securities (or any other proscribed activity) within the meaning of section 20 of the Glass-
Steagall Act” (69 Fed. Res. Bull. 115, Feb. 1983).61   
 Not long after the Fed issued its brokerage order, the Fifth Circuit Appeals Court struck 
down the enforcement of capital adequacy guidelines with its February 1983 decision in First 
National Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency 697 F.2d 674 (1983).  Although the 
court upheld the OCC’s cease and desist orders against the bank for disregarding regulations on 
safe and sound banking, it reversed the order for inadequate capital levels finding that the 
“record as a whole does not provide support for the Comptroller’s finding that the Bank’s capital 
level was unsafe and unsound” (697 F.2d 674 (1983)).  The Fifth Circuit took issue with the 
analysis used to determine the bank’s inadequate capital level.  As a result, the court’s ruling cast 
doubt on future uses of capital guidelines by the regulators unless legislators provided explicit 
statutory authorization.     
 Because the LDCs received financial assistance from the IMF as their debt service 
worsened, the IMF’s 146 member nations in early 1983 needed to make additional contributions.  
For its part, the U.S. owed $8.4 billion, and it was through the IMF appropriation bill that 
lawmakers ultimately addressed the debt crisis and banking regulation.  Largely following the 
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 On August 10, 1983, the Fed approved Chase Manhattan Corp.’s acquisition of Rose & Company Investment 
Brokers (69 Fed. Res. Bull. 725, Sept. 1983).  This marked the second bhc acquisition of a discount brokerage.  
Moreover, the Fed amended its Regulation Y to include discount brokerage activities, and the change took effect 
September 9, 1983 (69 Fed. Res. Bull. 696, Sept. 1983).  The Board made the rule change following the Second 
Circuit Appeals Court upheld its approval of BankAmerica’s application. 
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Reagan administration’s wishes, the IMF funding measure originated in the Senate where the 
Foreign Relations Committee on March 15 passed a bill (S 695).  On April 28, the Banking 
Committee approved the proposed legislation, but amended it at Sen. John Heinz’s (R-PA) 
insistence directing regulators to set minimum capital levels for banks.  On June 8, the full 
Senate passed the IMF funding bill.  After defeating a number of ideologically charged 
amendments from Foreign Relations Committee Members Gordon Humphrey (R-NH) and Jesse 
Helms (R-NC) restricting the use of the IMF funds, the Senate on June 8 approved the 
legislation.   
 In the meantime, the House Banking Committee on May 16 passed its own IMF bill (HR 
2957).  The House version provided IMF funding, reauthorized the Ex-Im Bank, and provided 
development banks funding.  At the request of Chairman St. Germain, the Banking Committee 
amended the proposed legislation imposing stricter requirements on banks by mandating the 
creation of special reserves to offset LDC loans.  At Rep. Jim Leach’s (R-IA) insistence, the 
committee amended the IMF provision by directing federal regulators to set adequate capital 
levels for all U.S. banks and to coordinate their efforts with their foreign counterparts.      
 Even though the House began considering its bill (HR 2957) July 25, it did not approve 
the legislation until August 3.  The debate in the lower chamber was considerably more intense 
than in the Senate, where populist Democrats and conservative Republicans united in opposition.  
After accepting several amendments posited by this opposition coalition, including Rep. Ed R. 
Bethune’s (R-AR) excess profits tax on large banks and Rep. Byron L. Dorgan’s (D-ND) 
limitation large banks’ fees for restructuring their LDC loans, the House passed its bill by the 
narrow margin of six votes.  Following the House’s action, however, the proposed legislation sat 
idle for nearly three months awaiting a conference.  While the proposed legislation way lying 
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dormant, Rep. St. Germain wrote an August 8 letter to President Reagan threatening to block 
further action unless lawmakers joined the IMF bill (HR 2957) to a housing authorization bill 
(HR 1) that he had worked on earlier in the year.   
 After several weeks of negotiations between the Reagan administration, congressional 
leaders, and Rep. St. Germain, the conference committee combined the housing (HR 1) and IMF 
(HR 2957) bills and attached them to a non-controversial supplemental appropriations bill (HR 
3959).  The committee then approved its report November 15.  Then, over the next three days, 
the two chambers approved and amended the bill sending it back and forth before the House 
completed final action on the last day of the session November 18.  On the last day of November, 
President Reagan enacted the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1984.  The banking related 
portion of the legislation became Title IX, known as the International Lending Supervision Act 
(ILSA) of 1983.  This act authorized the federal regulatory agencies to establish capital adequacy 
guidelines and to issue cease and desist orders to banks failing to comply.  ILSA represented a 
significant shift in bank regulation as policymakers instituted a new form of “prudential” 
regulation that did not proscribe certain activities, rather it imposed costs depending on the types 
of activities engaged in. 
 At one time, Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company was the nation’s 
eighth largest bank, yet it was still a money-center bank at the heart of a vast correspondent 
network.  Following wire reports on May 9 of Continental’s imminent failure, foreign depositors 
began hurriedly withdrawing their deposits; a global run had begun.  This run forced Continental 
on May 11 to borrow $3.6 billion from the Fed’s discount window.  Needless to say, the bank’s 
position deteriorated further as the run continued.  To stem the run, the FDIC on May 17 
declared the bank “essential” and publicly informed all Continental’s creditors and depositors 
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that the agency would guarantee their claims against the bank in their entirety.  The FDIC then 
announced a temporary assistance package of $2 billion, with $500 million in loans from other 
commercial banks and the remainder as a loan from it.  Because the run on Continental persisted 
despite regulators’ best efforts, they put forth a permanent solution on July 26 that entailed the 
FDIC purchasing $4.5 billion worth of bad loans, the bank writing off another $1 billion in bad 
loans, and the FDIC providing a $1 billion capital infusion through the bank’s holding company 
for which it received preferred stock.  Additionally, the FDIC replaced the bank’s board of 
directors and senior executives. 
In the aftermath Continental Illinois’ bailout, policymakers continued to pursue 
regulatory reform.  The Federal Reserve Board, for instance, on July 30 approved an application 
from Manufacturers Hanover (Manny Hanny) Corporation’s application for its subsidiary to 
engage in “underwriting, dealing in, brokering, and purchasing and selling obligations of the 
U.S. government and its agencies, general obligations of the various states…and such other 
obligations that state member banks…may be authorized to underwrite” (70 Fed. Res. Bull. 661, 
Aug. 1984).  In approving the request, the Board reasoned that the subsidiary’s clients would be 
sophisticated investors and that the firm would provide a public benefit by introducing more 
competition.   
Such actions led one Senate Banking Committee aide to tell Congressional Quarterly, 
“People are saying, ‘What are we doing offering new powers to these lunatics when they can’t 
handle the powers they’ve got?’” (Congressional Quarterly 1985).  Although some individuals 
on Capitol Hill may have been unable to articulate the rationale, regulators were more than 
willing to do so.  Speaking to the American Bankers Association convention later in the year, 
Comptroller C.T. Conover would explain, “I’ve devised a simple equation to describe the 
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process [of how modernizing the laws will yield a stronger banking system]—“Strength = New 
Powers + Firm Supervision” (Conover 1984).  In this way, regulators believed that the process 
was not one of simply removing pre-existing regulations and allowing banks to have a free-for-
all, rather it entailed replacing the old rules with new ones better designed to foster a competitive 
and dynamic marketplace. 
 Since 1984 was an election year and the Continental Illinois bailout was dominating the 
banking policy agenda, Chairman St. Germain employed the House Banking Committee to 
investigate the matter more fully.  Toward this end, the Financial Institutions Supervision, 
Regulation and Insurance Subcommittee, which St. Germain also chaired, held hearings on 
Continental Illinois over a three day span: September 18, 19, and October 4, 1984.  Comptroller 
of the Currency C.T. Conover’s testimony September 19 was the most noteworthy since he 
admitted regulators were aware of Continental’s difficulties for a few years, but resorted to 
bailing out the institution because they failed to develop an alternative resolution plan.  
Chairman St. Germain employed some rather intense prodding, when he exclaimed to the 
Comptroller, “The fact of the matter is, as a practical matter, neither you nor your successors are 
ever going to let a big bank the size of Continental Illinois fail” (House Committee on Banking, 
Finance and Urban Affairs 1984: 300).  Conover explained in response, “[I]t isn’t whether the 
bank fails or not.  It is how it is handled subsequent to its failure that matters.  And we have to 
find a way [to resolve large banking institutions].  I admit that we don’t have a way right now.  
And so, since we don’t have a way, your premise appears to be correct” (House Committee on 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs 1984: 300).62  The Comptroller ostensibly disclosed that 
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 Interestingly enough, Comptroller Conover never used the phrase “too big to fail.”  Instead, Rep. Stewart B. 
McKinney (R-CT) applied the term right after Conover’s disclosure.  Rep. McKinney declared, “Mr. Chairman, let 
us not bandy words.  We have a new kind of bank.  It is called too big to fail.  TBTF, and it is a wonderful bank” 
(House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affa
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federal regulators would not allow the nation’s eleven largest multinational banks to fail, but he 
was actually referring to nationally chartered banks. 
 Although the balance of power in D.C. remained roughly the same in 1985 following the 
recent election where Reagan won a second term in dramatic fashion and Democrats and 
Republicans retained control over their respective chambers, the health of the banking system 
continued to deteriorate as failures of depository institutions mounted.  Capitol Hill, however, 
remained stalemated on the matter of banking reform throughout the year.  As a result, the 
agencies and the courts took a prominent role in bringing about regulatory change.   
Drawing upon Garn-St. Germain’s “thirty-mile rule,” the Comptroller on February 21 
approved an application from the Mark Twain Bank, N.A., a subsidiary of Mark Twain 
Bancshares, seeking to relocate its headquarters from Independence, Missouri to Overland Park, 
Kansas.  The Comptroller began by reviewing the bank’s rationale.  According to the 
Comptroller, “The Bank, recognizing that its community, for Community Reinvestment Act 
purposes, includes locations on the Kansas side of the border, believes that the relocation will 
enable it to better serve those locations while still serving Missouri customers” (OCC 1985 38).  
Then, the Comptroller proceeded to consider the petition submitted by the Kansas Bankers 
Association (KBA), which questioned the OCC’s authority to approve the application under 
Kansas state law pertaining to holding companies, the Douglas amendment, and the Commerce 
Clause.  The Comptroller held that approving the relocation would not violate the Commerce 
Clause and that the Kansas law all ready discriminated against out-of-state bank holding 
companies.  Furthermore, it ruled the Douglas Amendment inapplicable because the application 
did not entail an out-of-state acquisition by a holding company, thus avoiding the input of the 
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FRB.  Consequently, in the first use of its kind to allow interstate banking, the Comptroller 
approved the relocation of Mark Twain’s main office. 
Nearly four months later on June 10, interstate banking received further legal backing 
when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Federal Reserve in the case of Northeast Bancorp 
v. Board of Governors (472 U.S. 159 (1985)).  The case involved three New England based bhcs 
receiving FRB approval under the Douglas Amendment to consummate interstate acquisitions of 
banks located in other New England states having reciprocal acquisition statutes.63  Because the 
Board approved the application, a handful of New York based bhcs that were excluded from the 
New England banking market sued in federal court.64  After the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld 
the Board’s approval of the application, the Supreme Court took the case and rendered an 8-0 
decision affirming the previous court’s ruling.  The Justices found that the New England state 
statutes were within the Douglas Amendment, and furthermore, that “they do not violate the 
Commerce Clause, the Compact Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause” (Northeast Bancorp v. 
Board of Governors 472 U.S. 159 (1985)).  Thus, interstate banking under the existing statutory 
framework received additional backing as the courts upheld the actions of one of the federal 
banking regulators. 
 The Supreme Court continued to hear banking cases the following term when it heard the 
case of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corporation 
November 4.  When the Court delivered its ruling early the following year on January 22, it gave 
lawmakers no alternative but to enact legislation prohibiting nonbank banks.  The case revolved 
around the Federal Reserve’s 1984 rule-making attempt under Regulation Y to amend the 
definition of a “bank” to expand the meaning of demand deposits to include NOW and other 
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 The New England bhcs included the Bank of New England Corporation, the Hartford National Corporation, and 
the Bank of Boston Corporation. 
64
 In addition to Northeast Bancorp, the two other NY bhcs were the Union Trust Company and Citicorp. 
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transaction type accounts.  Striking down the Federal Reserve’s action and affirming the Tenth 
Circuit Appeals Court’s ruling, an 8-0 majority stated, “If the Bank Holding Company Act falls 
short of providing safeguards desirable or necessary to protect the public interest, that is a 
problem for Congress, and not the Board or the courts, to address” (474 U.S. 361 (1986)).  Thus, 
only Congress could redefine the meaning of the term “bank” to close the nonbank bank 
loophole.     
While several banking bills were stalled on Capitol Hill in 1986, the Comptroller of the 
Currency issued the United States National Bank of Oregon (USNB OR) an interpretive letter 
that had far-reaching consequences on the financial services industries.  In a letter dated August 
18, the Comptroller broke from precedent by allowing this bank to “sell a full range of insurance 
products to customers of the bank and others from an office at the Bank’s branch locations in 
Banks, Oregon, a town with a population of under 5,000” (OCC 1986: 20).  This opinion 
departed from precedent because the Comptroller ruled that the bank may sell insurance to 
anyone regardless of whether he was a customer of the bank, thereby indicating insurance 
agency was no longer incidental to banking.  Furthermore, the ruling permitted USNB OR to sell 
insurance to inhabitants of regions with populations greater than 5,000 provided that the 
underwriter for which it was agent had authorization to operate in that particular state.  This 
ruling was exactly what banks seeking to enter the insurance industry needed. 
Though Congress failed to complete statutory reform in 1986, regulators were more than 
willing to accomplish policy change.  In an order written Christmas Eve, the Board of Governors 
approved Bankers Trust New York Corporation’s (BTNY Corp.) application to place 
commercial paper.  Commercial paper, which existed for many years, is basically a short-term 
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promissory note issued by a corporation with a maturity date of between 2 and 270 days.65  
Commercial paper provided a cheaper alternative to financing commercial activity through bank 
loans.  The placement process was one of the two ways in which issuers of commercial paper 
marketed their indebtedness.  More specifically, issuers of commercial paper typically had an 
entity use its connections to place its debt with a small group of sophisticated investors; this 
process is often referred to as a direct placement.  In rendering its decision, the Fed developed 
two arguments.  First, despite interpretations by the courts and other regulators to the contrary, 
the Board argued commercial paper was not a security.  Second, the FRB developed another 
argument that took precedence irrespective of whether commercial paper was a security.  Even if 
the Board was mistaken and commercial paper was actually a security, approving this activity 
did not violate Glass-Steagall because the FRB reinterpreted the “principally engaged” phrase.  
Using a revenue test to determine whether a firm was principally engaged in an impermissible 
securities activity, the Board concluded, “The conduct of the commercial paper placement 
activity at these less than 5 percent levels [of revenue] is consistent with the Board’s past 
practice” (73 Fed. Res. Bull. 146, Feb. 1987).  The 5 percent revenue limit, though, was 
suggested by BTNY in its application.  With this decision, the Federal Reserve inaugurated the 
section 20 revolution through which banks under the holding company structure could affiliate 
with firms engaging in impermissible nonbanking activities.   
 Resuming the chairmanship of the Banking Committee following the Democrats’ 
regaining control of the Senate in the 1986 midterms, William Proxmire on February 17, 1987 
unveiled to fellow committee Democrats a bill addressing the worsening thrift crisis.  Proxmire’s 
draft not only provided additional S&L funding, but also closed the nonbank bank loophole.  
According to Congressional Quarterly, Sen. William Proxmire believed that “the government 
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 A promissory note is nothing more than a legal evidence of debt. 
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would find it difficult to sell off ailing thrifts if prospective buyers could save money by entering 
the same financial market through the non-bank bank loophole” (Congressional Quarterly 
1988a).  The rise of mortgage securitization in the eighties, after all, had made the thrift model of 
generating mortgages and holding them to maturity outmoded.66  As a result, if such nonbank 
banks were permitted to exist, the pool of potential thrift buyers would be much smaller.  
Nevertheless, such a policy stance expanding banks’ powers represented a dramatic change for 
the Wisconsin Democrat who had long opposed banks expanding into the other financial services 
industries. 
 While the Senate Banking Committee rewrote Proxmire’s bill, the Board of Governors 
issued an order on March 18 authorizing the Chase Manhattan Corporation through a 
commercial finance subsidiary to conduct limited dealing and underwriting in commercial paper.  
Dealing entails a firm acting as a principal by buying and selling securities for its own account 
and then turning a profit by reselling the securities to customers afterwards at higher prices.67  
Closely related to dealing, underwriting also involves a firm buying and selling of securities for 
its own account, yet it often includes the underwriting firm guaranteeing the issuing party a 
certain minimum value for the securities.  As a result, both dealing and underwriting involve 
significant risk.   
In this application, Chase sought to underwrite the commercial paper, and in so doing, take upon 
itself greater risk.  The Board, though, upheld the request as closely related to banking reasoning 
that the “activity is functionally and operationally similar to the role of a bank that arranges a 
loan participation, and banks are particularly well suited to assume this role” (73 Fed. Res. Bull. 
369, May 1987).  This order followed upon the previous December’s authorizing BTNY Corp.’s 
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 This method of mortgage financing is also known as the originate to hold model. 
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 Dealing and placements represent the two methods by which commercial paper is distributed. 
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commercial paper placement.  To avoid Chase Manhattan Bank from becoming affiliated with a 
firm principally engaged in impermissible activities, the FRB limited the Chase Manhattan Corp. 
to deriving less than five percent of its total revenue from the activities of its commercial finance 
subsidiary. 
The day after the Board of Governors issued its order, Sen. Proxmire introduced S 790, 
which was broader than his February draft.  This bill contained three main components: 
regulatory authorizations, regulatory restraints, and consumer protections.  On the authorization 
front, S 790 provided the FSLIC with another $7.5 billion and granted the FDIC emergency 
powers and new resolution tools to handle problem banks.  Perhaps equally important, though, it 
imposed one-year moratoria on regulator approved expansions into the real estate, securities, and 
insurance industries, and on regulator approved formations of nonbank banks.  The moratorium 
on expanded insurance powers resulted from committee members John Heinz and Christopher 
Dodd (D-CT).  Although Dodd had previously sought to impose a permanent moratorium on 
banks entering the insurance sector, the panel rejected and opted instead for the one year version.  
Finally, the bill contained disclosure requirements concerning the length of time for check holds 
on deposited items.   
The Senate debated S 790 March 25-27.  The principal controversy surrounded the 
moratoria on federal regulators’ expansions of bank powers.  The moratoria on expanded powers 
also applied to foreign banks.  The moratoria, however, did not impinge on state regulators’ 
authority to grant state-chartered banks additional powers.  During this process, the chamber 
rejected Sen. Garn’s attempts to remove the moratoria on nonbank banks and expansions of bank 
powers.  Freshman Sen. John Breaux (D-LA), though, notched a major victory for moratoria 
opponents by making them retroactive to the beginning of March 1987 regardless of the bill’s 
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enactment date.  Finally, the bill directed President Reagan to appoint a commission to study 
overhauling the banking regulatory system.  The Senate approved S 790 March 27 by a margin 
of 79-11 with all eleven nay votes coming from Republicans. 
Although Chairman St. Germain had introduced a bill (HR 27) on the first day of the new 
session, the House was slow to act.  Compared to its Senate counterpart, HR 27 focused solely 
on funding the FSLIC.  The House Banking Committee approved St. Germain’s bill on April 1.  
HR 27 ignored regulatory matters of expanded powers or nonbank banks.  The bill’s main 
contents included $5 billion worth of FSLIC funding.  Needless to say, this amount was one third 
that requested by the Reagan administration and approved March 31 by the House Financial 
Institutions Subcommittee.   
 Meanwhile during the spring, the Board of Governors issued other significant decisions 
affecting the regulatory structure.  On April 24, the Board announced a “source of strength” 
policy concerning bank holding companies’ duties to their subsidiary banks, stating it is “the 
responsibility of bank holding companies to act as sources of financial and managerial strength 
to their subsidiary banks” (73 Fed. Res. Bull., 441, Jun. 1987).  Though Fed officials previously 
articulated the policy in testimony and speeches, the FRB had never officially issued a written 
statement on it.  Hereafter, the Federal Reserve employed this legal rationale to justify its 
decisions expanding bank holding companies’ activities through subsidiaries.  According to this 
line of reasoning, nonbanking affiliates of banks would not endanger federal deposit insurance or 
the Fed’s discount window, rather they would aid the banking system by providing additional 
revenue streams to their parent banking organizations.68  
                                                 
68
 To date, the federal court system still has not ruled on the “source of strength” doctrine.  There was one line of 
cases, known as MCorp, during the early 1990s that challenged the policy that went through the Appeals Circuit 
before reaching the Supreme Court, but the Court ultimately decided that the district and appeals courts erred by 
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 The Fed did not stop there when six days later it approved joint applications by Citicorp, 
J.P. Morgan & Co., and BTNY Corp. to engage in limited underwriting and dealing in certain 
securities.  The securities included municipal revenue bonds, mortgage backed securities, 
consumer-receivable-related securities, and commercial paper, all of which the Board referred to 
as “ineligible securities.”  Because this case entailed bank holding companies proposing to 
underwrite securities in subsidiaries all ready engaged in underwriting certain types of securities, 
the Board “concluded that the U.S. government and other securities specifically made eligible for 
underwriting and dealing by member banks in section 16 should not be viewed as the kind of 
activity proscribed by section 20” (73 Fed. Res. Bull. 476, Jun 1987).  Once again, the Fed 
limited the section 20 subsidiaries to less than 5 percent of their revenue from the impermissible 
activities.  Interestingly enough, Board Chairman Paul A. Volcker and Governor Wayne D. 
Angell dissented from the ruling.  Though they supported the policy result, they disagreed with 
the method taken to reach it.   Because of this ruling, Angell and Volcker argued, member banks 
would no longer be affiliated with corporations “principally engaged” in underwriting or dealing 
in securities, rather they would be affiliated with corporations “wholly engaged in such 
activities” (73 Fed. Res. Bull. 505, Jun 1987).69   
When HR 27 reached the House floor May 5, the main controversy surrounded the 
FSLIC funding package’s size.  The Reagan administration was advocating a $15 billion funding 
plan spread out over five years whereas many lawmakers, including St. Germain, believed a $5 
billion package was sufficiently adequate.  To aid its cause, the administration even successfully 
lobbied Speaker Jim Wright (D-TX) into supporting its funding plan.  As a result, Wright 
                                                                                                                                                             
concluding they had jurisdiction to rule on the regulation 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990), reversed, 502 U.S. 32 (1991).  
As a result, there still is no official federal court ruling on the FRB’s “source of strength” doctrine.  
69
 The Board approved a similar application in mid May from the Chase Manhattan Corp. to underwrite and deal in 
the same types of securities.  Once again, Chairman Volcker and Governor Angell dissented and referred to their 
statement in the Citicorp, Morgan, BTNY Corp. order (73 Fed. Res. Bull. 609, Jul 1987). 
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prevailed upon St. Germain to amend his committee’s $5 billion funding provision with the 
administration’s one.  This amendment caused many members of both parties to revolt; it failed 
258-153.  After defeating the $15 billion FSLIC amendment, the House returned to the original 
HR 27 with its $5 billion provision spread over two years; this version overwhelmingly passed 
with only six members voting against it. 
Even though both chambers easily passed bills, wrangling between them over whose bill 
they would negotiate delayed the convening of a conference.  When the conference began on 
June 22, Rep. St. Germain agreed to negotiate all the Senate bills’ provisions.  According to St. 
Germain’s aides, “it was clear that senators were adamant about taking up their entire bill, 
and…a compromise on FSLIC would be impossible without first working on the other Senate 
provisions” (Congressional Quarterly 1988a).  Over the next week and a half, the conferees 
agreed to $8.5 billion for the FSLIC, a redefinition of the term “bank,” and a moratorium on 
regulators’ expansion of bank powers expiring one year from S 790’s introduction.  The 
redefinition of a bank, which closed the nonbank bank loophole that had existed since the BHCA 
Amendments of 1970, amounted to a permanent moratorium on further nonbank banks.   
After some last minute veto threats from the administration which successfully extracted 
more FSLIC funding from the conference, President Reagan signed the Competitive Equality 
Banking Act (CEBA) of 1987 on August 10.  Though the statute focused primarily on the thrift 
industry, it also contained several important elements pertaining to the banking industry.  Since 
the FSLIC was then insolvent, the law sought to recapitalize the fund.  CEBA reaffirmed that the 
United States government, and the U.S. taxpayer, stood behind not only the FSLIC, but also the 
FDIC.  It also granted the FSLIC the authority to borrow up to $10.825 billion by issuing bonds 
and to impose additional assessments on member thrifts given the exceptional circumstances.   
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Second, CEBA enacted key changes to the banking system.  The statute ended the 
nonbank bank by redefining the meaning of “bank” contained in the Bank Holding Company 
Act.  CEBA added to this definition any institution insured by the FDIC, regardless of its loan 
making or deposit taking.  Because numerous nonbank banks had arisen since 1970, it 
grandfathered the operations of those ones operating before March 1987.  It attached a condition 
relating to the grandfathering that limited the annual growth rate of such limited service banks’ 
assets.  Perhaps even more important than closing the loophole, CEBA imposed a one-year 
moratorium on federal regulators approving any bank applications seeking expansions into the 
insurance, securities, or real estate industries.  The moratorium expired March 1, 1988.   
  The law also required the FHLBB and the FSLIC, the two federal thrift regulators, to 
adopt generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  These other accounting guidelines 
replaced the previous standard employed by the agencies known as regulatory accounting 
principles.  This change required the use of mark-to-market accounting methods and brought 
thrifts in line with the accounting rules employed by banking regulators.  Connected with the 
change in accounting principles, legislators permitted regulators to grant thrifts located in 
economically depressed regions forbearance.  The FDIC gained another resolution mechanism 
with the “bridge bank” that allowed it to create a new, sound bank and operate it in place of a 
failed bank for up to three years while looking for a buyer.  To curtail moral hazard and 
minimize insurance fund losses, the FDIC received the authority to overrule state banking 
commissioners, who chartered state banks, when they refused to close their insolvent institutions.   
CEBA unfortunately failed to stem the mounting bank and thrift failures.  Soon after the 
start of 1988, officials from the FSLIC and the GAO released reports indicating that the costs of 
resolving the thrift failures were much higher than policymakers previously anticipated.  
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CEBA’s FSLIC funding provisions suddenly became insufficient.  The new estimates revealed 
the costs increased significantly over the last four months of 1987.  With President Reagan in his 
final year in the White House, Sen. Proxmire planning to retire at the end of the congressional 
session, and elected officials focusing on the upcoming presidential election, lawmakers were 
rather preoccupied with matters other than banking reform.  Sen. Proxmire spent his last year in 
elective office attempting major legislative reform of the banking industry, but his efforts failed 
to produce any tangible results.      
Nevertheless, two days before President Reagan left office, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve approved the proposal from J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., Chase Manhattan Corp., 
BTNY Corp., Citicorp, and Security Pacific Corp. to underwrite and deal in a whole host of 
different debt and equity securities.  The Board approved the activities which would be 
conducted within bank holding companies’ section 20 subsidiaries; it still subjected the 
subsidiaries to less than the 5 percent revenue limit.  The importance of this order, however, was 
not so much that the Fed approved the application, but that in doing so, it provided a list of 
firewalls that would prevent the spread of contagion to any of the affiliated banks.  The 
protections included items such as requiring separate names and logos for the banks and 
affiliates, limiting the concentration of resources, and increasing capital adequacy requirements 
(75 Fed. Res. Bull. 202-210, Mar. 1989). 
THE BUSH YEARS 
As President George H.W. Bush took office in the midst of worsening bank and thrift 
crises, he attempted to tackle the problems of these crises in one of his earliest actions.  During 
its first week in office, the Bush administration leaked the idea of funding resolution of the thrift 
crisis a “depositors’ fee” on all depository institutions, thereby contradicting President Bush’s 
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“no new taxes” pledge (Boyd 1989).  Rep. Henry Gonzalez (D-TX), who became House 
Banking Committee Chairman following Rep. St. Germain’s loss in a 1988 Democratic primary, 
best summarized the political reaction of most elected officials to the Bush administration’s 
proposal, “I don’t see any difference between raising the premium and exacting a tax, a fee” 
(Boyd 1989).  Even though the adverse political reaction caused the administration to relinquish 
the tax proposal and increase deposit insurance premiums instead, the damage was still done as 
the Bush White House committed its earliest mistake.       
 Nearly a week after policymakers reacted harshly toward the bank tax idea, President 
Bush formally announced his legislative plan addressing the banking and thrift crises.  The Bush 
proposal contained the following components: placing insolvent thrifts under the FDIC-FSLIC’s 
joint management, overhauling the nation’s regulatory framework for depository institutions, 
establishing a corporation to finance the cost of resolving the numerous insolvent thrifts, and 
increasing the Department of Justice’s budget to pursue those bank executives guilty of fraud and 
other wrongdoings.  Bush defended his plan, arguing that “the taxpayers will not be called on to 
rescue it [i.e. the FDIC] a few years from now” (Bush 1990: 61).   
 Although both the House and Senate Banking Committees worked on the proposed 
legislation during February and March, the Senate Banking Committee completed work on the 
bill first.  Sen. Don W. Riegle Jr. (D-MI), who became Banking Committee Chairman upon Sen. 
Proxmire’s retirement, took the leading role in redrafting the Bush administration’s plan with 
fellow committee members behind closed doors, the Banking Committee on April 12 approved a 
bill (S 774) strongly resembling the White House’s one.  As requested by President Bush, S 774 
contained a $50 billion appropriation to fund resolution of the insolvent thrifts.  The Senate 
Banking Committee’s bill, however, differed from the administration’s bill in three significant 
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areas: it strengthened capital adequacy requirements for thrifts; it further restricted state-
chartered thrifts’ activities; and, it removed chartering authority from the FHLBB.  
 Exactly a week later, the Senate easily passed S 774.  Though the upper chamber debated 
the proposed legislation for three days, it changed few elements in the bill.  The Senate left the 
appropriation amount unchanged, although Sens. Riegle and Bob Graham (D-FL) tried but failed 
to circumvent Gramm-Rudman by placing the funding on budget.  The alterations of greatest 
significance, however, revolved around increasing thrifts’ capital standards, which only 
strengthened the bill.  Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-OH) was instrumental in getting the 
chamber to toughen capital requirements requiring thrifts to have a specified minimum amount 
of tangible capital; the Metzenbaum amendment set the level at three percent capital to assets.  
Additionally, his amendment required thrifts to amortize any goodwill they were carrying as 
capital over a twenty-five year period.  Sens. Garn and Riegle also amended S 774 allowing the 
FDIC to continue charging banks the maximum premium until its fund was replenished to at 
least 1.65 percent of total deposits, an amount greater than that sought by the Bush 
administration.      
 Unlike the Senate, the House had a more difficult time completing work on the 
administration’s proposed banking legislation.  Having received Chairman Gonzalez’s draft of 
the administration’s proposal HR 1278 on referral, the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions 
approved a version of HR 1278 on March 13 following some heated mark ups.  The most 
contentious aspect of HR 1278 within the panel, though, concerned capital standards and the 
subcommittee’s decision to set them lower than the administration requested.  The panel, 
however, amended the bill requiring thrifts meet the capital requirement based on their assets’ 
riskiness.  The House Banking Committee began work on HR 1278 nearly two weeks afterwards, 
 131 
and, just like its subcommittee, experienced the most disagreement over capital standards.  
Although the committee kept the Financial Institution Subcommittee’s risk-based measure of 
capital, it increased the amount of capital regulators required thrifts to have.  It required thrifts 
have tangible new worth of at least 1.5 percent of assets by the following June and to have core 
capital, which included goodwill, of 3 percent by the same date.  Both requirements were stricter 
than those of the Senate or Bush administration.  The committee also limited thrifts’ activities.  
On May 2 the Banking Committee approved HR 1278 with only two votes in the negative. 
 In light of the controversy encountered in committee, the House had a surprisingly easy 
time June 15 passing HR 1278.  The Banking Committee’s capital standards remained, though a 
number of Congressmen, most notably Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL), attempted to amend the bill 
lowering the standards.  Nonetheless, the Bush administration and its congressional allies 
successfully defeated all such amendments reducing the capital requirements.  During the debate, 
the House adopted Rep. Byron L. Dorgan’s (D-ND) amendment banning thrifts from investing in 
junk bonds.  The House also defeated amendments taking the funding for thrift resolutions off 
budget. 
 Following its selection in late June, the conference committee did not convene until after 
the Fourth of July recess.  While the capital standard issue fomented much controversy within 
the House, it became a non-issue in conference.  Instead, conferees argued the most about the 
financing method of the $50 billion appropriation.  The committee became deadlocked on 
whether the appropriation should be on-budget or off-budget.  The Bush administration and 
Republicans espoused putting the funding off-budget given the size of the deficit, whereas 
Democrats were split between the two options.  Ultimately Sen. Alan Cranston (D-CA) switched 
his vote from the off-budget to the on-budget plan to move the legislation.  In return, he 
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extracted some concessions from Chairman Gonzalez and other House members retaining the 
bill’s anti-discrimination provisions.  As a result, the conferees reached final agreement on a bill 
and submitted their report July 27. 
President Bush signed HR 1278 on August 9, thereby enacting the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989.  The law abolished the bankrupt 
FSLIC and stripped the FHLBB of its regulatory role; it then created the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) as a new bureau within the Treasury to regulate federally chartered thrifts and 
transferred the FHLBB’s chartering and regulatory authority to the OTS.  Second, FIRREA 
established two new deposit insurance funds under the FDIC’s management: the Savings 
Insurance Fund (SAIF) and the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF).  To aid the thrift cleanup, the statute 
created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), a new agency to resolve the assets of failed 
S&Ls.70  Fourth, to make it more difficult for the FDIC to invoke its authority under Section 
13(c)(4), the law expanded the size of the agency’s board of directors by adding the OTS director 
and two other presidentially selected appointees.71      
 FIRREA also changed the bank and thrift regulatory structure.  First, it rewrote the 
minimum capital standards for S&Ls, and further defined what constituted capital.  In particular, 
it prohibited regulators after 1994 from using their discretionary authority to include “goodwill” 
as capital.  FIRREA also increased bank capital standards on thrifts.  Second, to fund the SAIF 
and the BIF, the measure increased the deposit insurance premium, which was a fixed, flat rate 
that banks and S&Ls paid.  Third, to aid in the resolution process, financially sound banks and 
thrifts were allowed to purchase failed thrifts across state lines.  Fourth, the statute officially 
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 Basically, lawmakers created the RTC to perform one half of the FDIC’s function; it served as the resolution 
authority but not the insurance authority. 
71
 Section 13c(4) refers, of course, to the “essentiality doctrine” the FDIC employed to bail out failed depository 
institutions, especially under the infamous too big to fail moniker. 
 133 
sanctioned the FDIC’s cross-guarantee policy by which the agency seized the assets of healthy 
banks affiliated with failing banks.  Fifth, because thrift premium rates exceeded bank ones, 
FIRREA prohibited healthy S&Ls from converting to banks to join the BIF and reap its lower 
premium rates.  Sixth, it applied banks’ investment guidelines to S&Ls, and, more specifically, 
required S&Ls to divest any junk bond holdings by July 1994.   
Although FIRREA marked the completion of lawmakers’ banking legislation for the 
year, bank regulatory policy continued to evolve through other venues.  The most important 
development occurred on September 21, when the Federal Reserve Board announced that it was 
modifying its section 20 rule.  This rule allowed subsidiaries of bhcs to deal in and underwrite 
“bank-ineligible securities.”72  In addition, the newly generated rule “raise[d] from 5 to 10 
percent the revenue limit on the amount of total revenues a section 20 subsidiary may derive 
from ineligible securities underwriting and dealing activities” (75 Fed. Res. Bull. 751, Nov. 
1989).  The rule further expanded the category of “bank-eligible securities” to include securities 
“rated by a nonaffiliated, nationally recognized rating organization or…issued or guaranteed by 
the Federal National Mortgage Association [Fannie Mae], the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation [Freddie Mac], or the Government National Mortgage Association [Ginnie Mae]” 
(75 Fed. Res. Bull. 751, Nov. 1989).  Thus, certain asset-backed securities became eligible for 
purchase by bank holding companies and their subsidiaries. 
By the start of 1990, it was becoming increasingly evident that FIRREA and its 
provisions to fund the thrift cleanup were insufficient for solving the S&L problem.  The number 
of failing thrifts was climbing far beyond the amount that FIRREA was designed to resolve, and, 
as a result, regulatory officials began warning Congress early about the need for additional 
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 “Bank-eligible securities” included federal government bonds or Treasuries, but, in recent decades expanded to 
include municipal bonds and general revenue bonds.   
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action.  Needless to say, members of Congress were angered over this discovery and did not 
want to be seen passing another government bailout.    
Meanwhile, President Bush and his advisers remained silent on the increasing failures 
and the failures’ effect on the costs of federal deposit insurance.  The executive branch’s silence, 
however, only worsened relations with Capitol Hill as legislators refused to act on such a 
politically unpopular issue without having the president as an equal participant.  Treasury 
Secretary Brady eventually testified before the Senate Banking Committee in late May and told 
senators that conditions had worsened tremendously with between 700 and 1000 thrifts having 
failed or verging on failure.  He predicted losses to the federal government could exceed $100 
billion, but that this amount could easily change as the number of troubled banks and thrifts 
increased.      
 Both chambers in October finally crafted bills providing additional money for the RTC.  
Because of the Bush administration’s silence and the intense hostility such bailouts generated, 
congressional leaders did not bring any of the measures to the floor.  The final attempt to pass a 
funding bill died early in the morning of October 28, when Rep. Gonzalez’s unanimous consent 
attempt to consider H.R. 5891 failed. 
 The following year, Capitol Hill lawmakers accomplished little except for passage of a 
bill in October authorizing the FDIC to raise its insurance premiums.  At the time, FDIC 
premiums were at their highest level permitted under the law; the statutorily capped rate was 12 
cents per $100 of deposits.  On October 16, the House approved a budget reconciliation bill HR 
5835 containing a provision eliminating altogether the cap on premiums.  The provision resulted 
from a bill (HR 5610) the House had approved a month earlier.  On October 18, he Senate passed 
HR 5835.  Although the both chambers’ votes on HR 5835 were rather close, the deposit 
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insurance premium increase attracted little attention during debate (Congressional Quarterly 
1991b).  President Bush eventually signed the spending bill the day before the midterm elections; 
the deposit insurance provision did not cause the delay (Congressional Quarterly 1991b).     
 As the following year began, the failure of the Bank of New England Corporation 
(BNEC) and its three subsidiary banks reminded policymakers yet again of reforming the 
banking statutes to prevent future uses of TBTF.73  Although BNEC and BNE were publicly 
reporting losses in the hundreds of millions throughout the previous year, it was not until the 
holding company’s announcement on Friday, January 4, 1991 that a run began on the BNE in 
which depositors withdrew nearly $1 billion.  As a result, the OCC declared BNE insolvent on 
Sunday, January 4 and appointed the FDIC receiver.  The FDIC then immediately charged the 
other two banks in the group with the anticipated insurance fund loss, but because they were 
unable to pay the capital deficiency, the agency seized them as well.74  To stem the run, the 
FDIC announced that it would protect all deposits of the three banks, even those above the 
$100,000 statutorily guaranteed limit.  The FDIC’s blanket guarantee of all deposits turned 
attention back to the too big to fail doctrine.75 
 Lawmakers received additional impetus on February 5 when the Treasury Department 
released its 700 page FIRREA-ordered policy study Modernizing the Financial System: 
Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks.  The Treasury described the predicament 
facing American banks in the following way: 
                                                 
73
 The three banks composing the BNEC included Bank of New England, N.A. (BNE), Connecticut Bank and Trust 
Company, N.A. (BCT), and Maine National Bank (MNB).  All three banks combined had assets totaling nearly $21 
billion, making the BNEC one of the nation’s largest banking organizations. 
74
 This action marked the FDIC’s first official use of its cross-guarantee policy as it forced two solvent banks into 
receivership.   
75
 Incidentally, the BNE failure was the last time in the twentieth century the FDIC employed its “essentiality” 
authority.  There were, of course, three other instances in which the agency invoked this power between Continental 
Illinois and BND.  These three instances included First National Bank and Trust Company of Oklahoma City 
(Oklahoma City, OK 1986), First Republicbank of Dallas (Dallas, TX 1988), and MBank Houston, N.A. (Houston, 
TX 1989). 
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In short, unable to adapt and follow their best customers into related lines of 
businesses, banks have become steadily less competitive in their traditional activity of 
lending….Losses have increased and capital has decreased.  Taxpayers have become 
more exposed.  (Department of the Treasury 1991: 7) 
To alleviate the situation, the Treasury proposed allowing banks to affiliate with a host of other 
financial services firms, including nonfinancial companies, authorizing banks to expand into the 
other financial services industries, and removing restrictions on interstate branching.  Although 
the study recommended altering deposit insurance to limit coverage and thereby lower the 
federal government’s contingent liability, anything addressing federal deposit insurance’s 
funding shortfall was conspicuously absent.  
 The House Financial Institutions Subcommittee began the lawmaking process May 7 
when it easily approved a narrow bill (HR 2094) that provided the FDIC a $30 billion Treasury 
line of credit, capped deposit insurance coverage at $100,000 total per depositor throughout the 
country, and improved banking regulation by among other things, requiring regulators to act 
more promptly with insolvent institutions.  Thirteen days later without dissent, it passed a 
broader banking bill resembling the Treasury’ proposed plan.  This second bill, which remained 
unnumbered, basically provided everything the administration advocated such as removing the 
prohibitions against interstate branching, removing statutory restrictions on expanded bank 
activities, permitting nonfinancial corporations to own banks, and allowing banks to affiliate 
with insurance and real estate firms.  The unnumbered bill, however, did not limit deposit 
insurance as the Bush White House wished to $100,000 per person nationally.   
 A month after the House Financial Institutions Subcommittee passed the broader banking 
bill (HR 2094), the House Banking Committee began marking up bills.  Following several days 
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of markup, the committee June 28 approved a narrow banking bill (HR 6), which Chairman 
Gonzalez had introduced on the first day of the session.  As introduced, HR 6 replenished the 
deposit insurance fund by raising an existing Treasury line of credit to $30 billion.  Then, in 
something of a turnabout, the committee attached its subcommittee’s entire unnumbered broader 
bill and sent both to the floor together.   
 Since the House Banking Committee finished working on HR 6, the bill proceeded to 
Commerce where it sat idle until Congress returned from the August recess.  Upon resuming, 
Commerce’s Finance Subcommittee soon approved HR 6, but before doing so it attached two 
amendments.  One amendment thwarted the mixing of banking and commerce by prohibiting 
banks from affiliating with nonfinancial companies whereas the other one restricted the 
affiliations between banks and securities firms by limiting their cross-selling.  As this 
subcommittee worked on HR 6, Commerce’s Competitiveness Subcommittee considered the 
proposed legislation.  It too passed and amended the bill restricting banks’ entry into insurance, 
thereby curtailing some regulator approved activities.  Then, on September 25 the Energy and 
Commerce Committee easily approved HR 6 in a form nearly identical to that passed by its two 
subcommittees. 
Meanwhile, the Senate Banking Committee held nomination hearings on September 26 
and October 3 for Robert L. Clarke’s second term as Comptroller of the Currency.  President 
Bush had nominated Mr. Clarke for a second five-year term back in January, but the Senate 
delayed action on the appointment for over nine months.  At the two day affair, Democratic 
Senators blamed Clarke for the hundreds of bank failures occurring under his tenure.  Banking 
Committee Chairman Riegle went so far as to claim, “During his tenure, national banks failed in 
numbers not seen since the Great Depression” (Congressional Quarterly 1992a).  It was not only 
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the large number of bank failures that troubled Democrats, but also Comptroller Clarke’s role in 
the resolution of BNE at the start of the year that stirred opposition from Democratic Senators.  
In particular, he had been uncooperative with congressional requests for documentation 
concerning OCC examinations and actions taken to stem the unsafe and unsound practices at 
BNE.  As a result, the committee defeated Clarke’s reappointment in two party-line votes: one 
recommending confirmation and another merely forwarding his nomination to the floor without 
any recommendation.76  Though Clarke failed to win a second term as Comptroller, he remained 
in office as a recess appointment through the following February.   
 These two rather different bills reported by the House Banking and Commerce 
Committees created an impasse that thwarted further action.  By the third week of October, 
however, Rep. Gonzalez relented and agreed with Commerce Chairman Dingell on a 
compromise version.  The agreement involved prohibiting nonfinancial companies from owning 
banks, limiting banks’ insurance activities, and erecting more stringent firewalls separating 
banks from their affiliates.  In return, Dingell abandoned his demands for the SEC to regulate 
securities activities conducted in banks, thus relinquishing the Commerce Committee’s clear 
move to gain jurisdiction over one area of banks’ activities.  The two chairmen left the interstate 
branching provisions alone.  In response to the Gonzalez-Dingell compromise, President Bush 
issued a veto threat on October 29.  House leaders persisted in bringing the revised bill to the 
floor, so legislators utterly rejected it on November 4 by over a three to one margin.   
 Two days after the House defeated HR 6, the Banking Committee returned to HR 2094, a 
narrower banking bill it passed earlier in the year, and approved it once again for floor action.  
The committee maintained the bill’s earlier form and contents.  Unfortunately, once HR 2094 
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 Sen. Al D’Amato (R-NY) was the only senator to cross-party lines in these two committee votes and join Banking 
Committee Democrats. 
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reached the floor November 13 members added two amendments: one reattached non-
controversial banking law reforms discarded from the earlier HR 6 whereas the other one 
permitted interstate branch banking while curtailing the banking industry’s ability to enter real 
estate and insurance.  As a result, a rather odd political coalition of banks, securities firms, and 
consumer rights groups coalesced against the insurance and real estate interests supporting it; 
this second banking bill was defeated November 13 by a 227-191 margin.   
 While the House spent much of the year crafting banking legislation in the open, the 
Senate did so but behind closed doors.  In fact, Banking Chairman Don Riegle spent much of the 
year privately drafting a bill (S 543) that permitted banks to affiliate with securities firms, 
prohibited banks from affiliating with nonfinancial companies, provided the FDIC with a $30 
billion line of credit, required regulators act promptly to close insolvent banks, provided lender 
liability protection for banks foreclosing on contaminated property, and provided consumer 
protections for bank customers.  The Banking Committee passed the bill August 2, but delayed 
Senate action by failing to file a report on the proposed legislation until October 1.  In narrowly 
approving S 543, the committee altered Riegle’s bill somewhat through the amendment process.  
The changes included: altering the special premiums to cover the line of credit so that they 
applied only on domestic deposits, creating new resolution procedures for the FDIC and ending 
too big to fail by permitting the FDIC to cover uninsured depositors but to also impose a ten 
percent loss on them, dropping Riegle’s provision for a new bank regulatory agency outside the 
Treasury, and permitting both interstate branching and consolidation within three years.  The 
Senate considered S 543 for several days during mid November.  Before passing the bill 
November 21, however, senators made three other amendments of significance.  First, the 
chamber removed the provisions allowing banks to affiliate with securities firms.  Then, the 
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Senate added a provision permitting national banks to serve as insurance agents in states granting 
the same ability to state-chartered banks.  Finally, the chamber changed the interstate branching 
provision so that banks could only cross state lines by purchasing another bank.    
The House Banking Committee marked up its third banking bill on November 19.  The 
third incarnation was HR 3768; it closely resembled HR 2094 except for is lacked the interstate 
banking provisions.  The House debated HR 3768 two days later without permitting any 
amendments whatsoever.  Insurance industry ally Rep. Solomon strenuously opposed the bill, 
but was prevented from offering any amendments.  The chamber then approved the measure 
overwhelmingly, if unenthusiastically, 344-84. 
With November nearly over, the two chambers hastily assembled a conference.  To 
complete the legislation before session’s end, conferees settled on approving a narrow bill.  They 
achieved this goal by authorizing a line of credit of $30 billion to the FDIC, instituting higher 
deposit insurance premiums on banks to replenish the insurance fund, and granting the FDIC 
short-term borrowing authority.  The conferees from both Houses adopted the report November 
27.   
On December 19, President Bush signed S 543 into law, thereby enacting the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991.  First, FDICIA raised the 
FDIC’s Treasury line of credit to $30 billion.  Second, it authorized the FDIC to set risk-based 
deposit insurance premiums.  Until this time, the FDIC charged all banks the same rate, 
regardless of risk, thereby creating a moral hazard problem.  Third, the law required bank 
regulators to intervene immediately before a bank failed, practicing what the statute labeled 
“prompt corrective action,” to limit losses to the insurance fund.  Fourth, it instituted consumer 
protections such as the Truth-in-Savings Act requiring depository institutions to make certain 
 141 
disclosures to depositors about interest rates.  Fifth, the statute limited executive compensation at 
troubled banks and instituted safeguards insider lending.  Sixth, though by no means all, the law 
necessitated regulators develop a new formula for calculating whether a bank had adequate 
capital.  This law, along with 1983’s ILSA, composed the two sources from which regulators 
derived their ability to set capital requirements. 
The banking system, however, continued to have problems the following year as 
hundreds of depository institutions failed.  Needless to say, FDICIA did not immediately turn 
around the industry.  Furthermore, the cost of resolving the thrift crisis continued to increase, 
thereby necessitating additional action from legislators.  Though Congress attempted to extend 
last December’s RTC appropriation early in the spring, the efforts failed and the RTC had to 
return much of the funding to the Treasury.  With George Bush’s first term about to expire, 
lawmakers were so focused on the upcoming election that they wanted to avoid the unpleasant 
choices entailed in tackling the banking system’s woes.  As a result, 1992 witnessed no further 
progress on banking reform legislation. 
CONCLUSION  
 This chapter examined bank regulation during the Reagan-Bush years.  As evidenced by 
the amount of major banking statutes, this twelve year period proved to be one of the most 
productive for lawmakers in the realm of banking policy in decades.  Some of this legislation 
eliminated New Deal era interest rate controls.  Legislators eliminated the New Deal interest rate 
ceilings, authorized the federal regulators to establish capital requirements for banks due to 
international lending, redefined what constituted a bank and thereby brought more firms within 
the purview of regulators, granted the FDIC the right to increase premiums and then the right to 
establish risk-weighted premiums, and, unlike in previous times, ordered federal regulators to 
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take prompt corrective action whenever a bank’s capital fell below specified levels.  
Additionally, they extended previously enacted social regulations such as community 
reinvestment requirements and instituted entirely new ones aimed at disclosure and consumer 
protection.  In this way, lawmakers significantly revised not only the various tools available to 
the agencies, but also the relationships between them.   
 Federal lawmakers, however, were not the only ones busy during this period.  As 
revealed by this chapter, the regulatory agencies were also very involved in the policymaking 
process.  The FDIC continued experimenting with its “essentiality” provision as a way to provide 
financial assistance to failing depository institutions.  It extended financial assistance to 
organizations such as First Pennsy, Continental Illinois, and the Bank of New England.  By this 
time, though, this resolution mechanism was all ready falling into disfavor; Continental Illinois 
won it the too big to fail epithet whereas Bank of New England proved to be the last use of it 
until the 2007-2009 financial crisis.   
While the OCC and Fed were coordinating with the FDIC over resolving bank failures, 
they were also approving expansions of activities.  The OCC approved expansions by national 
banks into securities brokerage and insurance agency, not to mention permitting a bank to move 
its headquarters across state lines.  Not to be outdone, the Fed used its authority to permit 
affiliations between banks and firms engaged in nonbanking activities through the holding 
company structure.  Nearly a year after the OCC’s brokerage decision, the Federal Reserve 
approved Bank of America Corporation’s application to acquire the securities brokerage Charles 
Schwab.  Then, nearly a year later, the Fed began approving affiliations between banks and firms 
engaging in “ineligible” securities activities.  Both agencies justified their rulings as means of 
strengthening the banking system, yet neither really considered at the time the implications such 
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expansions might pose on deposit insurance system.  Nevertheless, the implications of how such 
expansions into other financial services sectors could one day channel governmental aid to those 
industries rather than the banking one was largely ignored for a later date.  
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5. BANK REGULATION DURING THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 
 This chapter presents bank regulation during President Clinton’s first seven years in 
office.  The narrative begins the March 1993 initiative that revealed Clinton’s interest in 
streamlining regulatory reviews of banks and extending additional credit to poor communities.  
Because the nation was still recovering from the bank and thrift crises of the preceding period, 
though, policymakers soon turned their attention to funding the remaining cost of the resolutions.  
In the process of completing legislative action on this matter, administration officials clearly 
communicated to Capitol Hill their interest in serious reforms of the nation’s antiquated 
branching laws.  Lawmakers remembered this interest in Clinton’s second year when they 
successfully pushed through the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994 that phased out existing restrictions on intrastate and interstate branching within a few 
years. 
 Shortly after the Democrats completed this major reform of the country banking laws 
concerning branching, however, the Democrats lost control of both congressional chambers in 
the midterm for the first time in forty years.  On the surface, at least, such a return to divided 
government threatened to block any further reforms of the banking statutes.  Nonetheless, the 
change in party control brought about significant changes both in terms of committee 
jurisdictions and personnel running those committees that new opportunities of statutory reform 
quickly appeared.   
 In February 1995, not long after the 105th Congress convened, House Banking 
Committee Chairman Jim Leach (R-IA) began his quest to complete modernization of the 
nation’s outmoded bank regulatory laws that would ultimately produce the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999.  Over the next few years, however, Leach’s efforts are stymied by 
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opposition mainly from the insurance industry and its opposition to further expansion by banks 
into insurance.  Not until Citicorp and Travelers announced their merger in April 1998 did hope 
for real legislative reform return.  Late this particular year, though, Sen. Phil Gramm (R-TX) 
killed the proposed legislation in the Banking Committee.  With Gramm slotted to takeover the 
chairmanship of the Banking Committee in 1999, Needless to say, the possibility for legislative 
reform appeared to lessen with Sen. Gramm taking over the Banking Committee chair, but he 
proved himself to be quite the legislator over the course of the year as he and his counterpart in 
the House, Rep. Leach, successfully guided the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 to 
enactment.  In so doing, lawmakers repealed a few vestiges of “Glass-Steagall.” 
 Though much of the activity during this period occurred at the legislative level, the 
federal regulatory agencies were still actively influencing the course of regulation with their 
various activities.  Since the problems associated with resolving the bank and thrift crises soon 
disappeared, the FDIC took on a lesser role vis-à-vis its two counterparts.  The Comptroller of 
the Currency, for instance, continued to permit national banks to expand into activities deemed 
“incidental” to banking.  In June 1993, the Supreme Court upheld the Comptroller’s decision to 
allow national banks sell insurance in the case involving the United States National Bank of 
Oregon.  A few years later in early 1996, the Supreme Court upheld the right of a bank holding 
company subsidiary to sell insurance in Florida.  Thus, banks managed to consolidate their 
regulator approved entry into the insurance industry.  Likewise, the Federal Reserve continued to 
approve applications from bhcs engaging in “ineligible” securities activities through their section 
20 subsidiaries.  In December 1996, the Fed raised the limit from 10 to 25 percent on revenue for 
section 20 subsidiaries; then two months later, it announced a major streamlining of its review 
procedures for bhc expansion, which was made possible by a recent statutory reform.  Thus, two 
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of the three federal banking regulators were crucially involved in the development of bank 
regulatory policy.  This involvement continued through the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley as 
they fought over the structure of the newly sanctioned activities.     
THE CLINTON YEARS 
 Nearly two months after taking office, President Bill Clinton delivered a March 10 
speech on the nation’s credit crunch and outlined a means to “speed the economic recovery” 
through “increasing access to credit” for small businesses and other community members 
(Clinton 1994).  To accomplish this goal, the president announced that the federal bank 
regulatory agencies would issue directives without any statutory changes streamlining the 
examination process and reduce burdensome paperwork requirements.  Implementing these 
changes, though, he stressed would “not reduce attention to important regulation” (Clinton 
1994).  Community reinvestment was one such regulation that regulators would not slight in the 
process.  As Clinton explained,  
Through a proper allocation of our regulatory resources, we will be able to focus 
more on examination procedures to further meaningful compliance with the 
Community Reinvestment Act and to promote fair opportunities for all our people 
while reducing the hassles for all creditworthy loans.  (Clinton 1994) 
This marked perhaps one of the earliest instances of a White House emphasizing the duty of 
banks lending to members of their own communities.   
Although ideas such as these concerning the importance of micro-lending and fairness 
might seem out of the blue to someone not familiar with President Clinton, they were not at all 
out of line with his worldview.  After all, Bill Clinton had expressed a rather different conception 
of the American banking system’s operation when he gave one of his earliest national interviews 
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the previous September right after having received the Democratic nomination.  He stated, “I 
think every major urban area and every poor rural area ought to have access to a bank that 
operates on the radical idea that they ought to make loans to people who deposit in their bank” 
(Greider et al. 1992).  Clinton elaborated upon this idea saying, “It’s not happening today.  A 
certain percentage of the bank assets of this country have to be devoted to community banking” 
(Greider et al. 1992).  The CRA became one of the principal ways in which the administration 
did so.  Writing in his autobiography, Bill Clinton argued,  
One of the most effective things we did [for the economy] was to reform the 
regulations governing financial institutions under the 1977 Community Reinvestment 
Act….before 1993 it had never had much impact.  After the changes we 
made…banks would offer more than $800 million in home mortgage, small-business, 
and community development loans” (Clinton 1994: 517-518).   
Though it is debatable to what extent such initiatives aided the economic recovery, it certainly is 
undeniably that the administration, unlike its predecessors, emphasized lenders’ social 
responsibilities in the realm of banking regulation.   
 In congressional testimony before both Houses during mid March, Treasury Secretary 
Lloyd Bentsen requested $45 billion to fund the RTC and the Savings Association Insurance 
Fund (SAIF).  He stressed that this politically unpopular appropriation, which Congress failed to 
complete the previous year, would hopefully be the last one needed to resolve the thrift crisis.  
The Senate Banking Committee approved a funding bill (S 714) in late March appropriating $42 
billion, but when it reached the floor in mid May, senators reduced the appropriation to $29 
billion and amended it requiring the RTC to revise its operating procedures to limit waste and 
improve recovery rates.  A few days before the full Senate vote, the House Banking Committee 
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passed its own bill (HR 1340) providing $18.3 billion solely for the RTC.  Under this bill, the 
FDIC funded the SAIF through the $30 billion Treasury credit line it received in 1991.  The cost 
of the RTC and the SAIF’s funding method, though, troubled Republican members who 
succeeded in delaying any further action on the measure until the fall.   
 While legislation addressing the RTC was stalled in Congress, the Supreme Court ruled 
in the case of USNB OR v. Independent Insurance Agents of America (508 U.S. 439 (1993)).  
The cases surrounded the Comptroller’s 1986 interpretive ruling allowing the United States 
National Bank of Oregon to act as an insurance agent out of one of its branches.  This 
interpretive ruling had drawn upon a section within the Federal Reserve Act Amendments of 
1916 authorizing national banks to sell insurance out of their offices in towns with populations 
under 5,000.  The novel aspect of the 1986 ruling, though, was that the Comptroller interpreted 
the statute’s text to allow national banks to sell insurance not only to residents of the small towns 
in which they were located, but also to customers outside of those locales irrespective of 
population.  Consequently, a trade group representing insurance agents sued the Comptroller in 
federal court.  Although the district court upheld the Comptroller’s ruling, it raised the issue of 
whether or not the insurance agency provision was still on the statutory books.  When the case 
arrived in the D.C. Appeals Court, the court seized upon the provision from the 1916 statute and 
overturned the Comptroller’s ruling on the grounds that subsequent editions of the U.S. Code had 
omitted the section.  When the Supreme Court unanimously ruled on the case in early June 1993, 
the Court upheld the OCC’s ruling on the grounds that the provision’s disappearance from the 
statutory code was “a simple scrivener’s error” (USNB OR v. Ind. Insurance Agents of America 
508 U.S. 439 (1993)).  Thus, the Comptroller had won a significant victory for banks wishing to 
enter the insurance industry as agents. 
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It was ultimately a compromise crafted by four Banking Committee members setting 
aside $8 billion for the SAIF helped free the proposed legislation for passage.  On September 14, 
the House narrowly passed HR 1340.  The bill then waited another two months before a 
conference convened and passed a version resembling HR 1340.  Both chambers quickly 
approved the conference report along partisan lines, and President Clinton enacted the 
Resolution Trust Company Act of 1993 less than ten days before Christmas.  Although the RTC 
Completion Act concentrated on funding resolution of thrift insolvencies, it contained provisions 
on federal deposit insurance and the use of those funds.  In particular, it limited the use of federal 
deposit insurance such that “the Bank Insurance Fund and the Savings Association Insurance 
Fund shall not be used in any manner to benefit any shareholder” (U.S. Statutes at Large 107 
(1993): 2390).  The effect of this provision, of course, was to prevent a repeat of the Continental 
Illinois case in which regulators used FDIC funds to backstop a bank holding company’s 
shareholders.   
 Further bank regulatory changes began anew after the start of 1994.  Congress had not 
forgotten the Clinton administration’s interstate banking reform proposals from the previous 
year.  Toward this end on February 3, the House Financial Institutions Subcommittee 
unanimously passed a branch banking bill (HR 3841).  Then a week later, the Financial 
Institutions Subcommittee Chairman Stephen Neal (D-NC) introduced the bill on the floor.  Rep. 
Neal’s bill permitted interstate banking everywhere one year after its enactment.  It allowed bhcs 
owning bank networks across state lines prior to its enactment to consolidate them after eighteen 
months.  After three years, it permitted bhcs to purchase out-of-state banks and consolidate them.  
Provided that states “opted in,” the bill allowed banks to open new branches across state lines 
without acquiring any in-state banks, so-called de novo branching.  To assuage consumer rights 
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advocates, the proposed legislation subjected federally chartered out-of-state banks to state 
consumer protection and fair lending laws.  The bill also expanded community reinvestment 
requirements so that banks wishing to branch across state lines needed to meet them.  Because 
foreign banks operating in the U.S. were free from deposit insurance and community 
reinvestment requirements, HR 3841 advantaged any of them seeking to branch nationwide.   
 While Chairman Neal’s subcommittee was approving its interstate branching bill, the 
longtime insurance industry proponent Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT) announced on the Senate floor 
in a sudden about-face that he no longer insisted upon amending a branching bill to limit banks’ 
insurance activities.  As a result on February 23, the Senate Banking Committee unanimously 
approved a bill (S 1963).  The Banking Committee bill closely resembled its House counterpart.  
It had a similar “opt in” provision for de novo branching and updated the community 
reinvestment requirements to keep pace with changes brought by this law.  There were, however, 
a few significant differences between the two chambers’ bills.  Unlike its House counterpart, S 
1963 permitted consolidation of preexisting interstate banking networks and any networks 
acquired after the bill’s enactment no sooner than two years after passage.  The Senate version 
also preempted state consumer protection laws federally chartered depository institutions and 
permitted nationwide branching to foreign banks only if they established banks in the U.S. 
subject to deposit insurance.    
 On March 9 the House Banking Committee passed HR 3841 with only a single nay vote.  
The committee rejected all but a bipartisan amendment requiring federal regulators to consider 
the opinions of community groups when approving branch closures.  Then, the House approved 
HR 3841 thirteen days later with little controversy using a voice vote.  On April 26, the Senate 
followed suit by approving S 1963 using a voice vote; the only audible nay came from Sen. 
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Byron Dorgan (D-ND).  To bring S 1963 closer to the House version, the Senate increased the 
consolidation provision from two to three years following enactment; it then requested a 
conference.   
 When the conference convened in mid July, conferees had to resolve differences over 
foreign banks and the applicability of state banking laws.  Although the conference dropped the 
Senate bill’s more stringent provision imposing deposit insurance on foreign banks wishing to 
branch across state lines, it imposed community reinvestment requirements on them.  The 
conferees decided that state laws regarding consumer protection and branching would apply 
equally irrespective of a bank’s charter.  The OCC, though, gained preemption authority over 
state laws disadvantaging national banks vis-à-vis their state-chartered competitors.  Once the 
committee reached agreement on July 25, the House quickly approved the conference report in 
early August, but the Senate delayed doing so until September 13.  President Clinton signed the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act September 29.   
 The statute contained several notable provisions.  On the matter of interstate banking, it 
essentially repealed the Douglas Amendment requiring reciprocal laws between states and 
instead permitted bhcs to acquire banks in any state as of September 1, 1995.  Toward that end, 
however, Riegle-Neal imposed concentration limits barring acquisitions leading to a bhc 
controlling more than thirty percent of the deposits in a particular state or more than ten percent 
of all domestic bank and thrift deposits.  The statute extended the CRA to bank holding 
companies by requiring the Board of Governors to evaluate bhcs and their bank subsidiaries 
before approving any interstate acquisitions.  Though the Fed had considered CRA evaluations 
when reviewing holding company applications for expansion, preexisting statutory law did not 
require it to do so.  In extending the CRA, Riegle-Neal created new categories for CRA 
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evaluation beyond the single, annual bank evaluation; it established new categories including 
state level ones, state by state comparisons, and metropolitan area ones.  The law allowed banks 
to merge with out of state banks and to consolidate them as branches under the resulting bank’s 
title as of June 1, 1997.  It contained concentration limits similar to those for acquisitions.  It also 
authorized banks to open branches across state lines without first acquiring another bank, so-
called de novo branching, provided that states enacted laws permitting the practice.  To confine 
banks to expanding across state lines in the manner it outlined, Riegle-Neal prohibited national 
banks from employing the thirty mile rule to branch into states that chose not to participate in 
interstate branching. 
 With Republicans having won control of both Houses of Congress for the first time since 
1954 in the 1994 midterms, the GOP instituted a handful of reforms impinging on bank 
regulatory legislation.  For instance, House Republicans altered the committee system.  On 
December 2, they announced a redesigned committee system.  In addition to eliminating three 
committees altogether, Republicans significantly curtailed the jurisdiction of the House Energy 
and Commerce Committee.  They not only reallocated much of its jurisdiction to other 
committees, but also shortened its name to simply the Commerce Committee to reflect these 
changes.  Of particular note for banking and financial legislation, Republicans stripped 
Commerce of its jurisdiction over securities matters and reassigned the jurisdiction to the House 
Banking Committee, thereby combining jurisdiction over the banking and securities industries in 
one panel.  The newly formed Commerce Committee, though, managed to keep its primary 
jurisdiction over the insurance industry.      
On February 27, 1995, the new House Banking Committee Chairman Jim Leach (R-IA), 
introduced a bill (HR 1062) designed “[t]o enhance competition in the financial services industry 
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by providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, and other 
financial service providers.”  He drafted a bill narrowly focused on the banking and securities 
industries to minimize the controversy it would foment.  Leach’s bill eliminated the bank holding 
company model under whose umbrella banks had long organized their activities and instead 
replaced it with a financial services holding company model in which holding companies offered 
a wide range of banking and securities services, including brokerage and underwriting.  A 
financial services holding company (fshc) is merely bank holding company that is permitted to 
engage in a wider variety of financial activities.  Because the structure proposed was a variant on 
the bhc one, the Federal Reserve Board gained regulatory responsibility over the new entities.  
The bill erected firewalls separating the banking and securities subsidiaries of the fshcs and 
imposed strict capital standards on the subsidiaries.  The House Banking Committee officially 
approved HR 1062 May 11.  Even though large New York securities firms and money center 
banks supported the measure, small banks were less than enthusiastic as they stood to gain the 
least from this new structure and added powers.  Although committee passage of HR 1062 
represented an apparent victory for Chairman Leach, Rep. Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) pointed 
out, “No one is that strongly for this bill, and no one is that strongly against the bill” (CQ 
Almanac 1995a).   
 Strong opposition to the bill, however, materialized immediately following committee 
approval when the insurance agents’ lobby abandoned its neutrality and announced its opposition 
to the measure unless Congress imposed a moratorium on the OCC granting national banks the 
ability to sell insurance.  Aware that the measure raised issues relating to the insurance industry 
and seeking to protect his committee’s remaining jurisdiction, Chairman Thomas J. Bliley (R-
VA), announced his committee wanted to examine the bill and was considering broadening it to 
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permit affiliations between banks and insurance companies.  Aware of the controversy brewing 
among the three financial services industries, House leaders intervened to negotiate a 
compromise between the principal legislators.  Needless to say, Speaker Newt Gingrich’s (R-
GA) comments that Republicans planned to address the insurance industry’s concerns when 
legislators debated HR 1062 did not help matters (Congressional Quarterly 1995a). 
Republican leaders nonetheless brokered a deal between the two committees.  Under the 
accord, the Commerce Committee would approve the same version of HR 1062 that Banking had 
in May, and the Banking Committee would amend its bill by placing a permanent moratorium on 
the OCC’s authority to approve national banks’ insurance agency activities.  Then, working in 
conjunction with Rules Committee, Republicans would merge HR 1062 with HR 1362, a 
regulatory relief bill moving through the Banking Committee in May and June.  Upholding its 
portion of the agreement, Chairman Bliley’s Commerce Committee approved HR 1062 on June 
16.   
Even though Rep. Doug K. Bereuter (R-NE) had introduced HR 1362 on March 30 “[t]o 
reduce paperwork and additional regulatory burdens for depository institutions,” it lay idle until 
mid May when the House Banking Committee finally referred it to the relevant subcommittee.  
After hearings in late May and June, the House Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit 
Subcommittee crafted a bill (HR 1362) exempting ninety percent of American banks from the 
CRA, curtailing the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) by preventing borrowers from initiating 
lawsuits even when lenders incorrectly disclosed loan fees, and rolling back the Truth-in-Savings 
Act requirements.  Voting along party lines, the subcommittee curtailed the Department of 
Justice’s authority to litigate discriminatory lending cases.  On June 15, the subcommittee 
approved HR 1362 with the support of only one Democrat. 
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 Regulatory relief proceeded to the House Banking Committee as Chairman Leach 
introduced a new bill (HR 1858) to replace the partisan-tinged HR 1362.  The committee devoted 
four days to hearings and markup in the last half of June.  Attempting to follow the stipulations 
of their earlier policy compromise, GOP leaders sought to attach a provision instituting a 
moratorium on the OCC granting banks additional insurance powers, but Republican committee 
members disobeyed the compromise and discarded the provision.  They did so by approving 
Rep. Richard H. Baker’s (R-LA) amendment permitting affiliations between banks and insurance 
companies; the amendment passed 36-12 with nineteen Democrats joining seventeen 
Republicans.  The discarding of the moratorium, however, was not the only objectionable item to 
arise in this venue.  The Banking Committee also weakened the regulatory mechanism for 
enforcing community reinvestment requirements, exempted banks with less than $100 million in 
assets from those requirements, and provided banks with a “safe harbor” period between CRA 
examinations.  Neither committee Democrats nor the White House were pleased with these CRA 
changes.  As a result, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin wrote the Banking Committee two 
letters; the first one was dated June 20 and expressed the administration’s concerns over the 
weakened consumer protection whereas the second one dated June 29 conveyed his 
recommendation for the president to veto the bill (Congressional Quarterly 1995b).  Despite the 
differences between the committee members and the White House, the Banking Committee 
narrowly passed the bill June 29.    
 While the lower chamber was embroiled in disputes over expanding insurance powers 
and weakening CRA requirements, the Senate was working on its own regulatory relief bill, 
though its version was much milder than the House ones.  On March 30 Sen. Richard Shelby (R-
AL), who had switched parties the day after the 1994 midterm elections, introduced a regulatory 
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relief bill (S 650); the measure attracted twenty-eight co-sponsors from both parties.  The full 
Senate Banking Committee, however, did not proceed with the legislation until late September.  
The committee delayed acting on the bill because Chairman Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY) wanted 
the House to complete its bill first.  Even though he chaired the Whitewater investigative panel, 
he went out of his way on S 650 working with Democratic Senators and the Clinton White 
House by removing amendments limiting the CRA that he gained the president’s support for the 
bill.  In fact, D’Amato explained jettisoning the CRA limitations because President Clinton had 
threatened a veto (Congressional Quarterly 1995b).  Moreover, S 650 actually imposed 
additional consumer regulations due to committee added provisions authorizing consumers to 
alter and repair their damaged credit reports.  The Senate Banking Committee approved the bill 
September 27. 
 House leaders intended to bring HR 1858 and HR 1062 to the floor as a package before 
summer’s end, but the Banking Committee’s removal of the moratorium on national banks’ 
continued expansion into insurance agency violated the agreement they had brokered, thereby 
delaying floor action.  Not content to abandon the proposed legislation, Chairman Leach applied 
repeated pressure to House leaders, which ultimately caused them to relent and devise a new plan 
for passage.  As part of this plan, the Rules Committee combined HR 1062 and HR 1858 into a 
single bill to receive floor consideration before the end of 1995; the merger of these two bills 
yielded HR 2520, which Rules introduced in late October.  The new bill removed Baker’s 
amendment permitting affiliations between banks and insurance companies and instead replaced 
it with the original moratorium prohibiting any further affiliations for another five years.  To 
appease Democrats, community reinvestment exemptions disappeared from the new bill.  
Finally, HR 2520 assigned the House Banking and Commerce Committees the task of structuring 
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the location of banks’ new securities activities.  This task was necessarily explosive since any 
decision affected who would regulate the new activities and who would benefit from formulating 
those regulations.  This issue created an impasse between bank-friendly committee members and 
insurance-friendly party leaders.  Because of this deadlock, Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-TX) 
postponed the new bill indefinitely (Congressional Quarterly 1995b).  Likewise, the Supreme 
Court’s announcement the previous month that it would hear Barnett Bank v. Nelson involving 
Florida’s prohibition bank affiliates of holding companies selling insurance undeniably made the 
banking industry reluctant to compromise with the insurance industry.  Consequently, the 
proposed banking legislation failed to receive floor action in the House. 
  Although the year began inauspiciously enough with the federal government shutdown 
and banking legislation postponed for the first several months, bank regulatory change was still 
occurring.  Having heard arguments in January for Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Bill 
Nelson, FL Insurance Commissioner, the Supreme Court rendered a unanimous verdict in March 
(517 U.S. 25 (1996)).  The case entailed a Florida statute prohibiting banks from selling 
insurance unless they were located in a town of less than 5,000 people and did not belong to a 
bank holding company.  Barnett Bank was a subsidiary national bank operating a branch in a 
town with less than 5000 people that bought an insurance agency and sued the state of Florida 
claiming federal law preempted the state’s action.   The Court decided the case on the grounds 
that federal law granting national banks or their subsidiaries the authority to sell insurance in 
towns with populations less than 5000 people preempted the Florida statute.  Interestingly 
enough, the Supreme Court did not consider how the state’s prohibition unfairly discriminated 
against banks that were bhc subsidiaries, yet bank subsidiaries tend to be larger and have access 
to more capital by the very nature of their corporate structures.  The Comptroller may not have 
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been directly involved in the case, but the ruling upholding federal preemption of state 
regulations effectively empowered the OCC vis-à-vis the states.     
Needless to say, the Barnett decision only complicated Rep. Leach’s attempt at banking 
legislation during the 104th Congress’ second session since banks were much less willing to 
compromise given their recent legal victory.  He spent the three months following Barnett 
redrafting his bill.  Chief among his priorities were codifying the Court’s Barnett standard, 
removing the OCC moratorium, and permitting affiliations between national banks and insurance 
companies under the financial services holding company model.  In early June, Leach tried 
bringing the bill to his committee for a revote, but some of the members refused to reconsider the 
proposal.  Consequently, he publicly abandoned the revised version of HR 2520.    
Within a month of Leach’s latest setback, House Rules Committee Chairman Gerald 
Solomon attempted an end run to bar the OCC permanently from approving further expansions 
of insurance activities. Solomon tried to amend the 1997 Treasury-Postal Service appropriations 
bill (HR 3756) requiring the Treasury Department to withhold funding if the OCC authorized 
any more insurance powers.  On July 17, bankers, the Clinton administration, and allies in the 
House came together and overwhelmingly killed the amendment 312-107.  This action 
represented the last ditch effort by a leading supporter of the insurance industry to curtail banks’ 
expansion. 
By September Chairman Leach was cobbling together a modest banking bill by 
combining the least controversial elements of HR 2520 with the regulatory relief bill (HR 1858) 
and provisions funding the deposit insurance fund for thrift institutions (SAIF).  With the House 
leadership’s consent, Leach planned to bring the newest bill to the floor September 18.  The 
rewritten bill no longer restricted banks’ expansion into the insurance industry, but it prevented 
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federal preemption on matters of insurance regulation.  Bankers, of course, disliked the 
provision, for it curtailed their recently achieved regulatory and judicial victories.  The 
combination of the September arrival of an omnibus spending bill and bankers’ opposition to 
eliminating federal preemption on insurance activities torpedoed Leach’s latest attempt to 
receive floor action. 
In a September 16 meeting with Republican leaders, White House Chief of Staff Leon 
Panetta suggested attaching the SAIF measure to the omnibus spending bill as a way of using its 
revenues to offset the additional spending sought by the Clinton administration (CQ Almanac 
1996a).  Over the course of the next week and a half, Republican congressional leaders 
scrambled to attach banking legislation to the catchall fiscal appropriations bill (HR 3610).  
Though Reps. DeLay and Solomon tried reinserting provisions restricting banks’ expansion into 
insurance, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) sought to keep the banking legislation as 
non-controversial as possible and thwarted such attempts.  By the end of September, 
congressional leaders successfully crafted an appropriations bill that included banking measures; 
President Clinton signed the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 the last day of 
the month.   
The statute’s banking provisions strongly resembled S 650, the modest regulatory relief 
bill Sen. D’Amato produced.  The final legislation funded the SAIF by raising premiums on 
banks and thrifts and even increased the regulatory burden on depository institutions by 
strengthening the Fair Credit Reporting Act requirements, but it also relieved banks of some 
lender liability issues associated with properties containing hazardous materials.  The most 
significant element for the expansion of banking, though, amended the BHCA by streamlining 
the Board of Governors’ approval process for bhcs seeking either to engage in previously 
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approved section 20 subsidiary nonbanking activities or to acquire nonbanking financial services 
companies.  Furthermore, the law permitted well-managed and well-capitalized bhcs to enter any 
activity that the Fed’s Regulation Y permitted without prior notice or approval.  Conversely, if a 
bhc wished to conduct an activity presently not allowed, it simply needed to notify the Board 
within ten days of doing so.    
 The following year began with the Federal Reserve initiating key regulatory rule changes 
concerning bank holding companies and their subsidiaries.  Though the Board had announced on 
December 20, 1996 that it was increasing the amount of revenue that “a section 20 subsidiary [of 
a BHC] may derive from underwriting and dealing in [ineligible] securities from 10 percent to 25 
percent of its total revenue,” the rule change did not take effect until March 6, 1997 (83 Fed. Res. 
Bull. 98, Feb. 1997).  Just before the revenue increase took effect on February 20, 1997, the 
Board significantly revised its Regulation Y “intended to improve the competitiveness of bank 
holding companies by eliminating unnecessary regulatory burden and operating restrictions and 
by streamlining the application and notice process” (83 Fed. Res. Bull. 260, April 1997).  These 
Regulation Y revisions resulted from the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 and 
took effect April 21, 1997.  Not only did they streamline the application process, but they also 
removed the remaining firewalls separating nonbank and bank affiliates within the holding 
company structure. 
 Although the Federal Reserve’s rule changes did not become effective until March and 
April respectively, the 107th Congress began legislative attempts to modernize the nation’s 
banking system almost immediately.  On the first day of the new Congress, Banking Committee 
Chairman Leach introduced the Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1997 (HR 10) to 
“enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential framework for 
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the affiliation of banks, securities firms, and other financial services providers.”  Beginning in 
February and running through June, the Banking Committee and its subcommittees held hearings 
on the proposed legislation.  Through the course of these proceedings, Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan Greenspan was one of the most frequent visitors, journeying to Capitol Hill three times to 
testify.     
 In his testimony, Greenspan expressed his support for legislative efforts modernizing the 
nation’s financial system that led to increased competitiveness and efficiency, and, in the 
process, benefited American consumers.  His overriding concern, however, revolved around 
structuring banks’ new activities and the possible harms that could befall the deposit insurance 
system.  In particular, he feared that HR 10’s provision allowing banks to broaden their activities 
through operating subsidies (op-subs) rather than through holding company subsidiaries 
affiliated with the banks imperiled federal deposit insurance.  Greenspan instead suggested that 
any expansion of bank activities occur through the bank holding company structure, so that any 
losses caused by the new activities would not expose the deposit insurance fund.  By expanding 
through holding company subsidiaries rather than through operating subsidiaries of banks, the 
Fed expanded its regulatory responsibilities at the expense of the OCC. 
While the Federal Reserve Chairman was making his case for structuring banks’ 
expanded activities to give his agency a greater regulatory role, the Comptroller of the Currency 
said very little on the matter before Congress.  Moreover, the Treasury Department remained 
silent for several months on the bank regulatory legislative proposals.  As a result, the Clinton 
administration’s position on the matter was in doubt to lawmakers.  Treasury Secretary Robert 
Rubin finally unveiled the administration’s plans for financial system modernization in late May.  
The Clinton administration proposed allowing federally insured depository institutions to engage 
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in a full range of securities, insurance, and investment advisory activities through operating 
subsidiaries.  The op-subs, however, would not be permitted to develop real estate.  Holding 
companies owning federally insured depository institutions, on the other hand, would be allowed 
to engage in the full gamut of insurance, investment advisory, merchant banking, and securities 
activities.  In addition, Secretary Rubin presented two alternative proposals for bank holding 
companies to mix banking and commerce.  Alternative A, as Rubin described it, entailed bank 
holding companies devoting some significant portion of their revenue as defined by Congress to 
nonfinancial activities.  Alternative B, on the other hand, maintained the existing system in 
which bank holding companies could not engage in any nonfinancial activities.  In other words, 
Option A permitted a mixing of banking and commerce whereas Option B maintained the 
preexisting separation of banking and commerce. 
Nearly four weeks after Rubin presented the Clinton administration’s financial 
modernization proposal, the House Banking Committee narrowly approved HR 10 on June 20.  
In the process, the committee attached two provisions that gave Chairman Leach reservations; 
one allowed a mixing of banking and commerce whereas the other eliminated the federal thrift 
charter within two years.  Rep. Roukema (R-NJ) posited the amendment mixing banking and 
commerce by permitting bank holding companies the ability to invest up to 15 percent of their 
revenues in nonfinancial companies whereas Rep. Bill McCollum (R-FL) introduced the 
amendment ending the federal thrift charter within two years.  The committee adopted both 
amendments by wide margins prompting Rep. Leach to state, “I supported the committee 
approval of the bill as a steward of the committee, but like all members I will reserve final 
judgment on the bill, particularly in light of how the banking and commerce issue is resolved” 
(Congressional Quarterly 1997: 2-76).   
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With the House Banking Committee having passed HR 10, the bill proceeded to the 
Commerce Committee for consideration.  Commerce Chairman Thomas Bliley (R-VA) had 
intended to consider the bill in early September, but the passage of HR 10 triggered a barrage of 
insurance industry lobbying.  Insurance agents were particularly incensed over the proposed 
legislation because it allowed banks to offer insurance products under the supervision of banking 
regulators rather than under the existing set of state insurance commissions.  As a result of the 
ensuing hysteria among insurance agents, Chairman Bliley postponed considering the bill 
indefinitely.      
After weeks of inaction on HR 10, the Finance and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee 
on October 24 eventually held a markup session lasting only a few hours and easily approved HR 
10 by a vote of 23-2.  Subcommittee Chairman Michael Oxley (R-OH) had the difficult task of 
maintaining the tenuous balance between the banking and insurance industries, a task made all 
the more difficult by the presence of the longtime insurance industry champion Rep. John 
Dingell (D-MI).  Even though Rep. Oxley sought to reassure bankers that the committee would 
not simply bow to insurance industry demands that banks compete under the same regulatory 
structure, he ultimately permitted an amendment from Rep. Dingell curtailing the OCC’s 
regulatory power over banks’ insurance activities.  In addition, the subcommittee amended HR 
10 to maintain the unitary thrift charter by allowing commercial firms to enter banking by 
opening or acquiring savings and loan associations.  Given the jurisdiction of the Commerce 
Committee and the various personalities involved, it was not surprising in the least that the 
subcommittee produced a bill more in line with the desires of the insurance industry than the 
banking industry. 
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In a Wall Street Journal Op-Ed piece on October 30, three prominent financial services 
industry CEOs argued “Today banks, insurance companies and securities firms that want to meet 
the demands of their customers have to be able to offer every type of financial product, across all 
markets, in every part of the world….U.S. financial corporations cannot do that unless Congress 
sweeps aside our antiquated banking laws” (Komansky, Purcell & Weill 1997: 1).  These three 
chief executives were David Komansky of Merrill Lynch, Philip Purcell of Morgan Stanley Dean 
Witter, and Sanford Weill of Travelers.  The three men proceeded to argue, “Regulations 
imposed since [the Great Depression] have only made matters more confusing: For example, a 
commercial bank may acquire a securities firm, but not the other way around” (Komansky, 
Purcell & Weill 1997: 1).  In this way, three prominent financial services industry CEOs publicly 
appealed policymakers to permit their financial institutions and American banks compete on the 
same playing as foreign competitors.       
The same day as the Journal article appeared, the Commerce Committee approved HR 10 
by a 33-11 margin.  This measure largely resembled the one the Rep. Oxley’s subcommittee had 
reported except for adding one amendment permitting banks to gain as much as five percent of 
their revenue from a commercial enterprise, thereby mixing banking and commerce.   
After Commerce passed HR 10, Rep. John Boehner (R-OH) whom Republican leaders 
selected to serve as banking reform point man held bipartisan meetings with the Rules 
Committee and the two committees that had reported the bill.  Boehner hoped to move the bill to 
the House floor as quickly as possible, but differences between the Banking and Commerce 
Committees differed on key issues such as the mixing of banking and commerce, ending the 
thrift charter, and regulating bank insurance and securities activities, not to mention the joint 
insistence by Reps. Solomon and Dingell to place further restrictions on banks’ insurance 
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activities, made the task quite challenging.  His efforts collapsed on November 8, when 
Commerce members, neglected to appear for a meeting with him and the Banking Committee.  
As a result, the proposed banking legislation never reached the House floor in 1997. 
Hoping to learn from 1997’s failed legislative attempt, Rep. Boehner, according to 
Congressional Quarterly, met countless members of the banking, insurance, and securities 
industries between November 1997 and March 1998 (Congressional Quarterly 1998: 5-11).  
Based on these meetings, Rep. Boehner and other Republican leaders developed another version 
of HR 10 which they unveiled on March 10.  First, the 1998 version permitted securities firms 
and insurance companies to own banks and the other way around.  The inequities of permitting 
banks to own other financial services companies but prohibiting other financial services 
companies from owning banks were one of the complaints of financial services industry 
members, such as Komansky, Purcell, and Weill.  Second, the bill authorized national banks to 
sell insurance, but to do so in subsidiaries overseen by state insurance commissioners.  Third, the 
bill gradually ended the unitary thrift charter through which commercial companies entered the 
banking industry.  Fourth, proposed legislation created a new type of corporate organizational 
structure, namely the financial holding company, through which the firms wishing to offer the 
assortment of financial services products would do so.  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), though, would have regulatory oversight of these subsidiaries’ securities 
activities.  Finally, the new HR 10 linked a statutory repair of federal credit union law to banking 
reform.     
 By the week of March 23, though, the various sectors of the financial services industry 
were once again battling one another.  On the last day of March, Rules Chairman Solomon 
removed the measure from floor consideration because members failed to agree on the rules for 
 166 
debate.  The Rules Committee’s efforts to achieve agreement were likely hampered by the rule it 
created just before the bill went down preventing the House from eliminating the unitary thrift 
charter.  Chairman Solomon, nonetheless, explained the bill’s death as the result of a lobbying 
effort unlike any he had ever seen that kept his and colleagues office telephones “ringing off the 
hook” (Congressional Quarterly 1998: 5-7).  Although this legislative reform effort was stymied 
in the House because members could not agree on the rules for debate, a merger creating the 
largest banking and financial services company occurred a week later that altered the landscape 
altogether.   
On April 6, 1998, Travelers Group and Citicorp announced plans for their two firms to 
merge, thereby creating Citigroup.  Travelers Group was a financial services company run by 
Sandy Weill that provided asset management, brokerage, consumer financing, investment 
banking, and insurance underwriting whereas Citicorp was a bank holding company owning 
nonbank subsidiaries and bank subsidiaries, most notably Citibank, N.A.  The merger of these 
two very different firms created a financial conglomerate capable of providing customers an 
assortment of financial products. 
Because Travelers engaged in activities prohibited by the BHCA, Citicorp could not 
legally acquire it.  According to the BHCA, though, Travelers could petition the Board of 
Governors to form a bank holding company and acquire Citicorp.  To facilitate the creation of a 
bank holding company under such circumstances and aid in the divestiture of prohibited 
nonbanking activities, section 4(a) of the BHCA authorized the Board “to extend the period 
[mandating divestiture within two years of becoming a bhc]… for not more than one year at a 
time…but no such extensions shall extend beyond a date…five years after the date as of which a 
company becomes a bank holding company” (U.S. Statutes at Large 70 (1956): 135-136).  
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Therefore, Travelers applied to the FRB to become a bhc and acquire Citicorp.  A few months 
later on September 23, 1998, the Board conditionally approved the acquisition and Travelers’ 
request to form a bank holding company named Citigroup and granted the new company a two-
year exemption to divest its prohibited nonbanking activities.77  Because the BHCA provided for 
a two year exemption with three additional one year exemptions possible thereafter, Citigroup 
had at most five years before it would have to divest its nonbanking businesses unless lawmakers 
significantly altered the banking statutes. 
 When the GOP leadership removed HR 10 on March 31, Rep. Boehner pledged to bring 
the bill back to the floor during the first week of May.  The Travelers-Citicorp merger certainly 
added pressure for legislative action.  After all, Citicorp had opposed the legislative reform 
efforts up until its merger when it suddenly changed policy positions.  Citicorp had opposed 
regulatory reform largely because it had achieved many of the expanded activities it sought 
through the existing regulatory structure and did not want to lose the protection it afforded.   
On May 13, the chamber passed HR 10 by a single vote with Speaker Gingrich and other 
GOP leaders twisting members’ arms to obtain the necessary support.  In the process of narrowly 
approving the bill, the House defeated two amendments allowing banks to expand their activities 
through operating subsidiaries.  The first of these amendments permitted national banks to 
conduct all financial activities except for real estate investment or insurance underwriting in 
subsidiaries whereas the second allowed national banks to expand into all activities then 
permissible for bank holding companies but not for national banks themselves.  The chamber 
then also amended HR 10 to prohibit holding companies from engaging in nonfinancial 
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 As one of its conditions for approving the acquisition, the Board required a fifteen day waiting period before the 
merger became official.  The waiting period notwithstanding, receiving the Board’s conditional approval meant the 
two firms would complete their merger. 
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commercial activities, thereby preventing a mixing of banking and commerce.  The proposed 
legislation proceeded to the Senate where it sat idle until after the summer recess.  
 Though the Senate Banking Committee scheduled a markup of HR 10 for September 3, it 
postponed the hearing a week because of immediate opposition from Sens. Gramm and Shelby.  
The Republican Senators wanted to exempt financial services companies and financial holding 
companies from the CRA’s requirements and refused to consider any other alterations to the bill 
until the committee resolved the CRA issue.  To proceed the following week, the committee 
amended the bill by eliminating the requirement that banks with poor community reinvestment 
records divest holdings and exempting securities firms and insurance companies unaffiliated 
with banks from community reinvestment requirements.  Neither Sen. Gramm nor Sen. Shelby 
participated in this compromise, for both men wanted further limitations placed on community 
reinvestment requirements so that community groups were less able to extort contributions from 
banks to avoid protesting expansions.  Gramm offered an amendment allowing banks to use 
preexisting CRA ratings rather than requiring new ones when seeking regulatory approval for 
activity or branching expansions.  The Texan, however, withdrew his provision when other 
Republican members indicated they were unwilling to torpedo the proposed legislation over 
community reinvestment issues.  As a result, the Banking Committee September 11 passed HR 
10 with only Sens. Gramm and Shelby voting against it.     
 Before the Senate debated the bill in early October, though, legislators negotiated 
solutions to two longstanding disagreements among the industries touched by the proposed 
legislation.  First, they successfully gained an agreement from the insurance and banking 
industries granting state insurance commissioners regulatory responsibility for insurance 
activities, but with the understanding that these authorities could generate different rules for 
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banks and insurance agents under thirteen different scenarios.  Word of this agreement became 
public the last day of September.  Second, the chairmen of the Senate Banking and House 
Commerce Committees agreed on handling banks’ entry into the securities business.  Based on 
their agreement, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) classified banks’ products as 
securities and regulated them whereas the Federal Reserve served as a check on the SEC and the 
federal court system gain an expedited judicial review process to resolve any disagreements. 
 On October 5, the Senate began debating HR 10.  Significant roadblocks, however, still 
thwarted the bill’s path to enactment.  For instance, the Clinton administration’s threatened veto 
of any bill excluding bank expansion through operating subsidiaries remained.  More 
importantly, Sen. Gramm still objected to the bill’s extension of community reinvestment 
requirements into other financial services sectors.   Although he supported modernizing financial 
services and allowing banks to offer other financial products, he detested the CRA’s burdensome 
requirements on banks and the bill’s extension of the act to nonbank affiliates and to banks 
seeking branching expansions.  As a result, Gramm masterfully employed parliamentary 
procedure to block the legislation, causing it to die on the floor October 9 without a final vote.  
Banking legislation remained in limbo through the midterm elections and into the next year.     
Congress recognized the persistence of bank regulatory legislation, for lawmakers began 
working on bills early in 1999.  Now under Sen. Gramm’s chairmanship due to Sen. D’Amato’s 
recent electoral defeat, the Senate Banking Committee began drafting a bill in late February.  
During the committee’s hearings, community reinvestment requirements proved to be the major 
issue dividing the parties.  Chairman Gramm, once again, sought to rollback the CRA’s reach.  
Toward this end, Sen. Richard Shelby submitted an amendment exempting rural banks with less 
than $250 million in assets.  This provision focused the reinvestment requirements on large 
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urban banks.  Democratic senators, though, vehemently opposed the move arguing that small, 
rural banks were the worst community reinvestment offenders by investing their money and 
assets outside of their localities.  To approve a banking bill, Sen. Gramm ultimately convinced 
Sen. Shelby to lower the value of the exempted financial institutions by $150 million.  Then, on 
March 4 the Banking Committee approved its bill (S 900) by a party-line vote of 11-9 with one 
Democrat and one Republican switching sides.   
The Banking Committee’s bill permitted banks with less than $1 billion in assets to 
conduct their nonbanking activities through operating subsidiaries, but required larger banks to 
do so within the holding company structure.  In breaking with the American tradition dating back 
to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the proposed legislation gave the federal banking regulators 
oversight of banks’ insurance agency activities.  S 900, however, prohibited operating 
subsidiaries from underwriting insurance or developing real estate.  The measure also strictly 
forbade affiliations between banks and commercial businesses.  On the contentious community 
reinvestment issue, S 900 exempted small, rural banks with less than $100 million in assets.  The 
bill did not address financial privacy issues.   
While the Senate Banking Committee worked on S 900, Chairman Leach and the House 
Banking Committee held a three-day markup session during the first half of March.78  On the 
third day of markup March 11, the committee approved another version of HR 10 by a margin of 
51-8.  In the approval process, two issues raised particular challenges.  Community reinvestment 
once again proved to be a contentious and partisan issue.  Generally, this issue divided legislators 
along party lines, with Democrats espousing reinvestment and Republicans opposing it.  Their 
majority notwithstanding, Republicans failed to alter the reinvestment requirements.  During the 
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 Because of Republican caucus rules enacted following the 1994 midterms, Rep. Leach was entering the final two 
years of his six-year term as committee chairman. 
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markup, privacy was the other troublesome issue.  To avoid further challenges over privacy 
matters by permitting consumers to opt-out of information sharing, Rep. Leach co-authored a 
provision which the committee adopted requiring banks to disclose their privacy policies.  In 
addition to these consumer issues, the Banking Committee’s HR 10 gave banks with less than 
$10 billion the option of organizing their nonbanking activities within operating subsidiaries or 
holding companies.  HR 10, however, prohibited operating subsidiaries from developing real 
estate or underwriting insurance.  The House Banking bill also limited the authority of state 
insurance commissioners to regulate banks’ insurance activities. 
In early May the Senate devoted three days to debating S 900.  As occurred at the 
committee level, community reinvestment was the most contentious and partisan issue.  Sen. 
Gramm defended the bill’s present form, but Democratic Senators challenged its reinvestment 
requirement reductions by offering two amendments to remove Gramm’s provisions.  Although 
the two Democratic amendments failed on May 5, Democratic lawmakers continued to press for 
toughening CRA.   
The other issue generating disagreement among senators concerned structuring of the 
banking industry.  Except for allowing banks with under $1 billion in assets to organize most of 
their activities within an operating subsidiary, S 900 required all other banks to organize their 
new activities in holding companies.  Since Sen. Shelby held a position more in line with the 
Treasury’s on matters of organizational structure, he put forth an amendment giving banks 
undertaking the newly approved activities the option of choosing which structure to use.  In 
response, Gramm threatened to remove the entire bill from the Senate floor if the chamber 
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adopted Shelby’s amendment.  The Senate ultimately rejected Shelby’s amendment 53-46.  
Finally, on May 6 the Senate approved Gramm’s S 900 along partisan lines by a 54-44 vote.79  
To a significant extent, the bill Gramm shepherded through committee resembled the 
Senate approved one.  The Senate bill required banks with more than $1 billion in assets to 
organize their nonbanking financial activities though holding company subsidiaries.  Banks 
below the $1 billion limit, on the other hand, received the option of organizing their new 
activities either within a holding company or an operating subsidiary.  In a change from the 
committee approved version, this one delegated state insurance regulators significant authority 
over banks’ insurance activities, including those involving insurance agency, but it prohibited 
them from discriminating between federally and state chartered depository institutions.  For 
securities activities, S 900 permitted banks to conduct these activities within the bank while 
barring the SEC’s oversight.  Unlike its House counterpart, the Senate bill exempted rural banks 
under $100 million in assets from meeting community reinvestment requirements and required 
disclosure of the agreements settling disputes between banks and community groups.  On the 
matter of privacy issues, S 900 was silent.    
Once the Senate passed a banking bill, the House Commerce Committee in late May 
began consideration of HR 10.  Unlike the two Banking Committees, Commerce’s markup of 
HR 10 proceeded smoothly in a bipartisan fashion.  The main issues of concern to this committee 
were privacy and financial industry structure.  On June 10, the Commerce Committee easily 
approved HR 10 without dissent.   Unlike the House Banking’s version, Commerce’s prohibited 
banks from conducting any nonbanking financial activities within operating subsidiaries, instead 
requiring them to do so within affiliates under the bank holding company.  The committee’s HR 
10 also granted states more authority to oversee banks’ insurance activities with little in the way 
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of protections from states discriminating against federally chartered banks.  Third, Commerce’s 
bill contained privacy measures such as its provision allowing people to opt-out of information 
sharing between third-party unaffiliated companies. 
Once both House committees approved HR 10, GOP leaders in late June selected the 
Banking Committee’s version, which contained the subsidiary structure and more lenient privacy 
language, and used it for the floor debate.  Right before July fourth, the House debated and 
approved HR 10.  Unlike 1998’s narrow passage of HR 10, this time the chamber passed the bill 
with a bipartisan margin of 343-86.  The House passed bill granted banks the option of 
structuring their activities as either operating subsidiaries or holding companies, but required 
banks with more than $10 billion in assets to enter any of the new nonbanking financial activities 
through holding company subsidiaries.  It also granted the SEC a larger role in overseeing banks’ 
securities activities and imposed tougher restrictions on those activities.  The House bill 
resembled its Senate counterpart on insurance regulation by granting state regulators broad 
powers yet protecting national banks from discrimination by the states.  Other than by increasing 
existing penalties for non-compliance, HR 10 hardly altered the CRA.  Also unlike it Senate 
counterpart, it required financial institutions to disclose their privacy policies and to allow 
customers to opt out of information sharing with third parties. 
Following House passage of a banking bill, a conference convened for a single day on 
August 3 before Congress’ late summer recess.  In addition to naming Rep. Leach as chairman, 
this meeting produced two other notable developments.  First, Sen. Gramm demanded a 
resolution concerning the counting of House conferees’ votes since the committee contained 
twenty House Republicans compared to twenty-two House Democrats.  To resolve the problem, 
House leaders arranged the votes by section so that House Republicans always outnumbered 
 174 
their Democratic counterparts.  Second, Sen. Shelby publicly announced the need for the final 
bill to contain much stronger privacy protections.  This announcement represented a significant 
Republican defection, especially since the Senate bill was silent on privacy issues.   
 When the conference reconvened in mid September, Chairman Leach attempted to 
operate in good-faith and in a bipartisan manner, by holding open debate and allowing all 
conferees to negotiate over the bill.  Doing so, though, quickly impeded progress as members 
could not agree on issues involving organizational structure, community reinvestment, or 
privacy.  At month’s end, Sen. Gramm requested GOP leadership intervene and devise a new 
strategy for crafting the conference report.  On September 30, House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-
IL) and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott met privately with the three committee chairmen.  
This meeting yielded a new backroom approach involving the three chairmen privately 
negotiating a working draft of the bill and then returning with the draft for members to amend.  
The three committee chairmen unveiled a revised draft of the bill on October 12.  Behind closed 
doors, Gramm had successfully convinced the other two men to scale back community 
reinvestment requirements by making exams less frequent, exempting small rural banks, and 
prohibiting banks and community groups from striking confidential deals.  
 Even though the conference now had a new modus operandi, the matter of structuring the 
banking industry and its new financial activities remained.  According to Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan, “After endless efforts to reconcile the two versions [i.e. the House 
and Senate bills], Congress threw up its hands and gave our institutions [i.e. the Fed and 
Treasury] until October 14 to settle it ourselves” (Greenspan 2007: 199).  When the fourteenth 
arrived, Chairman Greenspan and Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers spent the afternoon in 
the Treasury working out a compromise.  Greenspan described the negotiations as “a textbook 
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case of policymaking by rational compromise.  We sat and argued point by point” (Greenspan 
2007: 199).  Upon emerging from Summers’ office, they produced an agreement concerning 
their two respective regulatory agencies.  The accord involved structuring banks’ new activities 
and the division of regulatory oversight resulting from it.  The two men agreed to support 
legislation permitting banks, regardless of size, to structure their new activities, within operating 
subsidiaries rather than bank affiliates in the holding company structure.  Because Summers and 
Greenspan considered insurance underwriting and real estate development considerably more 
risky than the other new activities, they categorized them as exceptions and agreed upon insisting 
that lawmakers mandate that banks conduct them within affiliates under the parent holding 
companies.  In the process, the Secretary Summers increased the Comptroller’s jurisdiction 
whereas Chairman Greenspan expanded the Federal Reserve’s regulatory jurisdiction. 
Though resolution of the Treasury Fed disagreement over the structuring of new activities 
marked progress, the revised bill unveiled by the three chairmen on October 12 angered many 
Democrats because of its community reinvestment changes.  To further the proposed legislation, 
Treasury Secretary Summers appeared unexpectedly on the evening of October 18 to assist 
Democrats in their negotiations with Senator Gramm.  Over the next two days, Summers and 
Gramm conducted extensive discussions, eventually leading Summers to depart from their 
meeting on the night of October 20 believing they had negotiated something acceptable to the 
White House.  The Clinton administration, however, was not ready to accede to the bill’s 
reinvestment provisions.  Negotiations between congressional Democrats, Republicans, and the 
White House carried on for nearly two more days, before the parties finally reached an accord 
early on the morning of October 22.  Interviewed by National Journal a few days after reaching 
the agreement, Gramm explained his logic behind negotiations over the CRA, “Quite frankly, I 
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concluded Wednesday [Oct. 20], that the Administration had taken a hostage—by threatening to 
veto the bill—that they weren’t willing to shoot” (Victor 1999: 3127).  In exchange for letting 
Gramm’s reinvestment provisions stand, the White House demanded that expansion by banks 
into new activities be made contingent upon satisfactory reinvestment ratings.  
 The conferees from both Houses then quickly adopted the report.  The House and Senate 
both adopted the conference report on November 4th; the Senate approved the overhaul 
conference report 90-8 whereas the House approved it 362-57.  On November 12, President 
Clinton signed the Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) of 1999, also known as the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, before a crowd that included legislators, congressional staffers, and 
bureaucrats.  Members of the banking and financial services industries were conspicuously 
absent from the ceremony.  
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s most notable component was its partial repeal of Glass-
Steagall.  In particular, it repealed two of the sections separating commercial banks from 
investment banks (i.e. sections 20 and 32), but left the other two sections separating the banking 
industry (i.e. sections 16 and 21) intact.  GLBA repealed the prohibitions against banks 
affiliating with securities firms and having the same directors as securities firm, yet it left the 
prohibition against securities firms accepting deposits and the limitations on banks directly 
engaging in securities activities.  Aside from that, the statute left Glass-Steagall’s other 
components alone.  In addition, the FSMA repealed amendments added to the BHCA of 1956 in 
the Garn-St. Germain Act severely limiting bank holding companies’ insurance activities.   
Even though it created a new type of corporate structure, namely the financial holding 
company, that was basically a notch above a bank holding company, it did not allow banks to 
affiliate with commercial enterprises.  As for regulating new areas of financial activity entered 
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into by subsidiaries of the fshcs, the law apportioned regulatory responsibility among the existing 
banking and financial regulators according to the function of the activity.  In other words, the 
federal banking regulators would regulate banking units, the SEC would regulate any securities 
units, and state insurance commissioners would regulate the insurance units.  The law authorized 
federal regulators to establish safeguards within the new holding companies separating banks 
from the other nonbank subsidiaries.    
On the matter of overseeing the banking system, the law largely maintained the status 
quo by leaving the OCC to regulate national banks and the Fed to regulate holding companies.  
The GLBA allowed national banks to establish subsidiaries for new activities financial in nature, 
provided the bank was well-managed, well-capitalized, and all the subsidiaries assets totaled less 
than $50 billion.  The statute, however, did not authorize banks subsidiaries to conduct merchant 
banking, insurance underwriting, or real estate development; if a bank wanted to enter those 
areas, it had to form a financial holding company and do so through a holding company 
subsidiary.  Conversely, the FSMA permitted financial holding companies to engage in banking, 
insurance, securities, and any other activities the Board determined to be “financial in nature.”  
In this way, the law significantly liberalized the BHCA’s “so closely related to banking” phrase.  
GLBA also limited the Fed’s oversight and enforcement of nonbank affiliates, requiring it to 
defer to functional regulators unless the affiliates posed a material risk.      
 The law also had implications for consumer protection issues.  Although it generally 
preserved the existing community reinvestment requirements for banks, it conditioned bank 
affiliation with insurance or securities firms on having at least satisfactory reinvestment ratings.  
To appease the more conservative legislators, FSMA required community groups to disclose the 
manner in which they spent any funds received from banks under the CRA and lessened the 
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frequency of reviews for banks having under $250 million in assets.  The law required financial 
services companies and banks to disclose their privacy policies and to give customers the right to 
opt out of information sharing with third party firms.  The GLBA, however, did not permit 
customers to opt out of information sharing among related firms within the same holding 
company.  Finally, the statute contained some other relatively minor consumer protection 
features such as requiring automated teller machines to disclose to their fees. 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter began with a newly elected Democratic president with a unified federal 
government showing an early interest in banking regulation with an early initiative streamlining 
loan reviews while also pushing credit availability to the poorer members of society.  This 
interest in banking policy carried over to the following year as the White House and Capitol Hill 
worked together and easily passed major legislation permitting nationwide banking and 
branching and also expanding the provisions requiring banks reinvest in their local communities.  
Though the matter of branching had proven contentious for years, the Riegle-Neal Act passed 
both Houses with opposition numbering in the single-digits.   
 Despite the Democrats’ loss of Congress in the 1994 midterms, bank regulatory policy 
continued to evolve through statutory initiatives and agency ones.  While the insurance industry 
stymied Republican congressional efforts at a modernization of the banking system and overhaul 
of the regulatory system, the regulators and courts played major roles in granting banks new 
powers, solidifying them, and then expanding upon them afterwards.  With bank failures having 
almost disappeared, the FDIC’s role diminished, leaving the Fed and OCC to dominate the 
regulatory arena.  Both agencies through their rulings were instrumental in bringing about 
nationwide banking and branching.  The Federal Reserve, in particular, was crucial in issuing 
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rulings allowing holding companies to expand into “ineligible” securities activities through their 
section 20 subsidiaries.  Then, in late 1996 and early 1997, the Fed made pivotal changes when it 
increased revenue limits of section 20 subsidiaries and streamlined the approval process of bhc 
expansions, including granting holding companies the authority to begin activities without any 
prior notice provided the Fed had all ready issued rules concerning the matters.  This pattern of 
Fed rulings doubtless contributed to the decision by Travelers and Citicorp to follow through 
with their merger, which, in turn, prodded lawmakers finally to act and update the nation’s 
outdated regulatory law.  The result of this effort, of course, was the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
which was not the massive repeal of Glass-Steagall that its opponents would have people 
believe.  Instead, Gramm-Leach-Bliley basically updated the banking statutes so that they 
according with the regulatory decisions that occurred over the last few decades.  
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6. U.S. BANK REGULATION EVOLVING:  
GLASS-STEAGALL, GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY, DODD-FRANK, AND BEYOND   
 My dissertation investigated the development of bank regulation over the twentieth 
century through a case study focusing on what lawmakers enact, how regulators implement it, 
and how it subsequently evolves.  As I have shown, this pluralist process entailed interdependent 
multiple actors, especially multiple federal regulators, who are able to act consequentially and 
exert influence upon one another whenever they choose to do so.  The case study covered four of 
the more eventful periods of interaction among the federal regulators, including 1914-1933, 
1969-1980, 1981-1992, and 1993-1999.  Given the narrative presented in the previous four 
chapters, this chapter begins by reviewing the process by which the United States transitioned 
from Glass-Steagall to Gramm-Leach-Bliley.  Then, this concluding chapter examines what role, 
if any, Gramm-Leach-Bliley played in the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009.  Finally, this 
chapter employs my explanation of bank regulatory change to speculate on what possible 
developments we may expect in the wake of the recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act.       
During the first period of the case study, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal 
Reserve, failed to coordinate their actions to avert the series of banking failures from the twenties 
onwards that culminated in the Great Depression.  The events of the early 1930s led to the 
establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to resolve bank failures and 
guarantee the deposits of banks, thereby preventing future depositor panics.  Instabilities in the 
banking system persisted through the remainder of the Depression and into the early 1940s.  
From WWII onwards, though, the banking system stabilized as bank failures virtually 
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disappeared.  This stability, which also was marked by significant continuity in the legal and 
regulatory realms of banking policy, lasted for nearly thirty years.   
 When banking crises returned in the late 1960s, the federal regulators had grown more 
interconnected and interdependent.  Regulatory responsibilities had increased since the 
Depression era banking reforms, yet they had not done so in ways that allowed the regulators to 
act without affecting the responses available to their counterparts.  Though the OCC’s statutory 
powers remained largely unchanged with respect to its authority over the definition and powers 
of nationally chartered banks, the FDIC and Fed both gained significant regulatory powers 
through statutory reforms.  
The FDIC received a third policy option in 1950 with which to handle bank resolutions.  
This new “tool” was known as the “essentiality” provision and allowed the agency to extend 
financial assistance to failing banks, thereby preventing closures.80  Though the FDIC did not 
employ this provision until the 1971 failure of Unity Bank and Trust Company, it quickly 
employed this tool six months later to resolve the Bank of the Commonwealth, which was the 
nation’s largest failure to that date.  During the 1970s and early 1980s, the FDIC experimented 
with this resolution mechanism several more times before using it to resolve Continental Illinois.  
In bailing out the depositors and shareholders of Continental Illinois, the agency gave birth to the 
infamous Too Big to Fail (TBTF) doctrine.81  This policy change effectively divided the banking 
industry into two camps: a select few of very large, money-center banks which regulators would 
not allow to fail and everyone else.  Before the recent financial crises, the FDIC last employed 
this policy option in early 1991 when the Bank of New England failed.  Because this resolution 
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 As discussed in Chapter 4, the TBTF label was given by a congressional opponent of the regulatory development 
in House Banking Committee hearings on Continental Illinois in late 1984. 
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method extended protection beyond the existing statutorily defined deposit levels, Fed or OCC 
regulatory actions widening banks’ powers potentially expanded the federal government’s 
liabilities.  Moreover, lawmakers enacted several statutory increases in deposit insurance 
coverage limits from 1950 through 1980 which only compounded the federal government’s 
potential liabilities. 
Of far greater importance for the evolution of banking regulation, however, were the 
statutes assigning regulatory authority over bank holding companies to the Federal Reserve.82  
These legislative changes enlarged the Fed’s regulatory powers and constituency significantly.  
As my case study recounted, these statutory revisions occurred over a fifteen year span 
beginning with enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) of 1956 and concluding 
with the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970.  In the 1956 statute, the Fed gained 
responsibility over multi-bank holding companies.  According to the BHCA, the Fed was to 
define the powers and activities in which multi bank holding companies and their subsidiary 
units could engage, thereby gaining significant control over the affiliations that banks may form.  
To close the loophole in the BHCA exempting holding companies owning a single bank (obhcs), 
lawmakers later enacted the BHCA Amendments of 1970 to include one bank holding 
companies in the Fed’s regulatory jurisdiction and to redefine what constituted a bank.  Though 
the Federal Reserve did not immediately use these regulatory powers fully, lawmakers’ conferral 
of them gave the Fed a powerful tool by which it could influence the subsequent development 
and structure of the banking system, not to mention the actions of other actors within the policy 
realm. 
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Not until Paul Volcker’s final year as chair, however, did the Fed significantly turn down 
the pathway of granting affiliations between banks and other financial services firms within the 
holding company structure.  In March 1987, the Fed ruled that irrespective of whether 
commercial paper was actually a security, holding company subsidiaries could deal and 
underwrite such debt provided that the parent companies generated less than five percent of their 
revenue from these activities.  Almost a month later, the FRB announced its “source of strength” 
policy concerning bhcs’ duties to act as sources of revenue for their subsidiary banks when these 
insured depository institutions encountered financial distress.  Thereafter, the Fed employed this 
policy as its chief rationale for granting affiliations between banks and firms engaged in other 
financial services industries.  A week after officially announcing this policy statement, the Board 
approved joint applications from several of the nation’s largest bhcs to engage in limited 
underwriting and dealing in certain prohibited securities, which it referred to as “ineligible 
securities,” provided that the parent companies generate less than five percent of their revenue 
from such activities.  Two weeks afterwards, the FRB approved a similar application from the 
Chase Manhattan Corporation.  In two of his final actions as chairman, Paul Volcker dissented 
from both Board decisions.  Thus, the Federal Reserve was clearly heading in this direction of 
expanding affiliations between banks and other financial service providers before Alan 
Greenspan joined the Board.   
During Chairman Greenspan’s tenure, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
continued down this pathway.  The next major development in this series of regulatory rulings, 
though, did not occur until mid January 1989 when the Board widely extended the list of bank 
ineligible securities activities provided the parent companies stayed below the five percent 
revenue limit.  Nearly nine months afterwards, the Board issued another ruling doubling the 
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revenue limit to ten percent and expanding the category of “bank-eligible securities” to 
encompass securities issued by government sponsored enterprises or rated by industry 
recognized ratings agencies.  The Greenspan Fed eventually raised the revenue limit in 
December 1996 to twenty-five percent, thereby significantly increasing the size of financial 
services firms that could be acquired by holding companies and affiliate with banks.  Two 
months later, the FRB streamlined its review procedures for approving bhc activity applications, 
including shortening the timeline and permitting holding companies to enter certain areas with 
preexisting Board rulings without prior notice.  In September 1998, the Board approved 
Travelers’ acquisition of Citicorp, a merger which had been announced six months earlier, and 
exempted the new corporation from the BHCA’s activity restrictions for its first two years.  
Unless lawmakers finally accomplished reform of the banking statutes, the newly established 
Citigroup would have to divest itself of many of its nonbanking units.  With the exception of the 
FRB’s action streamlining its review process for bhc nonbanking activity applications in 
February 1997, all the other regulatory changes were conducted without any changes in statutory 
authority.83 
Even though the Federal Reserve arguably became the dominant player among the three 
federal banking regulators during the eighties and nineties, the Comptroller of the Currency still 
played a major role in the evolving structure of the banking system.  After all, it was the OCC 
which was perhaps the earliest of the three regulators to employ its statutory powers, especially 
the “incidental” powers clause of the National Bank Act, to expand the list of permissible 
activities and allow national banks to expand into these other lines of business.84  Deriving 
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 When national banks expanded into these other activities, they organized these other lines of business either as 
divisions of the bank itself or as separate operating subsidiaries of the bank. 
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authority from this clause, the Comptroller in late August 1982 was the first federal agency to 
rule that a bank could operate a securities brokerage.  In late February 1985, the OCC invoked 
Garn-St. Germain’s thirty-mile provision to allow a national bank to relocate its main office from 
Independence, Missouri to Overland Park, Kansas, thereby facilitating interstate branching.  The 
OCC also facilitated interstate branching in February 1985 when it drew upon Garn-St. 
Germain’s thirty-mile provision to allow a national bank to cross state lines by relocating its 
main office from Kansas to Missouri.  Drawing its authority on a WWI era statutory revision, the 
Comptroller’s Office ruled in August 1986 that a national bank could sell insurance to its 
customers, but, more importantly, that it could do so to individuals who were not currently 
customers and in locales with populations greater than 5,000.  This ruling marked a significant 
departure from previous approvals of insurance activities, and it presented a means for banks 
wishing to enter this line of business ever since lawmakers had closed the holding company 
route.  Though the OCC continued issuing rulings allowing national banks to expand through the 
remainder of the eighties and nineties, it was not quite able to counter the Federal Reserve’s 
expansions of bank holding companies.    
Given the various crises experienced by the American banking system at the end of the 
twentieth century, federal agencies were by no means the only governmental actors operating in 
the policy realm.  The twentieth century’s final two decades arguably produced the most 
significant amount of banking legislation since the New Deal.  Unlike the regulators, however, 
federal lawmakers typically responded to crises in the system and independent actions of the 
agencies in their statutory work.  DIDMCA, for instance, extended the Fed’s reserve 
requirements authority to all depository institutions, allowed all depository institutions to offer 
transaction accounts, and increased deposit insurance levels to $100,000.  Within two years, 
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federal lawmakers recognized the need for more statutory change and enacted Garn-St. Germain 
which immediately phased out interest rate ceilings, granted thrifts more powers to operate as 
banks, and instituted the thirty-mile rule for national banks.  Five years later with the thrift crisis 
exploding, Washington enacted CEBA to reassure depositors by pledging the federal 
government’s full faith and credit, not to mention closing the nonbank bank loophole by 
redefining what constituted a bank.   
 Because lawmakers failed to stem the bank and thrift crises before President Reagan left 
office, President George H.W. Bush entered the White House facing a worsening banking 
system.  The Bush administration then set out to enact major statutes reforming the banking 
system, but especially reforming the FDIC so that the agency would be better able to resolve the 
bank and thrift failures.  As a result, in President Bush’s first and third years in office, lawmakers 
completed work on FIRREA and FDICIA.  Though the administration sought more far-reaching 
reform and modernization of the nation’s banking system from both measures, it ultimately 
settled for reforms that dealt principally with the FDIC.  Among other things, these statutes 
established another temporary agency to resolve the failed thrifts, altered organization and 
leadership of the FDIC, granted the FDIC more procedures for handling resolutions, imposed 
more procedures when seeking to use the TBTF doctrine, gave the agency more ways to raise 
funds through rate changes on member banks, and allowed for capital requirements.  
Despite these major statutory revisions of the federal system of deposit insurance, 
President Clinton entered office in 1993 facing additional clean-up of the bank and thrift sectors.  
After completing work on these tasks during his first year in office, including legislation 
prohibiting the federal agencies from providing financial assistance to the shareholders of any 
failing depository institution, Washington in 1994 finally accomplished major revision of the 
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nation’s outmoded laws prohibiting interstate banking and branching with the Riegle-Neal Act.  
Following years of regulatory rulings expanding banks’ activities and judicial verdicts upholding 
most of those agency decisions, the Clinton White House and the Republican controlled 
Congress enacted the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.  This legislation basically 
updated the statutory code so that it was in accord with the existing body of regulatory rules; in 
so doing, it marked a partial repeal of Glass-Steagall. Though Gramm-Leach-Bliley contained an 
agreement reached between the OCC and Fed dividing regulatory authority over the banking 
industry’s structure, the Fed appeared to gain an advantage since the largest financial services 
firms were required conduct their activities through the holding company structure.85  The 
Financial Services Modernization Act neither erected additional regulatory agencies nor required 
much, if any, restructuring and redistribution of authority among the various banking and 
financial services regulators. 
Since the onslaught of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, public officials and others in the 
policymaking community frequently blamed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, especially its repeal 
of Glass-Steagall, for creating the environment for free-wheeling financiers.  According to this 
perspective, the United States would have averted the crisis, or at least the brunt of its severity, 
had President Clinton and congressional Republicans not enacted Gramm-Leach-Bliley.  As my 
case shows, however, such a belief could not be further from reality as evidenced by changes to 
the banking statutes, the regulators actions and rulings, and responses to the crisis made possible 
by Financial Services Modernization.  First, much of the Banking Act of 1933 remains, most 
notably the deposit insurance components the coverage limits of which have increased a number 
of times over the last seventy plus years.  Second, statutory reforms of the eighties and nineties 
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repealed other major aspects of the Banking Act including the ceilings on interest rates, 
prohibitions against transaction accounts by nonbank depository institutions, and the branching 
limitations.  Third, in terms of Glass-Steagall’s specific provisions separating commercial and 
investment banking, Gramm-Leach-Bliley only repealed two of the four provisions.  The GLBA 
repealed sections 20 and 32, which prohibited affiliations between banks and securities firms and 
prohibited common directors respectively, but it left section 16 that limited banks’ securities 
activities and section 21 that outlawed securities firms accepting deposits.  Fourth, rather than 
being in the class of social regulation, the Banking Act was quintessentially within the category 
of economic regulation since it focused on the banking system’s safety-and-soundness.  The 
1933 statute would have done nothing to prevent predatory lending or abuses of consumers by 
mortgage lenders. 
Over the course of the last few decades of the twentieth century, the Comptroller of 
Currency and the Federal Reserve revised and replaced many of the rules created under Glass-
Steagall restricting banks to the narrow services of taking deposits and making loans.  Banks 
were able to engage in the brokerage business through subsidiaries or affiliates as of the early 
eighties.  By the middle of the decade, holding company affiliates could be involved in a host of 
different types of securities prohibited to banks themselves.  Around the same time, national 
banks obtained permission to sell insurance products to existing customers and potential 
customers from any of their offices regardless of where the clients were located.  Thus, rather 
than suddenly provide banks with a host of new powers or activities, Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
essentially provided statutory authorizations for a number of the regulatory rules bankers had 
won from the OCC and Fed over the last few decades.   
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Moreover, the Financial Services Modernization Act even facilitated policymakers’ 
responses to the financial crisis.  One such policy option made possible by the 1999 statute 
included greater latitude for regulators in permitting affiliations between banks and other 
nonbank financial services firms.  As President Bill Clinton explained to Maria Bartiromo in an 
October 2008 issue of BusinessWeek,  
[I]t wasn’t a complete deregulation at all.  We still have heavy regulations and 
insurance on bank deposits, requirements on banks for capital and for 
disclosure….Indeed, one of the things that has helped stabilize the current situation as 
much as it has is the purchase of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, which was much 
smoother than it would have been if I hadn’t signed that bill.  (Bartiromo 2008: 19) 
This statutory power proved important for several of the Federal Reserve’s decisions during the 
crisis permitting acquisitions of major financial services companies by existing bank holding 
companies or making it much easier to approve conversions of firms to holding companies under 
the Fed’s supervision. 
 Having shown that Gramm-Leach-Bliley and its “repeal” of Glass-Steagall did not cause 
the financial crisis, it is valuable to apply my explanation of bank regulation’s evolution to the 
regulatory environment after Dodd-Frank’s enactment.  After all, it is my dissertation’s 
contention that the interplay of the actors in the policymaking process can explain a great deal 
about the regulation to emerge from it.  For our purposes, however, I will focus on three of them. 
First, lawmakers in Dodd-Frank stripped the regulatory agencies of their consumer 
protection responsibilities and established a new agency to monitor these items instead.  This 
new regulatory agency was largely the intellectual progeny of the bankruptcy scholar Elizabeth 
Warren.  She viewed the recent financial crisis as resulting from unscrupulous lenders taking 
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advantage of consumers on mortgages and other extensions of credit and wanted to create 
another agency modeled after the Consumer Product Safety Commission to prevent this 
behavior.  The result of Warren’s lobbying efforts was the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB).  The CFPB was situated within the Federal Reserve and received its funding 
from the revenue generated by the Fed in conducting its monetary and regulatory activities.  
Supporters of the agency hoped to protect it against de-funding efforts by future Congresses.   
Establishing the CFPB with its own unique consumer protection mission necessarily adds 
further complexity and interdependencies to the existing regulatory structure, yet locating it 
within the Fed complicates matters even more.  The Fed previously had consumer protection 
responsibilities over matters such as credit cards and bank holding companies, yet it experienced 
the same consumer protection shortfalls as the other banking regulators.  Unlike other financial 
regulatory agencies, the Fed all ready had multiple responsibilities including regulating the 
money supply, member banks, foreign banks and holding companies.  Unfortunately for the Fed, 
regulating the money supply is vastly different from regulating banks, a task that is concerned 
with safety-and-soundness.  Moreover, Dodd-Frank added new responsibilities to the Federal 
Reserve such as supervising the largest, most complex financial holding companies and serving 
as the systemic risk regulator.  The systemic risk authority, of course, assumes that regulators 
will be able to define clearly what poses a systemic risk, something they have been unable to 
accomplish to date.  Although the Fed had several regulatory failings in the recent crisis, it still 
managed to garner additional roles and responsibilities in the subsequent legislative reforms.  
Given that the Federal Reserve all ready has difficulty resolving differences between its various 
responsibilities, adding a consumer protection component only creates further difficulties and 
potential conflicts.  Likewise, the CFPB’s pro-consumer attitude will necessarily generate 
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conflicts with the other banking regulators as one looks out for consumers whereas the others 
protect the safety of the banking system. 
Second, as deposit insurance coverage limits increase, so too does the federal 
government’s accompanying liability.  Since the financial crisis broke and infected the U.S. 
banking system, federal lawmakers have twice enacted statutes temporarily raising deposit 
insurance coverage.  Washington enacted the first such measure on October 3, 2008 as part of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act; this statute increased coverage to $250,000 through 
December 31, 2009.  Then, on May 20, 2009, as part of the Helping Families Save Their Homes 
Act lawmakers extended the increase through the last day of 2013.  Given the existence of a 
moral hazard problem inherent in the pricing of deposit insurance, though such increases in 
coverage may alleviate potential depositor runs, they impose an enormous cost on the system. 
As the banking system grew and increased in complexity, there occurred certain 
circumstances in which the federal banking regulators determined that it was less costly for the 
government to extend financial assistance than to meet its posted deposit coverage limits.  These 
are the cases in which a failing bank is deemed Too Big to Fail.  Though lawmakers enacted 
several statutory provisions during the eighties and nineties to prevent any future use of the 
doctrine, TBTF reappeared in recent financial crisis as a host of federal banking and financial 
industry regulators met and agreed to offer assistance to some of the nation’s largest banks, 
securities firms, nondepository lenders, and insurance companies.  The Federal Reserve, in fact, 
was one of the worst offenders in the crisis as it extended credit to faltering banks and nonbanks.  
Dodd-Frank, however, neither changes the incentives for large firms to engage in such activities 
that might cause their failure nor does it prohibit the resolution of those failing banks and 
nonbanks.  The legislation requires the creation of a $50 billion fund to cover the resolution of 
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financial services firms deemed TBTF, an act which will surely invite future bailouts and 
corporate welfare.  Moreover, the law creates a financial stability council and expands the 
decision-making group to encompass other governmental officials such as those from the 
Treasury Department.  The inclusion of additional personnel in this decision-making process will 
surely create more opportunities for interested parties wishing to lobby the government and 
prevent the formulation of clear rules of operation. 
Third, as President Clinton’s response to BusinessWeek indicated, the Federal Reserve 
approved applications from the largest bank holding companies to acquire major nonbank 
financial services companies.  Applications within this category included JPMorgan Chase’s 
acquisition of Bear Stearns, Bank of America’s acquisition of Countrywide Financial 
Corporation, Wells Fargo and Company’s acquisition of Wachovia Corporation, and BofA’s 
acquisition of Merrill Lynch.86  The former president’s statement, however, failed to note the 
more important development that occurred during the crisis as the Fed approved applications 
from nonbank financial services companies to convert to bank or financial holding companies.  
Requests and approvals for such conversions included American Express, Discover Financial 
Services, CIT Group, and GMAC.   
For the purposes of Wall Street and the securities industry, requests by Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley to convert from investment banks to bank holding companies were the most 
significant.  The FRB hurriedly approved these requests on the evening of Sunday, September 
21, 2008.87  The Federal Reserve’s decisions on these two cases led financial journalists to 
                                                 
86
 At the time of the crisis, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were two of the five large investment banks 
headquartered on Wall Street.  The FRB formally approved the sale of Bear Stearns on April 1, 2008 whereas it 
formally approved the sale of Merrill November 26, 2008.   
87
 That same weekend, federal banking and securities regulators failed to find a merger partner or white knight for 
the beleaguered investment bank Lehman Brothers.  As a result, Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail and begin the 
bankruptcy process the following day. 
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remark memorably, albeit incorrectly, “The steps effectively mark the end of Wall Street as it’s 
been known for decades” (Hilsenrath, Paletta, & Lucchetti 2008)(Italics added).  The weekend’s 
events, which saw the conversion of two of the three major remaining investment banks and the 
failure of the third one, however, were not the end of Wall Street, for Goldman, Morgan Stanley, 
and Merrill Lynch continued to exist, but they did so subsumed within the bank holding 
company structure.  More importantly, these acquisitions and conversions altered the balance of 
power among the federal regulatory agencies.  By approving these actions which gave the 
nonbanks access to the discount window and the steadier funding source of insured deposits, the 
Federal Reserve completely perverted its “source of strength” doctrine.  Needless to say, neither 
Dodd-Frank nor other proposed legislative reforms addressed this doctrine or the dangers it 
poses to the entire banking system. 
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